Relativism and rationality in theories of natural law and natural rights, in Marx, and in contemporary philosophy by Girvan, Paul Francis
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY









All those accessing thesis content in Queen’s University Belfast Research Portal are subject to the following terms and conditions of use
            • Copyright is subject to the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, or as modified by any successor legislation
            • Copyright and moral rights for thesis content are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
            • A copy of a thesis may be downloaded for personal non-commercial research/study without the need for permission or charge
            • Distribution or reproduction of thesis content in any format is not permitted without the permission of the copyright holder
            • When citing this work, full bibliographic details should be supplied, including the author, title, awarding institution and date of thesis
Take down policy
A thesis can be removed from the Research Portal if there has been a breach of copyright, or a similarly robust reason.
If you believe this document breaches copyright, or there is sufficient cause to take down, please contact us, citing details. Email:
openaccess@qub.ac.uk
Supplementary materials
Where possible, we endeavour to provide supplementary materials to theses. This may include video, audio and other types of files. We
endeavour to capture all content and upload as part of the Pure record for each thesis.
Note, it may not be possible in all instances to convert analogue formats to usable digital formats for some supplementary materials. We
exercise best efforts on our behalf and, in such instances, encourage the individual to consult the physical thesis for further information.
Download date: 16. Sep. 2019
Relativism and Rationality 
Theories of Natural Law and Natural Rights,
in Marx,
and in Contemporary Philosophy.
by
Paul Francis Girvan, B.A., M.A.
Presented for the Degree of Ph.D.






1.1 Aim of the Thesis...... Page 1
1.2 Refutation of Relativism As a Theory...... Page 9
Chapter 2. The Ancient and Mediaeval Natural Law Tradition
2.1 The Undialectical Approach: The Sophists...... Page 18
2.2 The Dialectical Approach: Plato, The Unity of Morals, Politics and 
Economics... .. Page 25
2.3 Aristotle and the Oikos: Ancient Economy...... Page 39
2.4 Natural Law.......Page 46
2.5 Mediaeval Economy...... Page 57
Chapter 3. Modern Natural Rights As Opposed to Natural Law
3.1 Hobbes and the English Tradition: Natural Rights As Negative Freedom.......Page 62
3.2 The State As the Sole Source of Law: Law As Command or Will.......Page 71
3.3 Bourgeois Psychology and "Morality"...... Page 74
3.4 German Idealism: The Failed Dialectic...... Page 81
Chapter 4. Marx: Return from Egoistic Natural Rights to Communal Natural Law
4.1 Marx: Universalist Rationality...... Page 90
4.2 Communism As Humanism...... Page 100
4.3 Marx and the Capitalist Economy...... Page 120
4.4 Alienation: Background and Roots in Marx...... Page 134
4.5 Contradictions of Capitalism as Culmination of Alienation...... Page 142
4.6 Marx and Justice... .. ..Page 148
4.7 Marx: Freedom (Positive and Negative) and "The Rights of Man"...... Page 155
Chapter 5. The Particular and the Universal: Relativism and Rationality in 
Existentialism and Contemporary Philosophy
5.1 Existentialism...... Page 165
5.2 Sartre: From Relativism to Rationality?...... Page 169
5.3 Rawls: Freedom & Justice the Same Thing, i.e. the Market.......Page 174
5.4 Raz's "Personal Autonomy" As an Answer to the Question of Perfectionism Versus 
Anti-Perfectionism... ...Page 180
5.5 Charles Taylor and Authenticity...... Page 187
5.6 Bhaskar: Realism Includes Acknowledging Relativity...... Page 193
Endnotes.......Page 199
Bibliography...... Page 212
Relativism and Rationality in Theories of Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, in Marx and in Contemporary
Philosophy.
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Aim of the Thesis
My aim in this thesis is to make a beginning towards a holistic understanding 
of the relativism which is so pervasive and dominant in our culture. 
Relativism can be dealt with easily at a theoretical level, but its refutation at 
the intellectual level does not seem to loosen its hold on what can only be 
called the imagination — for a consistent relativism is only a fantasy. Its 
hold is evidenced in the form of soft relativism, found for instance in the 
common sayings “There are no experts in values”, “You can't get from is to 
ought”, and “Objectivism is totalitarian”. I aim to show that that is because 
value relativism is motivated by a social bias. I believe that my approach is 
consistent with that of Marx, but it is not a base/superstructure determinist or 
even a causal version of historical materialism; rather a traditional rational 
critique of certain key philosophical positions, with a hermeneutic of their 
consistency with the possibilities of practice of certain classes. My approach 
to the problem is through the concepts of the universal and the particular. I 
would argue that the best statement of the problem is that there is a conflict 
between relativism and — not objectivism, or absolutism but — universalism.
Value relativism is a reductionist scepticism about the human capacity for
i
rational knowledge of values, of the good for human beings, the right, the 
due, the proper, the decent and the virtuous, arising from the capacity for 
universality of the intellect, a central tenet of European philosophy which 
was corroded by modernity's “suspicion”1. It is essentially the replacement 
of morality by expediency; scepticism and relativism essentially rely on 
reductionism. Value relativism is a reduction of values to the particularity of 
the manifold conflicting non-rational feelings of atomic individuals (in 
Hobbes’s words “Whatsoever any man desires, that is it which he for his part 
calleth good”). These are reified by utilitarians, mainly as putative 
sensations of pleasure which are identified, in a usurping move, with 
happiness, which had previously referred to an orientation of the will to total 
good. This reduction is akin to Hobbes's reduction of the heights and depths
• • *3of love to one-dimensional desire.
The putative opposite, sensations of pain, are nowadays dignified by the 
term “suffering”, the amelioration of which can be seen as a negative 
statement of a deontological aim of utilitarianism and as a self-evident 
supreme good; this is part of the inconsistency of the cosmetic approach to 
Benthamism which has gone on since John Stuart Mill produced a mixture, 
and not a compound, of the empiricism of Bentham and the German idealism 
of Coleridge.4
The Stoics had divided the good into the bonum delectabile, bonum utile, 
and bonum honestum, the pleasant, the useful and the honourable; the last 
means that which is worthy of honour, the right, that which is in accordance 
with right reason. Arguments for the good in that sense necessarily appeal to 
reason and claim universality. Bargaining about pleasures, on the contrary,
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as in the Sophistic convention and the Hobbesian, Lockean and Rawlsian 
social contracts, produces results which cannot claim to be universally good 
or valid, but only expedient, since they are relative to the likes and dislikes 
of the participants, and more especially to their relative bargaining power, 
which is another nonrational factor. (This is as true of Bentham's market as 
of Locke's state).
I follow Plato in calling his idea of philosophy, which is the antithesis of 
sophism, dialectical. He saw it as universalist, both in that it treats universals 
as forms, ideas, essences or natures, and in that it organises such essences in 
a unity-in-difference (a “both/and”) within a hierarchical universality or 
totality, a system which reconciles differences in a higher synthesis. The 
prime example would be the dialectic of Eros in the Symposium. There Plato 
shows that the fulfilment of love as the natural desire for the finite beautiful 
for oneself the satisfaction of need, is found paradoxically in the ascent to 
what may seem -- for an analytic “either/or” approach, for which “everything 
is what it is, and not another thing” — to be its opposite, outgoing procreative 
love. That love — the achievement of unselfish devotion to absolute beauty 
(which is also goodness and truth) for its own sake — though higher than 
love as desire, is equally natural, and satisfies a natural need. Getting is 
completed in giving, which includes sharing the vision of truth, beauty and 
goodness through education.3 In the Republic Plato's theme is that 
philosophers would have to govern in the light of another unifying aspect of 
the dialectic: the unity of the good and the right, happiness and the virtues, 
the real and the ideal, the "is" and the "ought". To philosophers in the 
bourgeois era, from Hobbes to Dworkin today, these present themselves as 
binary opposites, and as the sources of irresolvable conflicts.
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I argue that Marx is far from being a "master of suspicion"6 in the 
(colloquially speaking) cynical bourgeois relativist tradition of modernity. 
In fact there is a close connection between Marx's idea of universality and 
Plato's. For Marx, "man is a universal and therefore free being";7 man 
"produces according to the standards of every species...hence man also 
produces in accordance with the laws of beauty". Proletarian revolution 
would bring about what Marx calls "the realisation of philosophy";9 loving 
production by the "universal class"10 for physical and spiritual needs, for the 
development of the potentialities for good of the entire human race.
In pursuit of an understanding of the current social attractiveness of 
relativism and of the widespread scepticism about reason and universality, I 
aim to show that there is a profound connection between, on the one hand, 
the reduction of the universal ontological and moral good to the particular 
pleasant or useful expedient, which is characteristic of value relativism, and 
on the other the theory of “mere nature” and of reason as instrumental to 
pleasure. This is found not only in the Sophists but equally in the possessive 
individualist theories of natural rights as negative freedom. The last are thus 
like the Sophistic convention theory the antithesis of traditional theories of 
natural law as positive freedom. These natural rights theories are seen, by the 
bourgeois apologists for private property in the means of production, as 
economic rationality — conforming to a scientific grasp of "natural" 
economic laws such as those of supply and demand — on the part of a 
postulated "natural" a-social, pre-social and anti-social "Man". In a Lockean 
version of the self-serving bourgeois divorce between the economic and the 
political," natural man only then enters — like Rawls's egoistic individual in
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the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, but prepared to be 
subjected to the laws of economics — into a Sophistic political convention, 
with the self-serving utilitarian aim of protecting the system of natural 
property rights. In the Hegelian version of the division of the economic and 
the political, the a-social “Man” of "abstract right" transcends the self­
interestedness of the (particularist) antagonistic natural base of civil society 
by rising idealistically to the level of political service of the state (the 
"ethical", the "universal").
I argue that there is on the opposite side of the spectrum a similar profound 
connection between on the one hand the theory of the dialectical universality 
of the intellect, and on the other the theory that the natural and rational 
orientation of a unified and unifying moral, economic and political thought 
and practice is towards a natural law theory of the common good; and, 
moreover, that such a natural law theory involves at base an acceptance of 
common ownership of resources — which may be diffused, as in Aristotle, 
but only according to distributive justice — such as is found both in the pre­
bourgeois dialectical tradition and in the post-bourgeois return to it; in Plato, 
Aristotle and Aquinas, and also in Marx.
I aim to show that the Platonic/Aristotelian teleological and communal 
approach to human nature, and the corresponding essentialist and 
universalist approach to reason, is essentially irreconcilable with the 
bourgeois mechanistic and asocial approach to human nature and the 
nominalist, empiricist, utilitarian and therefore value relativist approach to 
reason. This is as true today as in fifth century Athens, so that attempts by 
Rousseau, Hegel, Mill and the later Sartre to reconcile these positions must
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fail. Marx's concepts of nature and reason, however, lie wholly within the 
first approach, and can therefore be the basis for its fulfilment.
I claim that Marx's criticism of Hegel's divorce of particularist civil society 
and universalist state was a repudiation, as alienation, of Hegel's acceptance, 
through Rousseau and Kant, of the Sophistic, Hobbesian and Lockean idea 
of nature which led to the divorce of the economic (as "natural") and the 
political (as "social"). I also argue that Marx's rejection of modern — 
possessive individualist — rights was only the obverse of his Aristotelian 
return to traditional natural law. There the rights of the zoon who is naturally 
politicon (and, one could add, economicon) are derived from the justice of 
the mutually loving members of a community which is dedicated to the 
physical and spiritual well-being of each and all.
It could be said that my approach to my task is unorthodox; I would suggest 
that that is because it is exploratory and tentative. It could be said in 
particular that I am using the terms "dialectical" and "relativist" in an 
idiosyncratic way. That is partly due to the novelty, the difficulty, and the 
breadth of the terrain; partly also to my essentialist approach to the problem 
of rationality and relativism itself. This leads to an either/or approach to the 
problem, which again requires the difficult search for two appropriate 
disjunctive terms. This is a problem on which light may be shed by further 
development and debate on my thesis. It should be noted that I do not see a 
conflict between my earlier rejection of the disjunctive stance of an 
exclusively analytic either/or approach, where a holistic approach is required 
for a broad and deep understanding, and my present insistence on the mutual 
exclusiveness of two positions which are irreconcilable because the assertion
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of both would contravene the law of non-contradiction.
To give an example of essentialist thinking, I would argue, along with 
d'Entreves “ and Rommen, that the essence of the traditional natural law 
approach is a view of reason and nature which allows the possibility of 
rational knowledge of what is good for the human being, what furthers its 
telos\ its telos is communal as well as individual, and involves what Marx 
called "the ensemble of human relations" (Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach).'4 The 
main point of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach is that a truly human society 
requires the communal, loving unity of this ensemble of human relations. 
Instead it is divided up by bourgeois society into antagonistic spheres, the 
economic ("natural"), the political ("social") and the individualistic "moral" 
("Cousin Morality"). This is done in order to prevent moral or political 
interference with the rights of property-owners (including ironically owners 
of that liability, rather than an asset, labour power) in a laissez-faire capitalist 
economy.
Any positive ordinance of this ensemble — and I would add any structuring 
of these relationships -- can be criticised by individuals, groups or the 
community as a whole in the light of right reason (objective right). The 
subjective legal rights of individuals, groups and the community as a whole 
derive from law, which in turn derives from objective right. (This is contrary 
to the theory of Hobbes, according to which natural rights and positive laws 
are essentially antagonistic, being natural freedom and social constraint). 
But although in the older tradition natural rights and positive law are not 
radically separated or in conflict, nevertheless there are, independent of 
statute rights, many moral rights proper to a human being, including the right
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(subject to the judgment of prudence) to disobey unjust law, and the right 
and duty to disobey a law which commands acts contrary to the natural law, 
such as murder.15
Given my view of the essence of natural law, I cannot accept that any social 
contract theory is a natural law theory, even if a proponent such as Rawls 
maintains that it is, on the grounds of his disjunction between natural law 
and mainstream utilitarianism. On the contrary, I think the social contract 
theory is manifestly a return to the Sophistic relativist "wholly other" 
alternative to the natural law theory, which sees all laws as relative to 
bargaining power about conflicting arbitrary pleasures; or, in Rousseau's 
case, the socialisation of the asocial "natural" human being, followed by a 
degeneration into the tyrannical, due to a post-social institution of private 
property.16
All modern (bourgeois) moralities — whether social contract or utilitarian — 
are tainted by the Sophistic concept of asocial human nature, and most by a 
hedonistic instrumentalist concept of reason. They are to that extent 
particularistic and relativist — in different ways and degrees — whatever their 
authors' claims. They are all to that extent alienated, including Kant's retreat 
to the empty and abstract legalist form of universality, with its logicist test of 
non-self-contradiction, in an attempt to rescue some form of universality 
from the particularity of asocial nature. Redemption from such alienation 
can only come about through a return to the basic dialectical principles of the 
traditional natural law, as fulfilled in Marx's humanism.
In the last chapter I look briefly at existentialism and at some contemporary
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philosophers chosen as illustrations of the problem of the universal and the 
particular.
1.2 Refutation of Relativism As a Theory
In the light of what I have said in my introduction, and of the nature of my 
proposals for a contribution to an understanding of relativism, I do not 
believe much time needs to be spent in discussing the pure theory of 
relativism, which I believe, like denial of the principle of non-contradiction, 
reduces all discussion to nonsense. But relativism turns up in many guises. 
Generally, we can distinguish cognitive relativism, which is about all kinds 
of knowledge, from moral relativism, which is about matters of value. 
Protagoras’s position for instance is one of thoroughgoing cognitive 
relativism.17 Cognitive relativism is not as popular as a weaker kind, moral, 
value or cultural relativism; it is popularly thought that there is little or no 
disagreement about “facts”, but widespread and total disagreement about 
“values”. Such relativism is often explicitly connected to an “interest” 
theory, the reductionist theory that values are merely hypocritical 
expressions of the desire for pleasure and power. It often takes the form of 
historicism, or of a stagist understanding of “historical materialism”, on the 
strength of which Marx is often misunderstood as a value relativist.
One modern form of cognitive relativism is linguistic relativism, the theory 
that truth is created by the grammar and semantic system of particular 
languages. Wittgenstein calls these relative systems of values “forms of life”, 
and the rules established by a particular language a game, that we play as we 
speak the language; as we play a language game, we take part in a certain 
“form of life.” But his theory cannot avoid a self-referential inconsistency,
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for the nature of language would clearly be part of the structure of the world 
that is supposedly created by the structure of language. Wittgenstein’s 
theory is merely a theory about the nature of language, and as such it is the 
creation of his own language game. By his own principles, we can play a 
language game in which the world has an independent structure; then, our 
realism of will be just as valid as Wittgenstein’s constructivism. After all 
Nazis and the Orange Order (Ireland’s K.K.K.) have their own “forms of 
life”; how then can they be judged better or worse than others?
Once again, like every kind of relativism, Wittgenstein’s theory cannot 
protect itself from its self-referential contradiction. Nor can the theory 
escape the inconsistency of claiming for itself the very value — objective 
truth — that it rejects. This idea also appears in an idealist form, for instance 
in the linguistic theory of Benjamin Lee Whorf.19 According to Whorf the 
world has no structure of its own; its structure is entirely imposed by 
language. This means that learning a different language creates a new and 
different world, where everything can be completely different from the 
world we knew before. Whorf s theory has been challenged by Noam 
Chomsky. Chomsky argues that there are “linguistic universals”, i.e. 
structures that are common to all languages." This means that even if 
language creates reality, reality is going to contain certain universal 
constants.
We can also see this happen in an important modern form of moral 
relativism, namely cultural relativism: the theory that a culture could 
institute pretty much any system of values and that no culture can claim 
access to any absolute system of values. Cultural relativism is based on the
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undoubted truth that human cultures are very different from each other and 
often embody very different values. The anthropological empirical evidence 
that cultures are different is usually regarded as the strongest support for 
cultural relativism, and so for moral relativism.
There are several things wrong with this. Firstly, even if we accept that 
cultures can have some very different values, this still doesn’t prove cultural 
relativism: for while with cultural relativists we must recognise that some 
constellations and detailed embodiments of values are relative to a particular 
culture, value realism merely needs to point out that not all values are 
relative to a particular culture, i.e. that some values are cultural universals. If 
there is even one value that is common to all those cultures, such as that the 
innocent should not be killed, or that people should not deceive one another, 
cultural relativism is refuted. “Scientific evidence” can be subjective and it is 
too easy to draw sweeping conclusions. If an anthropological study sets out 
to prove a fundamental claim about the nature of value, we must be careful 
about whether the claim is an empirical one, and about how far difference in 
values can be argued for.
However, the real problem with cultural relativism and anthropology’s 
support for it is brought out when we consider the normative question of 
what ought to be. As a methodological principle anthropology is supposed 
to describe what a culture is like, and it really doesn’t fit in with that purpose 
to spend any time judging the culture or trying to change it. Those jobs can 
be left to other people. The anthropologist just does the description and then 
moves on to the next culture, all for the sake of scientific knowledge. 
However can, it is not possible for a human being as such to be so uncritical.
More importantly, cultural relativism gets transformed from a 
methodological principle for a scientific discipline into a philosophical and 
moral principle that is supposed to be universally binding: that since all 
values are specific to a given culture, nobody has the right to impose the 
values from their culture on to any other culture or to tell any culture that 
their traditional values should be different.
However, with such a moral principle, we have the familiar problem of self- 
referential consistency: as a moral value, from what culture does cultural 
relativism come? And as a way of telling people how to treat cultures, does 
not cultural relativism actually impose alien values on traditional cultures? 
The answer to the first question, of course, is that cultural relativism is 
initially the value of European and American anthropologists, or Western 
cultural relativists in general. The answer to the second question is that 
virtually all traditional cultures do not espouse anything like cultural 
relativism. The Greeks actually gave us the value- and theory-laden word 
“barbarians,” which was freely used by the Romans and which we use to 
translate comparable terms in Chinese, Japanese, etc. Traditional cultures 
tend to regard themselves evaluatively as “the people,” the “real people,” or 
the “human beings,” while everyone else is wicked, miserable, treacherous, 
sub-human, etc. The result of this is that if we want to establish a moral 
principle to respect the values of other cultures, we cannot do so on the basis 
of cultural relativism; for our own principle would then mean that we cannot 
respect all the values of other cultures.
On the other hand, we might try to save cultural relativism by denying that it
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is a moral principle. Of course, if so, there wouldn’t be anything wrong with 
one culture conquering and exterminating another, especially since that has 
actually been the traditional practice of countless cultures during the ages. 
However the principle of cultural relativism rarely enters public debate 
without being used as a moral principle to forbid someone from altering or 
even from criticizing some or all the values of specific cultures. (This could 
also be a form of complacent isolationism resulting from a sense of 
invulnerability, as is perhaps reflected in the current Star Trek’s “prime 
directive”, a postmodernist laissez-faire in which it differs from the blatant 
imperialism of the earlier Star Trek). As a practical matter, then, it is 
meaningless to try and save cultural relativism by erasing the moral content 
that is usually claimed for it.
Refutations of scepticism and relativism in principle are easy, and are a 
version of the argument for basic logical principles as the inescapable basis 
of thought; they turn on the meaning of negativity. Among the standard 
theoretical objections to relativism is the argument that relativism is self- 
refuting: that relativists cannot consistently hold their position, for to claim 
that truth is relative is to adopt an absolute or non-relative position. It is 
characteristic of all forms of relativism that they wish to preserve for 
themselves the very principles that they seek to deny to others. Thus, 
relativism basically presents itself as a true doctrine, which means that it will 
logically exclude its opposite (objectivism or rationalist realism); but what it 
actually says is that no doctrines can logically exclude their opposites. If the 
claims about value are not supposed to be true, then they cannot exclude 
their opposites. Relativism wants for itself the very thing (objectivity) whose 
existence it denies. Someone who advocates relativism, then, may just have a
problem recognizing how their doctrine applies to themselves. Logically this 
is self-referential inconsistency; you are inconsistent when it comes to 
considering what you are actually doing. It is a case of wanting to have your 
cake and eat it.
Another similar argument is that the relativist attempt to deny universals and 
essences presupposes what it is denying: the relativists claim that there is no 
such thing as an essence, but the fact that they are prepared to discuss the 
essence of their position is a performative contradiction of their theory.
Thus, relativism when universalised is self-defeating. But intellectual 
refutation is not effective in dealing with relativism as a social phenomenon, 
especially in diluted forms, such as what is called soft relativism (e.g. “There 
are no experts in values”). The arguments against relativism may seem 
conclusive, but there is a penumbra of unspoken assumptions and arguments 
(accounts of reason and philosophical method, of nature and of human 
nature) which are held to bolster the relativist position, and which do not 
seem to be affected by the head-on refutation of a statement of it as an 
isolated generalised thesis.
Effective consideration of the problem of relativism therefore requires 
looking at the cluster of social, political and economic positions which are 
typically espoused by adherents of relativism and scepticism about 
rationality, and by their opponents. Authentically human reasoning is 
dialectical and seeks the universal; the one, the good, infinity, openness, 
justification, positive freedom, emancipation, common ownership and love. 
This is the basis of the natural law tradition. Alienated relativism on the
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contrary is biologistic or mechanistic, and seeks the particular; the many, 
pleasure, the finite, closure, causal explanation, negative freedom, 
oppression, and the war of all against all for private property. This is the 
basis of the Sophist convention theory, as well as of Hobbes.
A reply to relativism thus requires looking not only at the intellectual but 
also at the social, political and economic contexts in which relativism arises, 
and in which it has theoretical and practical ramifications. It therefore seems 
important to look in the first place at the political and economic implications 
of its classical statement by the sophists, and of Plato’s dialectical reply, 
which founded the natural law tradition. But it is especially necessary to look 
at the significant echoes of these positions in renaissance and Anglo-French 
enlightenment reductionism and scepticism, connected to the Cartesian and 
Kantian dichotomies. The dialectical and natural law tradition combats 
relativism, whereas the modem rights approach of the Hobbesian social 
contract theory is relativist, as are utilitarianism and Nietzschean amoralism, 
with its postmodern variants. They have concepts of reason, nature, and 
value antithetical to those of the natural law tradition. These lead to moral, 
political and economic positions which justify conflict, which favour 
dominating and exploiting classes, and which therefore dominated and 
exploited classes embrace hopefully, but at their peril.
The modem dialectical reply to such value relativism is found in the survival 
of the natural law tradition, in neo-Platonism, in Rousseauan romanticism 
and German idealism. It includes Marx’s Aristotelian and Feuerbachian 
dialogical (I-Thou) humanism, which belongs to the natural law tradition. 
Marx has long been interpreted as sharing the modem relativism found in
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positivism, but his Aristotelian ontology is totally opposed to both positivism 
and relativism. Marx is critical of the “Robinsonades” whose abstract view 
of human nature was that of individuals isolated from society, to whom all 
values are relative, the good being reducible to their pleasure. That view is 
not reason, and an attack on it should not be seen as an attack on reason, but 
rather on irrationalism. The same is true of some forms of attack on the 
theory of the idealist Cogito, including on its Hegelian form, even in spite of 
Hegel’s concessions to the historical and social embodiment of mind.
The essence of the conflict between relativism and a universalism based on 
rationality is the opposition between (1) undialectical reductionism of all 
universalist claims except its own to the abstract category of the particular 
pleasure- and power-seeking of the a-social, pre-social and anti-social 
individual (the bourgeois “atom”), and (2) dialectical ascent to the concrete 
category of the universal. Hegel’s secularist solution lies in the reconciliation 
of private property and the state, Kierkegaard’s religious one in the self­
making of the Socratic but a-social “individual”. The best solution lies in 
Marx’s application of Hegel’s concept of the universal class (in Hegel's 
theory the bureaucracy, as servant of the universal, the ethical, the state) to 
the proletariat, as the class which does not require to exploit any other class, 
and hence can unite humanity. A proper understanding of that concept may 
also help to answer the problems raised by the contemporary conflicts 
between the particular and the universal evidenced in “communitarianism”, 
the “new social movements”, “identity politics”, and postmodern concerns 
about closed totalities.
In principle that solution would be a refutation of the concept of nature as
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mechanical, and of reason as instrumental, and the restoration of a concept of 
reason as spiritual, that is, totalising but infinite and open-ended. It would 
recognise that while it is true that all justifiable social movements of 
liberation from oppression express parts, but none of them the whole, of the 
demands of reason as justice, there is an important truth in Marx's insight 
that production for physical need is basic, that class is a reality, and (while 
recognising the importance of Marx’s hopes for Russian agrarian 
communism) that the working-class as the class of direct producers is now 
the only one which could bring about that unification of the human race in a 
system of production for need which is necessary to ward off disaster. It is 
not a question of the “primacy” of one demand over another, e.g., in Ireland 
of the much asserted primacy of the class over the national question; rather 
of, to quote Lukacs, “the primacy of the category of totality” (of holistic 
universality, or dialectics) — which in such a case would see the 
interrelationship of both in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle. 
The rational approach is not abstract; thus “nation” is an abstract universal, 
like “labour” in Marx’s 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse, which he 
momentously replaced with the concrete concept of the commodity labour 
power. “Nation” must be similarly concretised as “oppressor nation” or 
“oppressed nation”.
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Chapter 2. The Ancient and Mediaeval Natural Law 
Tradition.
2.1 The Undialectical Approach: The Sophists.
The first clear statement of relativism comes with the Sophist Protagoras, as 
quoted by Plato, “The way things appear to me, in that way they exist for 
me; and the way things appears to you, in that way they exist for you”. 
Thus, however I see things, that is actually true — for me. If you see things 
differently, then that is true — for you. There is no separate or objective 
truth apart from how each individual happens to see things. Consequently, 
Protagoras says that there is no such thing as falsehood. Also, there is no 
reason why I should tell anybody else what 1 believe, since it is then none of 
my business to influence their beliefs. Relativism thus has the strange logical 
property of not being able to deny the truth of its own contradiction because, 
if Protagoras says that there is no falsehood, he cannot say that the opposite 
of his own doctrine is false.
Unfortunately for Protagoras this would make his own profession 
meaningless, since his aim is to teach people how to persuade others of their 
own beliefs. It would be a contradiction to tell others that what they believe 
is just as true as what you say, but that they should nevertheless accept what 
you say. So Protagoras qualified his doctrine: while whatever anyone 
believes is true, things that some people believe may be better than what 
others believe. Protagoras wants to have it both ways, i.e. that there is no
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falsehood except what he says is false -- and that is the typical dilemma of 
relativism.
Protagoras’s way out, that his view must be “better”, doesn’t make any sense 
either: one must ask, better than what? Than opposing views? But there are 
no opposing views, by relativism’s own principle. Saying that one thing is 
“better” than another is always going to involve some claim about what is 
actually good, desirable, worthy, beneficial, etc., but no such claims make 
any sense unless we give a rational basis about why they are so.
Plato thought that such a qualification reveals the inconsistency of the whole 
doctrine. His basic argument against relativism is the following: if things 
exist in the way they appear to me, if anything that appears to me is true; 
then it must be true that Protagoras’s doctrine is false, if I say it.
Although Protagoras gives us a principle of cognitive relativism, his own 
main interest was for its consequences in matters of value: that truths of right 
and wrong, good and evil, and the beautiful and the ugly, are relative. This is 
value or moral relativism. It may seem a more plausible theory than general 
cognitive relativism. It is popularly believed that people disagree much more 
about matters of value than they do about matters of fact. And if we are 
talking about something like justice or goodness, it is much more difficult 
even to say what we are talking about than it is when we are talking about 
things like tables and chairs. We can point to the tables and chairs and 
assume that other people can know them, but we have a much tougher time 
pointing to justice and goodness. Nevertheless, moral relativism suffers 
from the same kinds of self-referential paradoxes as cognitive relativism.
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• 22 • •Protagoras like all the Sophists maintained that the laws are a convention; 
they are invented not discovered, and their only purpose is to serve 
individuals’ interests in terms of life, health, pleasure, wealth etc., which are 
seen as the only genuine values of human nature. Their relativism as 
understood by Plato, took the form of the question why I should be moral. 
The answer, in terms of the connection between reason (“why...?”) and 
morality took Plato twelve books of the Republic to answer. It required 
understanding the nature of reason, of nature as a whole, of human nature, 
and of the relation between them. Their statement of the problem also 
highlighted the importance of the egoistic individual (“I”) in creating the 
problem in the first place. It posed the problem in terms of a conflict of 
particular wills, of desire and power. Its impossible aim was to answer the 
question without acknowledging any community of universal binding 
rationality.
The question “Why should I be moral?” could be a genuinely rational one, in 
which case there would be no problem of relativism implied. What would be 
sought is an understanding of morality, reason and nature. This is already to 
adopt a rational and moral position, and only leaves the problem of justifying 
one set of goods, values and ideals over another, in particular circumstances 
— cultural and historical — where debate is indeed healthy for reason itself.
If, however, the question is, like the sophists’, a rhetorical one posed in bad 
faith, expecting any answer to fail inevitably, then it is really an expression 
of will, not of reason. In this interpretation its truculence would express the 
belief that in this particular case “reason” is only a camouflage for power,
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and “right” really only might. It would be frankly antagonistic and 
aggressive, prejudging the opponent as being equally wilful and as giving 
only pseudo-reasons, in bad faith towards the questioner — and/ or towards 
him/herself. This belief (possibly true in any given case, since interlocutors 
differ) instead of being defended by arguments appropriate to the situation, 
which is a difficult exercise, is facilely generalised to cover all claims to 
rationality. Even that belief might conceivably be contingently true, but 
each claim would have to be examined in its own right. The conceptual 
believe difference between reason and will (in this sense) is clear, and a 
genuine universal rationality uncontaminated by particular will is logically 
possible, however difficult and rare it may be. If that is denied, then the 
proposition expressing the denial is itself a case of will, not reason. That is 
reductionist.
In any case, for undialectical thinkers such as the sophists, the concept of 
nature is reductionist. It is contrasted with art (technology) as the mere, 
crude given which requires shaping to human ends. Reasoning is always 
purely instrumental - to secure one’s own selfish ends or wants. Modem 
nominalism (Ockham) and positivism in epistemology and ontology are 
remarkably similar to the outlook of the sophists, particularly their 
instrumental view of reason. In both cases thought or thinking are only finite 
parts of being; thoughts or systems of thought are merely particular things 
caused by spatio-temporal events including subjective desires and passions.
For such undialectical thinkers, reality is a sum of atomic entities, infinity is 
mere endless multiplicity, and value is a relation of subjective (relative) 
desire between one finite thing and another. The unity sought by sophistic
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reductionism is relativist disunity. It is the opposite of the unity sought by 
dialectical reason, because it reduces all explanation and understanding to a 
single principle e.g. pleasure, will (command, force, positive law etc.), and 
takes a partial and distorted particular view of human nature, for example as 
a closed mechanism instead of as a rational (spiritual) developing organism.
The dialectical and the undialectical approaches are antithetical in their 
ontology and their epistemology, their view of nature and of reason. Each of 
these approaches must regard the other as unrealistic and irrational. The 
sophists reject any concept of essence, Idea or Form and they also reject any 
notion of transcendence. For them, humans could not possibly transcend 
their finite, given nature, in order to reach, strive for, or realise (actualise) 
our essence. The sophists’ reductionist account of human nature rejects any 
possibility for us to develop our latent potentials so that we may become 
more truly what we should and can be. Rather they insist that human nature 
is totally and unchangeably as they claim we find it; but they only look at 
human behaviour in selected particular situations and circumstances, 
especially of conflict of wills over pleasure, property, money and power. 
Thus humans are seen as unable to change or develop themselves or others 
by participating in or imitating an Ideal or essence. This model of human 
nature encourages selfishness and aggression by claiming that those 
characteristics are a permanent, unchangeable (“eternal”) fact about humans. 
The sophists thus break up the dialectical, hierarchical view of the ideal 
unity of all things, by infinitising and absolutising a finite state of affairs. In 
so doing they limit, stunt and thwart our whole being by closing off the 
possibility of transcendence or true being — the unique human capacity for 
reaching beyond the particular, and actualising or realising the universal.
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The class basis of moral relativism in the ancient world is brilliantly captured 
by Plato in portraits of three differing interpreters of morality as sophistic 
convention. The upper-class Callicles in the Gorgias, the vitalist leader of 
the pack, believes that justice (morality) is a conspiracy of the weak invented 
to clip the wings of the stronger, who according to natural justice should 
rule. His vitalist immoralism, like that of Nietzsche24 (a source for right wing 
anarchism) contrasts with the middle class (“petty bourgeois”) calculating 
crude materialism which Glaucon, Plato’s brother, presents (as a devil’s 
advocate). In this version justice is seen by each individual as an insurance 
policy which is the best bet to produce the greatest amount of pleasure for 
him or herself. Glaucon’s version, like Hobbes’s, views morality or justice as 
a convention which is an artificial corrective to our brute nature. That view 
of morality sees reason as serving the passions in order to obtain the best 
deal in a situation of danger from everyone. So one should be ready to give 
up one’s natural tendency to attack others as long as they give up theirs— 
morality takes away some of our natural rights (freedoms) in order to protect 
other rights. But it is not “rational” to keep the rules if one can get away with 
breaking them.
Thrasymachus, finally, represents the underdog view of justice as convention 
or social contract, like that of the left wing anarchist. He views all morality 
(justice) as the advantage of the stronger over the weaker. In this he is in a 
way the antithesis of Callicles. Thrasymachus maintains an important half- 
truth in that the numerically stronger or the more powerful have indeed 
usually ‘justified’ (rationalised) their power over the weaker. He fails to see 
(but Socrates says he will keep trying to convince him) that there is a
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Platonic alternative model of humanity which offers not a class view of 
justice, but a universal dialectic of justice. Thrasymachus, like those 
anarchists who claim the legacy of Stirner, cannot envisage the possibility of 
a form of life which has as its goal the perfection of both individual and 
community through the implementation of reasonable authority, i.e. one 
open to rational discussion about what is reasonable, good, right or just for 
everybody, and not the imposition of someone else’s will to enforce the 
(objectively irrational) interests of others.
A good way of understanding the sophists is to look at J. L. Mackie's Ethics: 
Inventing Right and Wrong. He advocates a Protagorean relativism and 
follows the sophists in asserting that there are no objective values. He 
believes the truest teachers of moral philosophy
are the outlaws and thieves who, as Locke says, keep 
faith and rules of justice with one another, but practise 
these as rules of convenience without which they cannot 
hold together, with no pretence of receiving them as
25innate laws of nature.
This does not even draw upon the folk-wisdom which understands that 
“outlaws” are often, like Robin Hood, only outside unjust laws, and often 
keep faith and rules of justice not as rules of convenience but precisely 
because, unlike the laws of the Sheriff of Nottingham, these are seen as 
innate laws of nature. Like the sophist Lycophron, Mackie believes that “a 
moral sense”, law, and justice are not natural, rather they are invented to 
enable men to live together in communities. His book is intended to prove
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the relativity of morals on the ground that there is by nature no morality 
before or beyond the “morality” agreed by particular individuals. He writes
‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible 
description of what supplies many of our basic moral 
judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting 
points of moral thinking the argument from relativity 
remains in full force.26
Mackie believes that a unitary theory of a rational good has nothing to do 
with morality. Rather he insists that the feelings or intuitions of the 
individual are what constitute morality and, as there is a radical diversity 
among individuals regarding the goals they find satisfying, it is implausible 
that they will agree on a unifying moral theory.
2.2 The Dialectical Approach: Plato, the Unity of Morals, Politics and 
Economics.
Just as the sophists provide the archetype of relativism, so Plato provides the 
archetype of a response to it. Any answer to the problem of sophistic 
moral relativism would need to provide an account of morality, especially 
justice, which would not be a disguise for social, political or economic 
power-seeking on the part of anybody. For Callicles natural justice is the 
rule of the stronger; for Plato that is a case of might usurping right. Plato 
claimed that a fully satisfactory answer could only be seen in the light of a 
society in which the stronger does not rule. The only way that this could be
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guaranteed is in the communism of his first, “healthy” society in the 
28Republic. But as Glaucon’s request to Socrates — to prove that justice is 
always beneficial to the just person —pointed out, and as Socrates’s death 
witnessed, the real problem is to understand the point of pursuing morality 
even in the absence of such a just society; in other words when it is not 
requited.
Plato was living and working in a culture in which sophistic "values" such as 
those of Protagoras and other sophists were in conflict with traditional 
religiously sanctioned communal notions of justice. The dialectic of the 
twelve books of the Republic is his attempt at answering the crucial question 
of relativism, why I should be moral (just) rather than follow my own 
pleasure. His whole philosophy can be seen as an attack on Protagorean 
undialectical relativism, which views customary morality and justice as a 
bargain, a matter of convention, rather than as befitting our nature. In fact 
our nature is seen as a-social, pre-social and anti-social, and what befits it is 
bargaining, if we are not strong enough to make our pleasure the rule of 
society.
Plato has a different concept of nature and of mind from that of Callicles and 
the sophists. His dialectic unites nature and mind, being and value, in 
defining the nature or essence of a thing, what it really is, as its ideal— 
Aristotle spoke of this as the fullest development (actualisation) of its 
potential. For Plato such natures are only intelligible within a totality, a 
hierarchical cosmos, in which humans participate through transcending their 
finite existence by participating more fully in the Forms inhering in the 
infinite mind in which our finite minds participate. The good is
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hierarchical; the good for the rational animal is to be rational. The nature of 
mind or reason is to discover universal necessities; examples are 
mathematics and logic. Things are measured by their essence or nature. The 
finite -- for example a given system of justice -- only has value in its relation 
to what it ought to be and can be, the perfection or actualisation of its nature. 
What it ideally is, is what it really, essentially, is. However, existentially or 
in fact, it may not match up to its essence; courts of law are also called 
courts of justice, but the treatment they dispense may not be just.
Plato claims that such essences, or universals, are a distinct class of entities, 
that concrete things are images of their Form 30, that Ideas or Forms are 
objective, separate from sensible things; Forms do not change and are 
eternal. For Plato we are able to apprehend the Forms through a dialectical 
ascent of the mind from the sensible world of flux to the immutable and 
eternal world of the Forms.31 These are objects belonging not to the 
multifarious, changing world of sense, but to another, unchanging world, 
apprehended by the intellect through a dialectical ascent. There is a hierarchy 
within the Forms, at the head of which is the Form of the Good. The idea of 
the good is not just any one idea among all others; rather, in Plato’s view it 
occupies a pre-eminent place. Plato describes a hierarchical ascent from 
particularity to Form, and then ultimately to the absolute apex, the Form of 
the Good. The Form of the Good is beyond all other forms, even beyond 
being. It is from this principle that all truth is deduced. Mind, nature, value 
and being are united in the dialectic of the whole, the totality or unity.
Justice therefore cannot be defined in any narrow way, e.g. “Justice is 
fairness” or “Justice means to do good to your friends and harm to your
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enemies” or “Justice means to obey the law of the land”. The essence dr 
form of justice can only be understood in a holistic approach to social human 
nature.
It is worth noting that the Forms are not totally separate from us: for Plato, 
we imitate them and participate in them; the forms equate with being and the 
sensible with becoming: the things in the sensible world are imperfect 
representations of their true Form. Unlike the Sophists Plato claims 
universal, objective standards. His theory of forms deals not only with 
logical but with moral questions. He sees mathematical truths as 
paradigmatic: just as 2 + 2 = 4 (even if the whole world is asleep as 
Augustine said, or one might say even if the human race ceased to exist) - so 
killing the innocent is wrong. He believes that objective moral standards 
exist in the same way mathematical truths exist; they exist independently of 
us as ideal truths.
The transcendent Forms of Plato are thus the negation of sophistic 
reductionism. But how are we to come to know this metaphysical world? For 
Plato mind is, of its nature, directed toward the objective good of the whole. 
In order for our finite minds to be in tune with this absolute, universal, 
infinite Mind we must use our reason with the aim of the objective good. It is 
only in dialectical reasoning that we can ascend to a unitary and holistic 
understanding of being and rationality, nature and mind.
For Plato we are able to have knowledge of the Forms because the soul is 
immortal: it is eidetic, “Formlike”: it exists in the same sphere as the Forms, 
although it is not a Form itself. He sees man as in between the sensible
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world and the eternal world of the Forms; man belongs to the world of 
becoming and passes away because of his body, but he also belongs to the 
world of being because of the eternal part of his soul.34
The Form of the Good (Republic 505a) is what Socrates claims should be the 
most important study of the philosophers, who should rule the city. It is from 
this highest Form that all truth, goodness and beauty is intelligible.'0 Plato 
illustrates the study of the Form of the Good through his similes of the sun 
and the cave and the divided line analogy. While the metaphor of the line is 
epistemological, Plato emphasises in the metaphor of the cave that the ascent 
is an ethical or moral one. In the cave metaphor the central message is that of 
conversion. The ascent from the cave is liberating and enlightening. On this 
journey from darkness to light the self is released from conformity, through a 
developing and enriching struggle for the attainment of truth. The 
culmination of the whole journey is comprehension of the Good; this is not 
merely what is good for the seeker, or good for others, or good in relation to 
anything or anyone — it is simply unqualified absolute good.
Plato tells us that
What is at issue is the conversion of the mind from a kind 
of twilight to the true day, that climb up into reality which 
we shall say is true philosophy.36
This necessary turning around of the soul will be painful and difficult. Plato
• '37tells us, “the glare of the fire will dazzle him”. But once he has seen the 
light he will be reluctant to return to the cave and to his fellow prisoners. For
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when he has engaged in such divine contemplation he will want to stay up 
there forever.' But the philosophers must return to the cave; like Socrates 
they must be liberators (saviours, bringers of salvation), in order to help the 
prisoners.
For Plato the whole of life is movement on a moral scale; knowledge is a 
moral quest as the mind seeks reality and desires the Good, which is the 
transcendent source of spiritual power. Just as the sun gives the eye the 
power to see and can by virtue of this power be glimpsed, so the Form of the 
Good gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to 
the knower.
It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and you will be 
right to think of it as being itself known and yet as being 
something other than, and even more splendid than,
39knowledge and truth, splendid as they are.
The connection made by Plato of knowledge (of truth) and learning with 
goodness provides a deep intelligible conception of moral change. 
Knowledge is essentially related to morality by the idea of truth. Truth is not 
a collection of facts, immediate knowledge of particulars, but a grasp of 
universals (essences) in an understanding which totalises objective and 
subjective reality, the known and the knower (and lover). The search for 
truth and for a closer connection between thought and reality demands virtue 
and a purification from covetousness and desire. Knowledge, goodness and 
reality are thus seen to be connected — a unity. Through learning and striving 
we begin to see clearly and have the ability to think seriously and honestly.
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So for Plato goodness joins with knowledge to create a moral vision in 
which we attain knowledge of the divine. The Good is our source of energy 
and is the cause of thinking which attains truth and moral understanding. As 
Plato puts it
the capacity for knowledge is innate in each man’s mind, 
and that organ by which he learns is like an eye which 
cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole 
body is turned; in the same way the mind as a whole must 
be turned away from the world of change until its eye can 
bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of all 
realities which is what we call the good.40
It must be stressed however that in the Republic as in other dialogues 
Socrates treats the idea of the Good as something that is difficult to grasp 
and that can be observed only in its effects. Like the sun, which by giving 
warmth and light gives everything its being and perceptibility, the good is 
present for us only in the gifts it bestows — goodness and truth and beauty. 
The sun, supreme in the visible realm, corresponds to the Good, supreme in 
the realm of thought. It enables the objects of knowledge to be known by the 
mind, as the objects of sight are seen by the eye. Further, just as the sun 
causes things not only to be seen but to grow and come into being, so the 
Good gives the objects of knowledge not just their knowability but their 
reality, though it is itself beyond reality (or beyond being).
The good therefore may be said to be the source not only 
of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also
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of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, 
but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power.41
So the soul animated by eros can hope to catch a glimpse of the Good42 
although we are never able to fully apprehend the Good; nonetheless this is 
for Plato the proper direction in which to travel. For Plato
...our true lover of knowledge naturally strives for reality, 
and will not rest content with each set of particulars 
which opinion takes for reality, but soars with undimmed 
and unwearied passion till he grasps the nature of each 
thing as it is.
This points to a spiritual pilgrimage from appearance to reality. We turn 
round, we climb up, we raise our heads. We undertake a difficult journey of 
disciplined purification of intellect and passion, wherein passion {eras) 
becomes a spiritual force.44 In this Platonic turn, eros becomes the guide to 
the Idea.4:1 For loving desire is part of the very name philosopher (lover of 
wisdom). The myth46 of the cave envisages possible emergence into the 
sunlight, but this ideal is something to be achieved, a telos or goal.47 Plato 
constantly reminds us of the difficulties and perils involved and maintains 
that very few will make the grade. However there is help at hand to whoever 
attempts the ascent; the light of the Good as love, truth, justice, beauty gives 
life to reality for the pursuer of enlightenment. This imagery suggests the 
unique spiritual element in life, a salvific pilgrimage, a moral journey, 
leading to redemption or liberation.
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For Plato philosophy is a way of life, and his discussion of the Good in the 
Republic has a practical and ethical bearing. Knowledge of the good requires 
love of the good. An education following this path, he tells us, becomes 
enriching and leads to real human flourishing (eudaimonia). This is an 
essentialist, teleological view of life; it joins what we are to what we should 
and can be. Plato sees the human soul as an "inner politeia" and the polis 
(city state) as an expanded soul.49
What is ordered (rational, in the sense of spiritual) is good and what is 
disordered is bad; this is true of both individual and state. This is a key 
Platonic theme. For Plato the order of man in society is part of the cosmic 
order. The establishment of the politeia within oneself is the aim of 
education in general; what we can call an “inner Republic” or positive 
freedom—the freedom that is achieved by governing ourselves by reason 
rather than being governed by passions, impulses or addictions. When we 
fix the ‘gaze of our souls’ on the Good itself we can use it as a paradigm for 
the right ordering of the polis and the citizens, for the rest of our lives.50
the final thing to be perceived in the intelligible region, 
and perceived only with difficulty, is the form of the 
good; once seen, it is inferred to be responsible for 
whatever is right and valuable in anything, producing in 
the visible region light and the source of light, and being 
in the intelligible region itself controlling source of truth 
and intelligence. And anyone who is going to act 
rationally either in public or private life must have sight 
ofit.51
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As we have seen, this dialectical process is a progressive purification of 
possessiveness and the passions; a patient and continuous change of one’s 
whole being from a world of appearance to that of reality: the ongoing 
search for truth, where we change our orientation to keep looking in the right 
direction, to the Forms and ultimately to the Form of the Good. This is 
dialectical reasoning.
It is also of crucial importance to recognise the different uses of dialectic 
made by Plato and Hegel. For Hegel the Kingdom of Prussia (the ideal state) 
comes about as a rational requirement or logical necessity of Mind (Geist) 
unfolded in history; it could not have been otherwise. Whereas for Plato as 
for Marx, the attempt to actualise the ideal (the Platonic Republic, or Marx’s 
communism) was a rational task to be achieved. Plato attempted just such a 
task in Syracuse.
Plato argued that the truly just society could be achieved only when 
philosophers become the governors of society; only the philosopher can 
bring into being and maintain in being a state in which justice is embodied 
both in political arrangements and in the soul, because the crowning 
accomplishment in the education of the philosophers of the ideal state must 
be knowledge of the good. In the first -- "healthy" — society in Plato's 
Republic communism is the rule; even in the second best — "feverish" — 
society,5j Plato tells us that a strict necessity of the life led by the 
philosopher rulers is that they should be communists in the sense that money 
and private property are banned for rulers; this for Plato was part of the 
embodiment of reason in society. Marx shared Plato's first insight: in order
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for mind to rule everyone would have to be communists.54
For Plato, only with the eye of his mind fixed on the good can the 
philosopher ruler govern justly and wisely and discern truth from falsehood, 
good from bad, beautiful from ugly. Otherwise he does not know what he is 
talking about:
If a man cannot define the form of the good and 
distinguish it clearly in his account from everything else, 
and then battle his way through all objections, determined 
to give them refutation based on reality and not opinion, 
and come through with his argument unshaken, you 
wouldn’t say he knew what the good in itself was, or 
indeed any other good.55
Plato is concerned not only with moral but with ontological justice i.e. with 
being human. He sees justice as an essential part of our nature, not like the 
sophists as merely a convention or type of insurance policy entered into out 
of fear. The sophistic conventional “morality” and “justice” is confronted by 
its antithesis, a universal morality (rationality) and a universal justice. 
Dialectical thought responds to sophism by advocating the overcoming of 
the particular, relative ‘justice’ of the sophists (Athenian justice, Persian 
justice etc.) through the universal form of justice. For Plato justice can only 
fully be achieved in community, although Socrates as an individual achieved 
justice to a great extent in spite of his society. Both individual and society 
can become just if both let their lives be ordered by the good. This is 
achieved when we govern ourselves by practical wisdom, reason, courage
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and temperance.
For when the philosopher has been trained in 
mathematical and dialectical enquiry he will be able to 
discern what justice itself is, what beauty itself is, what 
truth is and above all other forms he will be able to see as 
far as this is possible what the Form of the Good is; even 
if it is only a glimpse, or an insight for it can never be 
seen totally itself. Then and only then is he in a fit state to 
instruct others and lead them on the journey to what is 
really real — the true and the good and the beautiful.56
Unlike contemporary aesthetic theorists Plato separates art from beauty, 
because he regards beauty as too serious a matter to be commandeered by 
art. In the Republic Plato is concerned that in a future just society art has the 
potential to be used as a destructive force: because art can appeal to the 
lower part of the soul by encouraging immorality, harmful errors, untruths 
and illusions; but beauty is different. Beauty {to kalon, the fine or noble)
r o
gives us immediate access to goodness and truth; our attraction to beauty is 
the noble desire for goodness and truth. Plato’s theory of Forms expresses a 
certainty that goodness is something real, unitary, and simple, but not fully 
expressed in the sensible world. So for Plato the good is at the same time the 
beautiful; it does not exist somewhere apart for itself and in itself.59 Beauty, 
symmetry or measuredness, and truth are the three structural components of 
the good which appears as the beautiful.
In every case...moderation and proportion seem, in effect,
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to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we’re 
looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty.60
In the Philebus as in the Republic Plato speaks of the difficulty of locating 
the Good. Plato holds that love or desire for the beautiful prompts anamnesis 
(remembering) and the good comes to us in the guise of the beautiful. 
Gadamer explains the importance and role of beauty in Platonic philosophy.
Beauty shines forth most of all, and it most of all 
stimulates love in us. Thus it awakens in the lover the 
longing and passion for what is higher.61
The beautiful comes to be regarded as the direct presence of the divine in 
man and the cosmos. Plato was convinced that salvation concerns the 
whole soul: the soul must be saved entire by the redirection of its energy 
away from selfish fantasy toward reality. This dialectical process begins with 
looking upon what is visibly beautiful and leads to a vision of eternal beauty, 
and so on to a plane of ontological enlightenment in which one looks upon 
that beauty with “the eye of the mind”. Because virtue in general may not 
attract us beauty presents spiritual values in a more accessible and attractive 
form. In this conception of the beautiful Plato gives to sexual love and 
transformed sexual energy a central place in his philosophy. This desire 
takes the form of a yearning to create in and through beauty, which may 
appear distorted as at base sexual love or love of fame, but may be 
dialectically transformed as the truest love and desire, the love of wisdom or 
philosophy and of its inculcation in others; the desire for (or pursuit of) 
universal, infinite truth, beauty and goodness.64
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[We] escape from the mean petty slavery of the particular 
case and turn toward the open sea of beauty (my italics).63
Beauty, Plato insists, shows itself to the best part of the soul as something to 
be desired yet respected, adored and not possessed. He believes that the 
desire for beauty is an attraction or desire for the good which can with proper 
instruction overcome egoism and transfigure hedonistic desire.
The proper way to go about or be guided through the 
ways of love is to start with beautiful things in this 
world...you should use the things of this world as rungs in 
a ladder. You start by loving one attractive body and step 
up to two; from there you move on to physical beauty in 
general, from there to the beauty of people’s activities, 
from there to the beauty of intellectual endeavours, and 
from there you ascend to that final intellectual endeavour, 
which is no more and no less than the study of that 
beauty, so that you finally recognise true beauty.66
67Here, Plato embarks upon a dialectical enquiry into the essence of love. 
Effectively what Plato has introduced is the dialectical unification of eros, 
the desire for the finite, with the love which is of infinite absolute Beauty 
and leads to the practice of loving others as you would have others love you 
(the Golden Rule). Eros is both truly good and beautiful, dialectically 
unifying goodness, truth and beauty.
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2.3 Aristotle and the Oikos: Ancient Economy
It is my argument that significant relativism such as that of the sophists and 
the bourgeoisie is an expression of, and an excuse for, a particular political 
and socio-economic will to power. The kind of political and socio-economic 
thinking which is opposed to such relativism finds a brilliant archetype in the 
basic principles of Aristotle's political and economic theory, which provided 
a paradigm for the critical basis of Marx's alternative to bourgeois political 
economy.
Aristotle, in the philosophical tradition of Plato, engaged in direct criticism 
of the Sophists. He rejected the theory of the sophist Lycophron, a doctrine 
similar to that of mainstream contemporary liberalism’s belief that the law of 
a political community should be morally neutral, and merely a "guarantor of 
men’s rights against one another".69 Instead, Aristotle believed that the law 
of the polls should be a rule of life which would enable the members to 
become good and just, to live well. In the Politics he writes,
a polis is not an association for residence on a common 
site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and 
easing exchange. There are indeed conditions which must 
be present before a polis can exist; but the presence of all 
these conditions is not enough in itself to constitute a 
polis. What constitutes a polis is an association of 
households and clans in a good life, for the sake of 
attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence... It is
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therefore for the sake of good actions and not for the sake 
of social life that political associations must be 
considered to exist.70
For Aristotle's economic thinking, true wealth is to be found in living the 
good life, living well, eu zen\ it is not found in money or any other private 
material good, but in using those things for the communal good. His theory 
therefore tends to focus its attention on what the proper use of wealth is; it is 
for the free and good life of the individual citizen or the city. An enormous 
collection of commodities/money is not wealth. This traditional natural law 
notion of true wealth, found also in Aquinas, is akin to Marx’s concept of the 
production of use-values in line with the full development of the human 
personality within the interdependence of the community. Aristotle writes
It is like the story told of Midas: just because of the 
inordinate greed of his prayer everything that was set 
before him was turned to gold. Hence we seek to define 
wealth and money-making in different ways; and we are 
right in doing so, for they are different; on the one hand 
true wealth, in accordance with nature, belonging to 
household management, productive; on the other money­
making, with no place in nature, belonging to trade and 
not productive of goods in the full sense. In this kind of 
money-making, in which coined money is both the end 
pursued in the transaction and the medium by which the 
transaction is performed, there is no limit to the amount of
72[private, particular] riches to be got. [Emphasis added]
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In that context, discussions concerning the proper organisation of production 
or trade are for Aristotle undertaken not, as in capitalist political economy, 
so as to show how ever greater surpluses can be realised through more 
efficient management, but rather to show how a better life or more beautiful 
things can be provided.
For Aristotle, economic formations can be divided into two types according 
to their governing end: economies producing use values or consumption 
goods broadly understood {oikonomike, the art of the household economy) 
and those in which the economy is driven by the (in principle unlimited) 
search after surplus value or profit {chrematistike, the art of acquiring 
money).
The former was schematised later by Marx as C-M-C (or its earlier variable - 
for example, C-C (barter), or C, a completely autarkic economy (self 
contained production /consumption economy without exchange of any sort), 
and the latter as M-C-Mk This way of conceiving the precapitalist 
economy with its emphasis on use (consumption) as the end of economic 
activity, Marx adapted from Aristotle and above all from the Politics, Book 
I, in which is set forth with unmatched clarity the oikos model of the 
economy. Aristotle writes
The practice of exchange of goods did not exist in the 
earliest form of association, the household; it only came 
in with the larger forms. Members of a single household
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shared all the belongings of that house. But members of 
different households shared many of the belongings of 
other houses also. Mutual need of the different goods was 
the essential basis of exchange.. .But they do not carry the 
process any farther than this; it remains one of barter.74
The idea of the household economy offers a glimpse into a world in which 
the economy was put to the rational service of human ends and in which it 
was their needs and not the uncontrolled, autonomous workings of the 
market that shaped relations between persons.
That oikos economy can be described in general terms as an exchangeless 
hierarchical community dedicated to providing the material prerequisites of 
the good life for the household’s free members, and the master foremost 
among them. The essential principles of the oikos (marketless) household 
economy, governed by the community, could be and were extended to a 
vision of the good economy at the level of the city. This suggests that the 
oikos model can be employed in two rather different ways, according to 
which part of it one emphasises: either a marketless command economy, or 
an economy subordinated to the purposes of the community (a use-value 
economy), but which does not necessarily exclude markets.
The second form of exchange relations (C-M-C) was a development out of 
the more primitive barter (C-C), and was mediated by money. One 
commodity was exchanged for money (C-M) and the money in turn for 
another commodity (M-C). Aristotle thought that the introduction of money 
as a means to an end but not as an end in itself was a development in the
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process of exchange and had certain benefits.
What money does for us is to act as a guarantee of 
exchange in the future: that if it is not needed now, it will 
take place if the need arises... So money acts as a measure 
which, by making things commensurable, enables us to 
equate them.73
It must be pointed out while Aristotle treats C-M-C or production for 
exchange, as “not its [production’s] proper or peculiar use”, he also views it 
as “necessary and laudable” because its main aim is rational- the satisfaction 
of human needs. Interchange of this kind is not contrary to nature and is not 
a form of moneymaking; it keeps to its original purpose - to re-establish 
nature’s own equilibrium of self-sufficiency. All the same it was out of it 
that moneymaking arose.
Aristotle reveals that the telos of C-M-C (oikonomike) was to develop into 
the un-natural M-C-M’ (chrematistike) or kapelike (hucksterism, commercial 
trade, acquisition) and further again to the incestuous M-M’ (tokos) - the
77making of money out of money.
At the beginning of Chapter 9 he traces the development of this new 
phenomenon: from C-C, to C-M-C, to M-C-M’, and finally to M-M’. 
Kapelike, unlike oikonomike’s and chrematistike’s rational fulfilling of 
human needs, involves people entering the market not to sell what they have 
produced in order to buy what they need, but rather to buy (M-C) in order to 
sell for a profit (C-M’). M-C-M’, while involved in buying and selling—like
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C-M-C—develops into something alien, without a natural end or telos (M-C- 
M’).
There is another kind of property-getting, to which the 
term moneymaking is generally and quite rightly applied; 
and it is due to it that there is thought to be no limit to 
wealth or its acquisition. Because it closely resembles that 
form of acquisition which we have been discussing, many 
suppose that the two are one and the same. But they are 
not the same.. .one is natural, the other is not.
The final form of development of exchange-value, and the most unnatural
for Aristotle is usurer’s interest {tokos) - making money out of money (M-
M’). Aristotle writes,
Money-making then...is of two kinds; one which is 
necessary and acceptable, which we may call 
administrative; the other, the commercial, which depends 
on exchange, is justly regarded with disapproval, since it 
arises not from nature but from men’s dealings with each 
other. Very much disliked also is the practice of charging 
interest; and the dislike is fully justified, for interest is a 
yield arising out of money itself, not a product of that for 
which money was provided. Money was intended to be a 
means of exchange, interest represents an increase in the 
money itself. We speak of it as a yield, as a crop or a 
litter; for each animal produces its like and interest on
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money is produced out of money. Hence of all ways of 
getting wealth this is the most contrary to nature.79
With the emergence of a society founded on exchange, money becomes the 
bond between individuals. This was a watershed move from use-value, need- 
orientated economies — C-M-C or its variants — to an exchange-value, 
unlimited accumulation of surplus-value economy, M-C-M’, to its 
culmination in finance capital, M-M\ The original difference between use- 
value and exchange-value develops into the difference between the oikos and 
chrematistics.
Marx took this manner of understanding capitalism from Aristotle, and 
especially from his idea of the chrematistic life, chrematistike (the art of 
acquiring money wealth), which Aristotle contrasts to oikonomike (the art of 
household management) with a view to its usefulness to the higher end, 
living well (eu zen).
However, the oikos economy, while regulated by human intention and not by 
the anarchic market, was at its core a despotic community since its 
purposiveness resided in the master and his needs. In relation to those ends, 
the other members of the household were objects of exploitation, from the 
wife down to the slave who was a thing, not a person.
Also it could be criticised for the lack of incentive for technological 
innovation. Ironically enough this was caused by the rejection of pleonexia 
(the mad Midaslike pursuit of money wealth instead of the good), for while 
the Greeks knew of the liberating potential of technology, because of slavery
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they had neither economic nor moral imperatives to seek it out.
The despotism of the ancient oikos economy can be understood to have been 
a consequence not of the search for ever greater productivity or surpluses, 
but rather of the emancipation of some members from the grim world of the 
provisioning of humankind. Thus radical inequality and unfreedom were 
intimately bound up with the oikos economy.
The destruction of the C-M-C type economies and their replacement by a 
capitalist one can be viewed as the material prerequisites in which the 
growth of labour-replacing technology could, if put under rational (human) 
control and based on human need, provide for the needs of all humankind. 
Marx held that this would be a higher form of community or ontological 
justice -- one it which an economy of moral human relations would again be 
consciously embedded and contained, only now in a form which would not 
require nor even tolerate social hierarchy or despotism.
2.4 Natural Law
Aristotle's "economics" is an integral part of a general natural law theory of 
what human relations should be. It sees justice as inherent in rationality, and 
in human nature, as essential to human nature, and necessary to rationality. 
That which is naturally right is universal, and recognised as valid by any 
rational mind. It has everywhere the same force, quite apart from any 
positive law that may embody it. As Aquinas, working in the same tradition, 
argued, an unjust law is a contradiction in terms; it does not belong to law, 
but to acts of violence. A positive legal norm which conflicts with the natural 
law can impose no obligation, though the state may have the physical power
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to impose it.
This is in contrast to the modern rights approach of Hobbes, which, like that 
of the sophists, is relativist. Marx is critical of Hobbes’s "Robinsonade" is on 
the grounds that its abstract view of human nature was that of atomic 
individuals isolated from society; values are relative to their particular wills, 
the good being reducible to their particular pleasure. As has been pointed 
out in 1.1 Hobbes puts it, "Whatsoever any man desires that is it which he 
for his part calls good."
These differing attitudes to relativism depend on different basic philosophies 
of law assumed by each. Law is seen by one as based on universal reason, by 
the other as based on force, command or particular will. There are 
corresponding differences in the understanding of key philosophical terms 
such as nature, reason, justice and rights.
It is the key thesis of the natural law tradition that law is based on an 
understanding of nature by universal reason; hence there are certain 
principles of natural law or justice which exist quite independently of the 
positive law of any particular state, such as Rome or Athens. Because such 
laws are based on reason and are concerned with human well-being or 
flourishing and growth they place all people under a moral obligation, for 
example not to perform certain types of actions. This tradition does not 
believe that justice is simply a matter of convention, relative to a particular 
community (Athenian justice, Roman justice). Justice is not what the 
positive or civil law of a particular society happens to be, nor is it created by 
an act of human volition or will. The idea of justice is eternal and
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unchangeable and in this sense is prior to law - in other words law is derived 
from eternal justice. The Stoic philosopher Cicero summarises this approach.
True law is right reason in agreement with nature. It is of 
universal application, unchanging and everlasting...it is a 
sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to 
repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it 
entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by 
senate or people, and we need not look outside of 
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there 
will not be different laws at Rome and Athens, or 
different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all
. • 80 times.
The last claim is the most ambiguous in this formulation. It would be 
sufficient to say that a natural law philosophy will hold that sound moral 
reasoning, whether on the part of an individual or a group, can claim 
universality, and can criticise any human positive law. Of course different 
states may choose different social practices and institutions: regulating 
traffic to drive on the right or the left is not a moral choice but an open 
option for any state. But most other institutions and practices, such as 
notably private property, are subject to moral evaluation and judgement. 
Aquinas for instance, referring to Isidore of Seville, claims that freedom and 
common ownership are of the natural law, but that servitude and private 
property (understood in an Aristotelian sense of trusteeship, and not a 
Lockean bourgeois sense) can be “added” to the natural law. This claim
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might be open to moral dispute in the era of globalisation, and perhaps even 
in Thomas’s time.
Aquinas who is expressly in the same tradition as Aristotle views justice as 
both a natural need, and a rational principle to be discovered. This would be 
a process whereby our idea or thoughts about justice become better, truer, 
and higher. This is a process of flourishing {eudaimonia) where we become 
actually what we are potentially. We become truly human; we realise our 
essence by attaining rationality (spirituality). This approach can aptly be 
described as humanism. McCarthy in Marx and Classical Antiquity identifies 
the same perfectionism in Marx and Aristotle.
There are more secondary sources that favourably 
compare Marx’s and Aristotle’s theory of social justice 
with their rejection of utilitarian and natural rights theory, 
their stress on the ultimate ethical and political values of 
friendship, mutual caring, rationality, and human dignity, 
their theories of human need and self-realisation, their 
underlying metaphysics and teleology of activity and 
potentiality, and their epistemological assumptions about 
subjectivity and objectivity. For both men, it is in the 
perfectibility of mankind that the potentiality of the
09democratic imagination lies.
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2. 5 Aquinas on Law: Divine, Eternal, Natural and Human Positive.
A necessary element of natural law is the orientation toward the objective 
common good for human beings, based on an adequate grasp of human 
nature. The natural law became the foundation of the Christian conception of 
history in the Middle Ages. Thomas’s theory of natural law is an 
interpretation of man’s nature and of his relation to God and to the universe. 
For him natural law is unintelligible unless we realise its close link with the 
eternal divine order on which the whole of creation rests.
In Thomistic philosophy man is called to participate intellectually and 
actively in the rational order of the universe, because of his rational nature. 
For Thomas reason is the essence of man, the divine spark that makes for his 
greatness. It is the “light of natural reason” which enables us to discern good 
from evil. Thomas’s notion of the light of reason goes back to Platonic and 
Augustinian sources and he uses it in a humanist sense. His conception of 
natural law is an expression of the dignity and power of man and can be 
aptly described as a humanism. He writes
This participation in the Eternal law by rational creatures 
is called the Natural law...the light of natural reason, by 
which we discern good from evil and which is the natural 
law.84
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Every part is ordered to the whole as the imperfect is to the perfect. The 
individual is part of a perfect whole that is the community. Therefore law 
must concern itself in particular with the happiness of the community.
For Thomas law is "a promulgated rational ordination to the common good 
by one who has charge of the community". He does not base the law on the 
Divine Right of Kings which is a Renaissance and not a mediaeval concept. 
In fact he argues from the fundamentally democratic or populist principle 
that
to order anything to the common good belongs either to 
the whole people or to someone who is the vicegerent of 
the whole people. And therefore the making of law
belongs either to the whole people or to a public
86personage who has care of the whole people...
Law should have reason as its rule and measure and therefore we are obliged 
to respect it in order to attain happiness, which for Aquinas is the end to 
which all human beings are destined. He holds that man necessarily desires 
his own happiness. This is also what God wants for each and every one of 
us.
Humankind is a universal community or cosmopolis. Law is for Thomas its 
expression, being based upon the common nature of humanity; thus it is truly 
universal. This universal law is eternal and immutable. All the laws of nature 
and all the laws of society or morality should be considered as different 
cases of one single law, divine law. This law like God Himself is eternal.
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Thus the name given to the first law which is the source of all other laws is 
eternal law. The eternal law is the eternal reason of God. The Creator has an 
exemplar idea of mankind and his nature and in his divine wisdom directs 
man back to Himself through man’s participation in the eternal law. The 
eternal law then, is the origin and font of the natural law, which participates 
in the eternal law.
Man, as a rational creature, has the strict duty of knowing what the eternal 
law exacts of him and should conform to it. This might be an insoluble 
problem, were this law not in some way written in our very substance, so 
Aquinas says that we have only to observe our nature attentively in order to 
discover it. Eternal law is thus shared by each one of us, and is found written 
in our nature.
Because the natural law is founded on human nature itself, we cannot be 
ignorant of its basic principles; however, we may fail to understand the 
natural law fully. Human beings are not infallible; we are subject to the 
vicissitudes of ignorance, error, clouded judgements and coercion. If we are 
to arrive at sound judgement and sound living and wish to avoid serious 
error, then we need a norm (morality, or law) in order to achieve our final 
goal - happiness; this norm is the natural law.
But the law of nature is not the only law which guides man on his way to 
happiness and perfection. Other laws are necessary. Human laws must draw 
out all the conclusions of natural law. All law, eternal and natural, human 
and divine, is linked together in a complete coherent system. However, 
human law has no principle of its own to invoke. It is strictly limited to
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defining ways of applying natural law. Human laws aim at prescribing the 
natural law to individuals for the common good. These human laws only 
bind in the degree to which they are just.
Thomas recognised that not all men have the ability, time, patience or 
inclination to understand fully the natural law and to this end he tells us that 
this is why God gave us the Divine positive law as was handed to Moses in
87the form of the Decalogue (the Ten Commandments).
Natural law should be not only the foundation of morality and of all social 
and political institutions, but also the paramount standard by which these 
institutions could be judged. The community must be based on justice, and 
justice as disclosed to man in the precepts of natural law must prevail over 
any other command or authority. So if positive law contradicts the natural 
law it must be considered null and void. This means that allegiance to the 
state can be only conditional. Unjust laws are not properly laws at all. They 
do not, in consequence, oblige in conscience, ft could be argued that the 
same applies to class rule, which is the dictates of a mode of production.
Man is bound to obey secular rulers to the extent that the order of justice 
requires. For this reason if such rulers have no just title to power, but have 
usurped it, or if they command things to be done which are unjust, their 
subjects are not obliged to obey them, except perhaps in certain special 
cases, when it is a matter of the virtue of prudence (phronesis).
So in certain cases, disobedience may be not only a possibility, but a duty; a 
theory of resistance can be built up on such premises. Lord Acton claims that
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this possibility makes Aquinas “the first Whig”.90 This is a serious 
misunderstanding; the first Whig was Locke, whose theory was based on the 
practically unlimited right of property.
For Thomas, the order in which the commands of natural law are ranged 
corresponds to our nature. Here there are three stages. The first stage is that 
due to our very nature we necessarily desire to preserve our own being. 
Natural law plays a part here by maintaining and defending the elementary 
requirement to preserve human life. Secondly, through our nature we share 
with other animals an inclination towards certain things, for instance the 
coupling of male and female and the bringing up of children which Cicero 
says nature has taught all animals. Thirdly, humankind is utterly distinct 
from other animals, while having certain similarities to them, as we alone 
possess reason. Other animals tend towards their nature without knowing it, 
whereas humans on the contrary have the ability to be conscious of their 
nature. Because of our ability to reason we have a natural inclination to 
know the truth especially to know the truths about God and to live in society. 
“Natural inclinations” here does not mean a mechanical disposition, but 
specifies an orientation towards a goal whose attainment fulfils our nature.
Thomas draws a parallel between the basic precepts of natural law for 
practical reason and the axioms of science for theoretical reason. Theoretical 
reason enables us to discern self-evident propositions, for instance the law of 
non-contradiction. These propositions are true in themselves and need no 
further clarification; there is no room for mistakes here as these propositions 
are essential to all reasoning. But theoretical reasoning, because it deals with 
contingency, is more liable to make mistakes, the further it gets down to
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particular cases. So Thomas cautions us to “act intelligently”. The more you 
descend into the detail the more it appears how the general rule admits of 
exceptions, so that you have to hedge it with cautions and qualifications.91
For Aquinas the first and general precept of natural law is “good is to be 
done and pursued and bad avoided”. This he believes is a self-evident 
principle like the principle of non-contradiction.
Thomas starts from the likeness of human nature to the divine nature. He 
says that understanding and free will are the most essential marks that 
distinguish man from every other earthly creature. It is precisely through 
these that man is in a special degree the image and likeness of God. The use 
of analogy here as elsewhere in his work is a key feature in his philosophy. 
For him the whole of being, though altogether different from the Divine 
Being, is an image of God and a participation in it. This ranges from the 
merely inanimate being of inorganic nature up to man, who, as we have seen, 
Thomas argues is created by God after His own image.
The Thomistic conception of natural law however, views law as a mediatory 
element between God and man, and an assertion of the power and dignity of 
human reason and human nature. For Thomas law is not the imposition of 
arbitrary will; it is the outcome of reason — law is an act of the intellect. 
Natural law for him is not a detailed code but a general guide to 
reasonableness in action. Law is not there to make men obedient, but to help 
them to be happy or fulfilled (virtuous). However, the close association of 
morals and law is the distinguishing mark of the natural law throughout its 
long history. The modern notion sees the older doctrine as the contamination
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of legality with morality -- a “moralisation” of law.
Man’s good is to be in accord with reason. And inversely, whatever is 
contrary to reason is evil. Each thing’s good is what is suited to it in view of 
its form. Each thing’s evil is whatever contradicts this form and tends 
consequently to destroy its order. Since man’s form is his rational soul itself, 
every act conforming to reason must be called good and every act contrary to 
it called evil. Thus when a human act includes something contrary to the 
order of reason, it by that very fact falls into the species of bad action. In this 
way, for example, theft is a bad action because it consists in taking 
possession of another’s goods.
For Thomas it is virtue that determines the goodness of a human act. But 
moral virtue cannot exist without intellectual virtue, for the structure of the 
human act involves the deliberation and judgement of reason. What we find 
here is that intellectual virtue needs moral virtue to decide not only what has 
to be done, but how we ought to do it. It is not enough merely to decide to 
act well. We must also judge well. For man to act well not only must his 
appetite be well disposed by the habit of moral virtue, but his reason must be 
well disposed by the habit of intellectual virtue.
For Thomas our knowledge of natural law unites both morals and politics. 
Similarly, moral and political philosophy, epistemology and ontology cohere 
in a unity of philosophical knowledge. He believes that we must act in 
conformity with our rational nature. For rational nature constitutes the 
ontological criterion of man’s “oughtness”. It is through this free realisation 
and development that we become human - free and rational beings.
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Thomistic morality is, accordingly, a naturalism. But it is by that very fact a 
rationalism because reason acts as its rule. He believes that humans as 
rational beings must find out what we are so that we may act accordingly. 
Here the command to become what we are is the highest law: so that we may 
actualise to the ultimate limits, the potentialities of the rational beings that
94we are.
Justice, fortitude and temperance with all the particular virtues related to 
them are for Thomas the means by which we acquire within ourselves, by 
patient exercise and practical wisdom (phronesis), an ever more perfect 
image of God, which it is our end to become.
Justice is as Aristotle said a kind of general virtue (r/g/zZ-eousness), which 
includes all other virtues. Like the other virtues, justice must be interiorised 
(like Plato’s idea of the just individual ruled by reason in the just state ruled 
by reason). Before being just in the polls (the state) we must be just in our 
own selves.
2.6 Mediaeval Economy.
It may be appropriate to take a quick look at the mediaeval economy, to 
illustrate the practice thought to be entailed by the natural law. It was of the 
essence of the mediaeval economy, as it was of the mediaeval polity, that it 
was seen as derived from and subject to the natural law. The law of nature 
or natural law is invoked by mediaeval writers such as Aquinas as a moral 
restraint upon economic self-interest. The unpardonable sin is that of the
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speculator or the middleman, who snatches private gain by the exploitation 
of public necessities. For the mediaevals no one may ask more than a just 
price, fixed by either common estimation or public authorities. However, 
even just prices can vary with supply and demand; but they will not vary 
greatly to exploit individual necessity or favour individual opportunity.
The intense economic activity of the Middle Ages contained the seeds of an 
intellectual revolution. Mediaeval opinion had no objection to rent or profits 
provided that they were “reasonable”. No one might charge money for a 
loan. One might of course take the profits of partnership provided that one 
took the partner’s risks. One might demand compensation -‘interest’ - if one 
is not repaid the principle sum at the time stipulated; one might ask payment 
corresponding to any loss one incurs or gain one forgoes; and one might 
even purchase an annuity, for the payment is contingent and speculative, not 
certain.
Social institutions assumed a character which may almost be called 
sacramental, for they were seen as the outward expression of a spiritual 
reality. Society’s stability was thought to be due to its straining upwards to 
the celestial order of which it is the dim reflection. However, the fifteenth 
century saw an outburst of commercial activity and of economic speculation, 
and by the middle of it all this teaching was becoming antiquated. Florence 
was the financial capital of mediaeval Europe; but even at Florence the 
secular authorities in the middle of the fourteenth century fined bankers for 
usury, then fifty years later firstly prohibited it altogether, and then, imported 
Jews to carry out the work that Christians were forbidden to do.
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What remained unlawful to the end was what appears in modern economic 
textbooks as “pure interest” — interest as a fixed payment stipulated in 
advance for a loan of money or wares without risk to the lender. The essence 
of usury was that it was certain that whether the borrower gained or lost the 
usurer took his money. For the schoolmen condoning usury would have 
created a scandal, for it is contrary to Scripture, it is contrary to Aristotle, it 
is contrary to nature; it is to live without labour, it is to sell time which 
belongs to God and it is to rob those to whom the money is lent.
However it must be remembered that whole ranges of financial activity 
escaped the mediaeval denunciation of usury almost altogether. It was rarely 
applied to the large-scale transactions of kings, feudal magnates, bishops and 
abbots. It was even more rarely applied to the Papacy, Popes regularly 
employed banking houses with an indifference to the morality of their 
business methods. The Papacy was in a sense the greatest financial 
institution of the Middle Ages and as its fiscal system became more 
elaborate, things became worse and not better. The abuses which were a 
trickle in the thirteenth century became a torrent in the fifteenth. So the then 
‘international’ money markets escaped the teaching on usury; fourteenth 
century Italy was full of banking houses doing foreign exchange business 
with every commercial centre from Constantinople to London.
This discrepancy was not viewed as hypocrisy because the teaching on usury 
was based on a different order of economic activity than that of the loans 
from great banking houses to the merchants; the writers and re-writers of the 
doctrine were perfectly well aware that neither commerce nor government 
could be carried on without credit. The teaching on usury was simple and
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direct — to prevent the well-to-do moneylender from exploiting the peasants 
and craftsmen. So while a blind eye was turned to those in high places the 
Church’s scheme of economic ethics had been worked out to protect those at 
greatest risk. It was enforced partly by secular authorities and partly by 
ecclesiastical discipline. No individual or society under pain of 
excommunication was to let houses to usurers, they were to be refused 
confession, absolution and Christian burial, until they had made restitution 
and their wills were to be invalid. However, practically the Church was an 
immense vested interest, implicated to the hilt in the economic fabric, 
especially on the side of agriculture and land tenure, as it was itself the 
greatest of landowners. The persecution of the Spiritual Franciscans who 
dared in defiance of the bull of John XXII, to maintain St. Francis’s vow of 
evangelical poverty, suggests that the teachings of Francis against economic 
wealth resembled too closely the teaching of Christ for the princes of the 
Church.
However, the Church endorsed the theory that the lands of the Middle Ages 
were of common domain. The serfs for instance had the right to use them for 
the satisfaction of their needs; they could gather firewood, hunt, fish and 
graze their animals etc. This meant that many were able to free themselves as 
a class from their serfdom. When the common lands were converted into 
modern private property the serfs were excluded from the use of what was 
formerly theirs. As Joseph Ferraro says
According to the principles held by St. Thomas, the social 
order promoted by the modern Church is not a juridical 
order properly speaking; it is rather an institutional
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violence against the poor. What the modern Church 
considers as the order established by God, St. Thomas 
would hold to be against and in contradiction with that 
order.93
With the rise of bourgeois society people were bereft of the social relations 
and institutions which were characteristic of feudal society; these were 
replaced with institutions based on the simple view of humans as 
economically motivated, intent on maximising their own interests. Marx 
defines this view in his assessment of Bentham as “a genius in the way of 
bourgeois stupidity” who takes “the modern shopkeeper, especially the 
English shopkeeper, as the normal man”. He similarly criticises Proudhon 
for viewing competition as “a necessity of the human soul”.
By the seventeenth century a significant revolution takes place. “Nature” 
comes to connote, not Aristotle’s teleological physis, but appetitive and 
aggressive competition. Natural rights (Hobbes’s freedom of the “state of 
nature”) are invoked by the individualism of the age as a reason why self- 
interest should be given free play. The fundamental difference between 
mediaeval and modern economic thought is that the former starts from the 
position that there is a moral authority to which considerations of economic 
expediency must be subordinated, whereas the latter normally refers to 
economic expediency. The community-oriented virtues, not only of Plato 
and Aristotle and of the medievals but also as is now widely recognised of 
Marx, are not compatible with bourgeois modernism which is connected 
with the needs of the atomic individual of the capitalist class. The emerging
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bourgeois world ushered in the ending of limitations to the rights of 
property, and the abolition of notions of the just price; it also turned upside 
down the teaching on usury which was part of the Church’s potential 
restraining influence on the power of the owners of commercial wealth 
which made it to some extent an inheritor of the Platonic ideal of 
philosopher rulers.
Chapter 3. Modern Natural Rights As Opposed to Natural 
Law.
3.1 Hobbes and the English Tradition: Natural Right as Negative Freedom
Modernist moral and political thought generally is a return from the classical 
and mediaeval Platonic tradition to a sophistic position. The Hobbesian 
social contract is a return to the sophistic account of justice as convention. 
The assumptions which underlay the sophistic theories of Plato’s day 
underlie all the typical modem moral and political theories — from 
utilitarianism to Rawls.
In Hobbes’s state of nature there exist only lawless individuals, in whom 
there is no natural tendency to live in society; and man’s life is “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short”.96 For him the fear of violent death expresses 
most forcefully the most powerful and the most fundamental of all natural 
desires, the initial desire, the desire for self-preservation.
62
He conceived of the good life in terms of man’s beginnings or man’s 
“natural right” (i.e. the supposed natural right to do whatever you want - kill, 
rape etc.) as distinguished from duty or perfection or virtue. According to 
Hobbes, all virtues and duties arise from the concern with self-preservation 
alone and hence immediately from calculation. Hence Hobbes’s already 
noted relativist concept of goodness: “whatsoever is the object of any man’s 
appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object 
of his hate and aversion, evil”.99
In contradiction to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Aquinas, the Hobbesian 
notion of misnamed “natural law” would see “positive” human law as a 
necessary correction to our nature as "wolf to man". Here human law is not 
seen as a necessary complement to the natural law; rather it is seen as 
necessary to overcome what is, for Hobbes, the law that we find in nature, 
"the war of all against all". As d'Entreves and Rommen point out, contrary 
to the opinions of A. E. Taylor100 and Howard Warrender101, Hobbes’s is not 
a natural law theory at all, but its rejection. Its revolutionary bourgeois 
asocial, egoistic and selfish view of human nature is antithetical to that of 
Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Hobbes's view of reason is also antithetical to 
theirs; it is only an instrument or tool of the passions. Justice is merely a 
convention, pact, deal, an insurance policy which we would rather not have, 
but which we had the better have. George McCarthy makes a pertinent point 
revealing the differences in these two approaches to justice.
Aristotle begins his investigation into the nature of ethics 
and social justice in his Nicomachecm Ethics by first 
raising the question of the ultimate end or final good of
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human life, or what he calls eudaimonia (happiness). This 
question is far removed from the question of self-interest 
and pleasure of the seventeenth-century possessive 
individualism of Hobbes and Locke or the eighteenth-
i
century utilitarianism of Bentham.
As I have the pointed out in the introduction the basis of Hobbes's position 
on justice is the relativist one that "Whatsoever any man desires, that is it 
which he for his part calls good".103 This is a denial of the notion of 
objective universal rational good, and the reduction of good to pleasure. For 
him there are no essential or objective defining properties of goodness; 
rather it is merely subjective, and relative to what pleases an individual. 
What Hobbes does is to remove the normative (moral) and virtuous 
dimension of the word - all that goodness amounts to is the attractive, 
satisfying or pleasant, instead of what it really should (and rightly, 
dialectically, does) mean: the true, beautiful, moral, just, right, noble, 
honourable, rational and even divine. Leo Strauss describes this as Hobbes’s 
political hedonism; he writes that for Hobbes
the good is fundamentally identical with the pleasant; 
virtue is therefore not choiceworthy for its own sake but 
only with a view to the attainment of pleasure or the 
avoidance of pain...sensual pleasures are, as such, 
preferable to honour or glory.104
The inevitable consequence is the theory of the natural state as one of 
universal war, in which the cardinal virtues are force and fraud. Since the
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law of nature is war, the only motivation for Hobbes's retaining for justice 
the title "law of nature" is the traditional prestige of that title. Hobbes 
recognises that it is not even properly called law at all, since is only a recipe 
for self-defence, whereas for Hobbes law properly speaking is the command 
of a sovereign. That aspect of the title is rescued by Hobbes on the grounds 
that the "natural law" does happen to be commanded by God.
What Hobbes means by the natural law is stated in the first and second 
precepts. The first precept, or general rule of the law of nature is, “that every 
man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and 
when he cannot obtain it that he may seek, and use, all helps and advantages 
of war”.105 From this can be derived the second law “that a man be willing, 
when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself (my 
emphasis) he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and 
be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow 
other men against himself’.106 In essence what Hobbes is describing here is a 
Wild West scenario, where you leave your guns at the door, as long as 
everybody else does so, but once somebody starts shooting then you can use 
your concealed weapon too.
Hobbes makes the false claim that this is essentially equivalent to “that law 
of the Gospel, whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do 
ye to them”.107 On close inspection this is obviously not true; the Gospel’s 
unconditional version of the Golden Rule is to love our neighbour as 
ourselves. This can be clearly seen in the Sermon on the Mount; but Socrates 
also speaks in a vein strikingly similar to that of the Sermon on the Mount in 
the Gorgias where he counsels Callicles to accept slaps on the face.
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Also it is worth noting that for Hobbes the first principle is ‘seek peace’: by 
this he presupposes war. This makes morality and justice solely a means for 
attaining peace; that goal could in theory be secured by genocide; you can 
achieve peace by killing everybody. Tacitus famously said that the Romans 
make a desert and call it peace.
Hobbes also provides us with the failed enthymeme that injustice can never 
lead to peace since “war can never preserve life, nor peace destroy it”. At 
first sight this seems logical, but there is actually an equivocation between 
peace and life. The central concept is also an empty abstraction: the kind of 
war, like the kind of peace, needs defining. This abstract characterisation of 
war and peace by Hobbes is in fact false, since in some cases war does 
preserve life and peace destroy it. The war against the Nazis saved the lives 
of countless Jews, whereas the peaceful submission of other Jews resulted in 
their deaths.
The necessity for the positive theory of law is argued by Hobbes as a matter 
of correcting humanity’s ‘mere nature’. In positing the social contract he 
accepts the view that man is by nature or originally an a-political animal, as 
well as the premise that the good is simply identical with the particular 
pleasant. This theory whose claim to natural law is disputable has no 
recourse to the higher, older Natural Law. It reinforced private property and 
atomistic self-seeking egoism (a-social, pre-social, anti-social) and 
possessiveness. Thus it became in the hands of Hobbes a gross caricature of 
the older tradition of natural law; he nevertheless continued to call it Natural
T 109Law.
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Hobbes held that reason is unable to know universal truths, ideas or forms. 
Words denoting universal concepts are mere names. In moral philosophy he 
believed that the passions hold first place. Reason finds itself obliged to act 
as an instrument or tool of the passions. It merely calculates means to the 
end of satisfying selfish desires.
A. P. d’Entreves in his book Natural Law states that the modem theory of 
natural law was not “properly speaking, a theory of law at all. It was a theory 
of rights”.110 He argues that the confusion was created by Hobbes and his 
anarchical conception of “natural right” as opposed to natural law. For the 
medieval, natural law was the necessary presupposition of natural right — 
there is only a subjective right {jus) in as much as there is a law {lex) 
deriving from objective right {jus, based on right reason, orthos logos, recta 
ratio). A’s natural subjective right corresponds to B’s duty in objective right. 
Hobbes implicitly denies this and rejects the idea that the word jus could be 
used in an objective as well as in a subjective sense. The jus naturale of the 
modern political philosopher is now no longer the lex naturalis of the 
medieval moralist or the jus naturale of the Roman lawyer. As Hobbes states
though they that speak of this subject use to confound ius 
and lex, rights and law: yet they ought to be 
distinguished; because Right consisteth in liberty to do, or 
to forbear: whereas Law determineth, and bindeth to one 
of them: so that law and right differ as much, as 
obligation and liberty.111
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112 • • •With Hobbes and also Locke the emphasis is shifted more and more from 
the objective meaning of right to the subjective. This was something that the 
great majority of natural law lawyers, philosophers and writers would 
previously not have accepted. The lawyers who had been brought up in the 
study of natural law had carefully distinguished between objective and 
subjective right — between the rule of action and the right to act or to receive 
just treatment. Unlike Hobbes they had never held that the two meanings of 
jus are antithetical, but had seen them as correlative — right always 
presupposes, derived from and corresponds to law. This difference is crucial 
if we are to understand the full implications of the modern natural rights 
theory.
What Hobbes attempted to do was to maintain the name of natural law but to 
divorce it from the Aristotelian teleological idea of man’s perfection.113 
What he presents us with here is the extreme Protestant theory of man’s total 
depravity caused by original sin — our fallen nature — which he takes as a 
scientific description of human nature for all time. For Hobbes, man in the 
depths of his being is what the state of nature shows him to be: “a wolf, 
wicked, devoted solely to the self’.114
It may be objected that Hobbes claims that in the state of nature there is no 
sin, but it is clear that there is killing etc., and that the fact that it is not called 
wrong is due simply to the fact that there is no law against it.
Leo Strauss explains the break that Hobbes made with tradition:
It is only since Hobbes that the philosophic doctrine of
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natural law has been essentially a doctrine of the state of 
nature. Prior to him, the term ‘state of nature’ was at 
home in Christian theology rather than political 
philosophy. The state of nature was distinguished 
especially from the state of grace, and it was subdivided 
into the state of pure nature and the state of fallen 
nature. Hobbes dropped the subdivision and replaced the 
state of grace by the state of civil society.115
From what is for Hobbes the “fundamental and inalienable” right of self- 
preservation he traces all justice and morality. The fundamental moral fact is 
not a duty but a right. Duties are binding only to the extent to which their 
performance does not endanger our self-preservation.116 With Hobbes there 
is no obligation to respect or preserve another’s rights. By nature there exists 
only the individual’s perfect right and no perfect duty to others. He sees 
man’s nature as aggressive and competitive, fighting it out with others for 
finite, scarce resources, where the goal of each man is infinite (i.e. indefinite) 
possessiveness or acquisitiveness: what Aristotle called the vice of 
pleonexia.
Hobbes’s view of individual pre-social rights made a decisive break with 
traditional natural law theory which had a strong element of hierarchy, and 
where the natural law, and its subordinate positive human law, were derived 
from the divine eternal law. He inverts the original natural law (which was 
crystal clear about the relation between law and rights — there is only a 
(corresponding) right if there is a law — by stating that rights are logically 
prior to the natural law. For Hobbes the natural law is derived from these
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rights; it is the antithesis of rights, as command is the antithesis of freedom; 
it limits freedom; and it exists only to preserve other freedoms (rights).
In the ancient and medieval community the key element of natural law is not 
individual rights but rather the orientation toward virtue and the objective 
common good for human beings, based on an adequate grasp of human 
nature. This battle between a subjective and an objective, an emotional 
and a rational, a finite and an infinite, a particularist and a universalist 
conception of goodness has been seen in the Platonic confrontation with the 
Sophists, which stemmed fundamentally from the Sophists' divorce of being 
and value (teleology). The foundation of Sophistic thought was that nature, 
as the rule of the stronger, could not be altered, or judged critically, and this 
they perceived as the realistic and the rational understanding of the nature of 
men and gods. Similarly Hobbes states
The most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each 
other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have 
an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they 
can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; when it 
follows that the strongest must have it, and who is the 
strongest is decided by the sword.119
Hobbes, the modern sophist, denied that man has a natural inclination toward 
mutual help and love. For Hobbes love/desire were reduced to the same 
thing — covetousness; desire signifying the want of a thing, and love the
r •. 120possession ot it.
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3.2 The Slate as the Sole Source of Law: Law as Command or Will.
In order that Hobbes’s abstract “peace” may be made possible in spite of our
natural inclination to use whatever means we like to grab all that we can (the
war of all against all), all contracting parties must yield their rights to the
Sovereign -- the state personified — whether this is organised in a
monarchical or democratic manner. Hobbes sees individuals as free of all
relations of mutual personal dependence and hence not fit for society, but
only for the competitive struggle for existence, unless there is an artificially
constructed power to correct and control them — the Leviathan. This leads to
the conclusion that command or will, and not deliberation or reasoning, are
the core of sovereignty. For Hobbes, laws are laws by virtue not of truth or
121reasonableness, but of power alone.
The rise of the modern notion of law is marked by the abandonment of 
natural law in favour of a “positive” approach. d’Entreves states that this led 
to “the restriction of all law to positive law”. “ This led to the exclusion of 
morals from legislation. This destroys the very essence of morality, as moral 
values were not only excluded from the legally posited law, but were now 
derived from legal diktat, no longer from a hierarchical, universal, moral, 
natural, rational law. This is a victory of force over reason, the state and 
the market124 becoming the supreme arbiter of moral life.123
For Thomas God wills a thing because it is good (rational). Hobbes on the 
contrary follows Ockham’s position that a thing is right because God wills it. 
As I have pointed out above in 3.1 Hobbes justifies his use of “law” to
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characterise what he recognises are only “theorems concerning self-defence”
— “called laws it... but improperly” — on the grounds that law is a
command, in this case by God. That does not make his position a natural
law one in the sense in which Plato’s is. Rommen in The Natural Law
• 126remarks that “Hobbes’s doctrine is the theodicy of Ockham secularised, 
and the extreme consequence of the proposition that law is will”. For 
Ockham the natural moral law is positive law, divine will. An action is not 
good because of its suitableness to the essential nature of man, but because 
God wills it. Law as such was separated in a positivist fashion from the 
eternal law when the natural moral law was made into a positive act of God’s 
absolute will. So for Ockham there exists no unchangeable natural law that 
governs the positive law; positive law and natural law stand in no inner 
relationship to each other. The absolute power of God in Ockham’s doctrine 
became at the hands of Hobbes the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan.
One of Hobbes’s purposes in devising his own notion of “natural law” was 
the destruction of independent ecclesiastical law — forcing the Church into 
the service of the state. This served to break down the organisation of society 
as estates and led to the build up of the modern bourgeois social order. C. B. 
Macpherson illustrates this point
[A] stronger state is necessary to maintain a capitalist 
society than is needed to maintain a society in which the 
social relationships are more obviously personal, or more 
obviously purposeful, and so more easily understandable.
The latter society can be kept going by customary moral 
codes the strength of which is automatically renewed
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because the relationships are visible and their value is 
readily perceptible. A capitalist society needs stronger 
political sanctions. It was Hobbes’s supreme merit to see
1 98this and to urge it relentlessly.
For Hobbes the source of natural law is the fear of violent death and the urge 
to render life and property secure. Since for him our nature is bad, thus the 
state becomes good and its positive will becomes the supreme norm of 
property-securing justice. The original idea of natural law, in contrast, 
conceived of a movement of the human mind towards an eternal and 
immutable universal justice. This justice is conceived as being the higher or 
ultimate law, which proceeds from the nature of the universe, and from the
129Being of God and the reason of man.
For Hobbes however the law has its source only in the absolute will of the 
sovereign; the state gives security and protection by monopolising all power 
and it demands as a price strict obedience and subordination through 
identification of natural law with positive law. Thus the concept of natural 
law degenerated from an objective metaphysical idea into a political theory 
which sought to justify and promote “Sovereignty”. The idea of natural law, 
once the eternal objective norm of all social life, served Hobbes as a means 
of establishing the absolute rule of the state, property and the market.
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3.3 Bourgeois Psychology and “Morality”.
C. B. Macpherson in Democratic Theory comments of Hobbes that the
assumptions, explicit and implicit, upon which his 
psychological conclusions depend are assumptions 
peculiarly valid for bourgeois society.
What Hobbes attempted to do was to read back into man the contentious, 
competitive behaviour, which he found in bourgeois society. Hobbes 
attempts to universalise the particular - he takes man’s particular alienated 
life under capitalism and makes it humankind’s universal nature. All 
relations between humans take on the relations of the market - “The value, 
or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price”. Now, human 
relations are largely determined by our relation to capital. This crudely 
reduces the relations between the individuals in society from mutual aid and 
co-operation to the relations of units competing in an individualist struggle 
for place and power in the “free and equal” market.
This raises the vitally important theoretical question as to whether modem 
“morality” is morality at all. Macpherson asserts that
Hobbes’s morality is essentially a bourgeois morality.
When this is followed back it can be seen that Hobbes’s 
analysis of human nature, from which his whole political 
theory is derived, is really an analysis of bourgeois
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man. 132
So Hobbes’s picture may be called an unpleasantly accurate analysis not of 
man as such, but of market man {homo economicus) since the rise of 
bourgeois society. For Hobbes morality is derived from nature as seen after 
the fall and not from our original Edenic nature. He does not allow for 
redemption, the return to our original good nature as the older tradition does. 
That tradition viewed morality as a means to recovering our true nature 
whereas for Hobbes morality is not natural or rational (in the spiritual sense). 
Hobbes’s morality is served by purely instrumental reason, calculating the 
best way to insure the interests of particular individuals or groups.
A. MacIntyre in A Short History of Ethicsn4 tells a story about Hobbes being 
seen giving alms to a poor man. When Hobbes was asked would he have 
done it if Christ had not commanded it, Hobbes replied that he would have 
because not only did it please the poor man but also it pleased him to see the 
poor man pleased.135
Hobbes attempts to found the law of nature on a particularist psychology in 
which the fear of death, and desire for power and commodious living are the 
main natural drives. These he believes are the causes of all our actions and 
should be the criterion of law. For Hobbes our nature is mechanical; our 
actions are caused by self-interest alone - the pursuit of pleasure, profit, and 
power, in a mechanical manner which cannot be changed. It is worth noting 
that this is equivalent to the causal, mechanical relations found in the 
bourgeois market - buyer to seller, capitalist to worker.136 These causal 
relations are, he believes, as natural as are those of physics, and as such can
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be described in a scientific (Galilean) way. Human nature mechanically 
causes possessive, selfish aggressive, competitive behaviour. Human nature 
causes us to compete and fight with each other for material gain and pleasure 
— for him this is a necessity and “natural”. But Hobbes clearly overlooks the 
fact that it is usually reasons and not causes which must be sought in the 
explanation of human actions. He does this by maintaining that self-interest 
alone is the cause of action and in so doing he rules out the full gamut of 
reasons for human behaviour, including love, concern and need and also 
self-denial and self-control and justice. Furthermore, the desire for power 
etc. is themselves reasons for acting and not causes at all. As reasons they 
must stand up to rational scrutiny, which cannot be reduced to casual 
explanation. Watkins comments that
self-preservation or the avoidance of wounds and 
destruction is an egocentric end dictated by a man’s 
biological-cum-psychological make-up, this implies that 
Hobbes’s laws of nature do not have a distinctively moral 
character...[but]...Hobbes speaks of them as ‘moral’ 
laws.137
Indeed Hobbes’s first principle “endeavour peace” is not moral at all. It 
really turns out to mean that we should maintain our physical survival by 
handing up some of our pre-social natural rights to the state so that we may 
obtain our individual pleasure in commodious living. So Hobbes is in fact 
not a moralist or a natural law philosopher at all but rather a bourgeois
1 T O t
apologist - a gross materialist. Indeed it would have been the opinion of 
Kant that while the Hobbesian account of nature was true, enlightenment
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should take not this Anglo-French materialist form but the German idealist 
form of obedience to an autonomous universalising reason. That however as 
we shall see was very different from the traditional Aristotelian unity of 
reason and nature.
Locke borrowed from the mediaeval tradition, especially Aquinas through 
Bishop Hooker. However he was also strongly influenced by the possessive 
individualism of Hobbes and transposed Hobbes’s contract to the political 
level, making the state a trustee or even a night-watchman whose only duty 
is to protect my property in my body, my life, my liberty and my estate. This 
begins with my natural right to own that with which I have mixed my labour; 
this is a possessive individualist emphasis within the parameters of Hooker’s 
natural law. We have thus the first theoretical division between the socio­
economic natural dimension or sphere and the “rational” political dimension 
or sphere (in the new sense of rational as profitable, or calculating self- 
interest). This echoed the factual bourgeois division between the economy as 
the unlimited use of capital, obeying alleged natural laws, e.g. of supply and 
demand. This division was later theorised by Hegel as the division between 
the natural sphere of “civil society” and the spiritual (geistig) sphere of “the 
universal, the ethical”, the State. Marx in turn criticised this division (e.g. in 
“On the Jewish Question”).
Hume, the father of positivism, made explicit what was implicit in Hobbes, 
that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. He was 
attempting to found a “science of man”. He thought that he was 
accomplishing for ‘morals’ what Newton had recently accomplished for the 
natural world. Reason, he thought, has nothing to do with ends but is
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confined to discovering the means to those ends. For Hume the great 
discovery of modern morals is that all values are subjective. He insists that 
there is logically no deduction of an “ought” from an “is”. There is a total 
dichotomy of fact and value; this comes from replacing the view of human 
nature as having an intrinsic telos with a mechanistic model, and also 
reducing all justification to causal explanation, seeing mechanical causality 
as the sole source of all explanation.
Hume’s theory of science is empiricist; he describes experience as a 
manifold of impressions. His view of scientific explanation is based on the 
constant conjunction of experiences. So the object of science is to look for 
causal explanation, assuming determinism. Causality itself is explained by 
Hume as a psychological belief due to a constant conjunction of atomic 
experiences of events. Positivism also decrees that all values come from the 
wishes or passions of individuals, whose views are simply another fact and 
cannot be judged by any criteria such as essence or value. Here morality is 
causally explained as sentiment or feeling, for reason is unable to grasp any 
values in the nature of things: reason simply follows the dictates of what is 
‘in our breast’ - the passions.
The is/ought, fact/value dichotomy stems from a mechanistic view of human 
nature and society in which each individual is seen as determined by nature 
to seek his or her own interests, and as rationally justified only in doing so. 
This is connected with empiricism — what is observed or experienced are 
facts, and not values. For if the universe is a mechanism then there are no 
objective, rational values -- these are just arbitrary choices. This leads to 
differing views of the source of morality. For Hume it is “in the breast”, but
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for him as well as Bentham it is also in utility or pleasure.
Bentham’s totally inadequate scientistic reconstruction of morality (it has no 
place for justice—“talk of rights is nonsense, talk of natural rights is 
nonsense upon stilts”) seeks objectivity in mechanism. “Nature has placed 
mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them to 
determine both what we shall do and what we ought to do”. Values are 
therefore entirely relative, given by desires for pleasure, wants, wishes etc., 
and therefore cannot be judged from any criterion outside themselves; they 
are the criterion of rationality. It is foolish (irrational) to do anything which 
does not lead to my pleasure. This is, in my sense, the height of relativism. 
For this egoism, community is fictitious; there are only individuals, and they 
should not be directed towards the universal common good, but only to the 
greatest pleasure of the greatest number. There is no conflict here between a 
given egoism and any alleged altruism: there exists only egoism; but a 
rational organisation of society, including a market and also legislation 
which is primarily directed to securing a free market, will reconcile 
competing egoists.
This mechanical model of nature, science and rationality is relativist: its 
mechanistic ontology and its emotivist epistemology are based on feelings, 
especially putative sensations of pleasure which are relative to particular 
individuals and do not have the universality of thought. This is a complete 
departure from the Aristotelian or any other realist ontology and 
epistemology, including a theory of science. For a realist theory, iron rusting 
is not just a constant conjunction of experiences or events, or the mind 
ordering the empirical data — the rather it is an observable, objective, natural
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necessity. It is of the nature or essence of iron to rust when exposed to 
water; this will always happen independently of our mind’s recognition of it. 
This theory of natural necessity counters relativism. It is also critical of 
Kant’s formal logicist view of moral necessity. The realist theory of science, 
as held for instance by Roy Bhaskar, offers a criticism and an alternative to 
this kind of scientism.
An Aristotelian style or Gestalt biology or psychology (which derived from 
Husserl’s phenomenology) is a useful corrective to positivism as it makes us 
see the needs of the organism e.g. nutrition, health, as natural and objective. 
Gestalt psychology criticises scientism which is positivist. It also criticises 
the view that the practice of science requires the theory of universal 
mechanism, by stressing the organic model of much of nature, which is 
teleological. This is Aristotelian in spirit as opposed to Cartesian. For such 
thinking, if humans are to flourish then they need justice as plants need 
water: they also need to be loved and to love. Such an account of needs 
bridges the division between the “is” and the “ought”. It is of the nature of a 
human being, as Aquinas argues, that the intellect needs total truth, and the 
will needs total good. The recognition of truth as a good for humans is a 
practical judgement, but it is also a theoretical one, about the nature of 
things; the “is” and the “ought” are included in such an insight into human 
nature.
5. 4 German Idealism: The Failed Dialectic
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It is true that Kant’s theory of the categorical imperative necessarily rejects 
Anglo-French enlightenment utilitarianism as expediency and not morality at 
all. This is an attempt by Kant to rescue morality from mechanism, and to 
that extent to return to the older tradition of natural law. However, he accepts 
the Cartesian dichotomy of mind (reason) and mechanistic matter (to which 
nature is reduced). He develops that into what Marx called “the Christian
139Germanic dogma of the opposition between spirit and matter”.
He also accepts, via Rousseau's social contract, the Lockean concept of 
economic nature divorced from contractarian politics. The social contract 
theory in Rousseau's hands is an attempt to raise it up from its empiricist, 
individualist, hedonist and antagonistic form, which Marx called a 
Robinsonade, to a universal intellectual and moral level, worthy of human 
nature as the Stoics for instance had seen it. But as Marx pointed out in a 
very crucial passage in “On the Jewish Question”, Rousseau had to see the 
social contract as a quasi-miraculous way of raising the modern asocial 
"natural" being to the height of the social — a distinction which would have 
been unintelligible to Aristotle, and was unintelligible to Marx. Marx quotes 
Rousseau:
Whoever dares to undertake the founding of a people’s 
institutions must feel himself capable of changing, so to 
speak, human nature, of transforming each individual, 
who in himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a 
part of a greater whole...of substituting a partial and
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moral existence for physical and independent existence.
He must take man’s own powers away from him and 
substitute for them alien ones... 140
Against this Marx’s reply is:
Political emancipation is the reduction of man on the one 
hand to the member of civil society, the egoistic, 
independent individual, and on the other to the citizen, the 
moral person... [But] only when man has recognised and 
organised his forces propres as social forces so that social 
force is no longer separated from him in the form of 
political force, only then will human emancipation be 
completed.
Kant also accepts empiricism as an account of the basis of experience is 
receptivity to a Humean manifold of impressions. The transcendental mind, 
however, imposes an order on phenomena i.e. the mind imposes on this 
flotsam and jetsam “forms of intuition” such as space and time and 
“categories” such as causality. The manifold of sensations is ordered by the 
mind. Kant held this to be the source of the objective; the nature of 
objectivity is transcendental subjectivity. Objectivity does not come from the 
world; it comes from the mind’s imposition of categories. For Kant objective 
morality also comes from the noumenal realm which is divorced from nature 
(the phenomenal realm).141 Morality is therefore not natural; the only 
meaning Kant could give to “natural inclination” would be “instinct”142 
which would contradict the freedom and autonomy which he sees as
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essential to morality. Deprived of natural substance, morality is reduced not 
only to legalism (for Kant the essence of universality) but, as Hegel argued, 
to formalism, and I would add, to logicism - the test of a “maxim” is only 
that it can be universalised without self-contradiction, not any content which 
has reference to anything in the physical universe, such as human welfare, 
physical or spiritual.
As a result of this sundering, human positive law is said to no longer have 
any competence in the “court of conscience” ,43~ in morality — whereas for 
Thomas by contrast good laws must be obeyed “for conscience sake”.144 For 
Thomas, law is inseparable from the moral sphere; moral judgements enable 
us to decide the goodness or badness of laws. Law is an act of the intellect 
besides and before being an act of the will.
According to Habermas the Kantian separation of law and morality is an 
irreversible achievement of modernity. He shares with Kolakowski the fear 
of Stalinism which they both claim shows that it is good to separate politics 
from morality - to prevent the stifling of moral opposition to tyrannical state 
law.14:> This is not a necessary conclusion; as we have seen Acton called 
Aquinas the first Whig because his natural law theory allows resistance to an 
unjust state, and even tyranncide. Perhaps Habermas believes that mediaeval 
thinkers held the — in fact Renaissance — theory of the Divine Right of 
Kings.
For pre-Cartesian philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, as for 
some anti-Cartesian philosophers such as Hegel and Marx, reason is 
dialectical because it points to, and leads to, higher being, whether it be the
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Platonic Republic or the unification of the human race in the unalienated 
mode of production and distribution of communism. The undialectical 
thought of Hume and Kant led them both to a closure of thought and being; 
Hume’s closed mechanistic account of nature and sceptical epistemology 
finds a mirror image in Kant, whose position is an equally undialectical 
closure, that of logical necessity.
Dialectical thinking is diametrically opposed to mechanistic thinking and 
claims to reach a unifying, totalising and evaluative truth, and not just to 
understand the causal relations between finite things, or to serve 
instrumentally and uncritically the atomic individual’s desires, wants or 
cravings (which are to teleological reasoning often irrational or unnatural). 
There is rationality in the universe, and it contains values which are natural, 
so to live well we must live by these values. For instance human beings are a 
natural kind, and it is a matter of knowledge that they do not thrive on either 
side in concentration camps; similarly they do not thrive in an exploitative 
system of production which is based on profit. This is a matter of natural 
necessity; just as we know that water will rust iron. For dialectical thinking 
there is nothing wrong with instrumental reason as long as the end is right or 
good and the means genuinely lead to it: mere subjective desires obviously 
do not always meet these criteria as they may amount only to the selfish 
desires of particular individuals or groups such as classes, who represent 
vested interests.
Unlike Aristotle and Marx, empiricists deny essences or natural kinds. This 
is undialectical and is rejected as anathema by both the pre-Cartesian and the 
post-Cartesian dialectical tradition. Essentialism constitutes not only a link
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between previous dialectical thinkers and Hegel and Marx, but also is the 
central tenet of both their epistemologies and ontologies.
The Aristotelian teleological approach views reality as a development of 
potential to achieve the actual, or a development from potency to act. This is 
an essentialism, in that the essence is the actuality of the potential inherent 
within the thing; the essence is what the thing truly is and can be. Nature is 
another term with the same meaning as essence; a thing’s nature is also its 
essence or what it actually is or can be when its potential has been fully 
developed. This Aristotelian teleological approach of the development of a 
thing’s potentiality so that it can actualise its essence or nature is an 
important part of both Hegel’s and Marx’s thought.
Dialectical thought, inseparable from philosophy in classical and mediaeval 
thought, was abandoned in the dominant schools of early modern 
philosophy. Kantian dualism, itself a result of Cartesian dualism, provoked 
the rediscovery of dialectics by thinkers who wished to reconcile the dualism 
of “is” and “ought” which characterised modem theories of thought 
(epistemology) and being (ontology).
The thought of Hegel was such an attempt. With his rediscovery and use of 
the Platonic/Aristotelian/Stoic/neo-Platonic dialectics of ancient times and 
his praise of Spinoza’s thought in modern times, he attempted to overcome 
the Kantian and other dualisms through the synthesising power of dialectics. 
Hegel followed Kant’s rejection of Anglo-French utilitarianism, but he 
rejected what he called Kant’s formalism and attempted to restore a place for 
a content in ethics (Sittlichkeit) beside Kant’s morality (Moralitaet).1*6 The
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goal of the union of form and content was a typical motif of dialectical 
thinking. Hegel claimed that dialectical reasoning is the intellect’s own 
method for the discovery of truth. Hegel called this Science (Wis sense haft). 
For Hegel the culmination of this process is the establishment of Concrete 
Universals. The subject and substance are now the same, no longer divided 
into phenomenal and noumenal realms; the self-consciousness of Spirit has 
achieved full development and includes and retains within it all that has gone 
before; in the process the Spirit has enriched itself in its becoming actual.
Hegel believed the Kingdom of Prussia had put an end to man’s alienation 
from self or God. He believed that once man conceives of himself as a 
spiritual being who is part of an absolute Spirit (Geist) he can conceive of 
himself as God. Human destiny would now be to establish a concrete human 
divinity. This would come about when the world of actual, concrete 
existence was understood by Hegelian philosophical insight, ending man’s 
alienation from God. For Hegel the true is the whole. But the whole is 
nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. 
The Absolute is what it truly is only at the end; it is essentially a result of its 
own becoming. So the subject is necessarily an expression of the truth of the 
Absolute (Substance) and becomes identical with the absolute in the Idea’s 
final self-consciousness as Geist. It is crucially important to recognise that 
Hegel also calls this Absolute freedom. For Hegel, Spirit (Geist) is 
constantly actualising itself in this process. The actuality of the development 
of human history is the process of human history working out all the 
consequences of the ideas of historical events. It is only through a 
developmental process that actuality can be gained. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) 
is not simply empirical reality but is based on reason. Actuality is reached
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when the idea and mere existence become one.
In The Philosophy of Right he claims that philosophers who abstract from 
actuality build “models out of thin air”. Reality consists of both what is 
actual and what is potential but for him it is only that which is actual which 
is rational. Much of the criticism of Hegel as an apologist for the Prussian 
state arises from the statement in the Preface to The Philosophy of Right, 
“What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”.147 Hegel’s aim is 
to describe reality and the reason within it; to interpret the world—the owl of 
Minerva flies only with the onset of dusk. When philosophy paints its ‘grey 
on grey’ a form of life has grown old. The philosopher can no more get out 
of his epoch than a man can jump out of his skin. The truth of what is and 
the true nature of actuality come together only in dialectical knowledge; not 
merely by a registering of outward appearance, but in the grasp of the 
underlying essence or reality. For him philosophy does not stop at external 
appearances but holds that if something exists then there must be a reason 
for its existence. For Hegel only real philosophy will scientifically uncover 
the truth, by rising from mere understanding (Verstand) to reason {Vernunft).
No matter how chaotic or arbitrary history may at first appear it is part of 
what Hegel terms a rational progress through what he calls the cunning of 
reason {List der Vernunft). So for Hegel Reason is purposive activity and 
shows itself in historical events and epochs, and crucially in the activity of 
concrete human beings. What is of most importance about the concept of 
Spirit in the Phenomenology is that it is comprehended as the unity of 
substance and subject—whereby the unity increasingly realises itself in 
historical shapes. For Hegel, the phenomenology of spirit is the history of
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self-consciousness. Hegel traces the development of Spirit from Oriental 
times through Greek civilisation, on to the beginnings of the Roman world— 
which lay, for him, in the struggle for recognition and in the relationship of 
lordship and bondage emerging from it—through to the Christianity of the 
middle ages, whose nature Hegel expounds in the principle of the unhappy 
consciousness, to the achievement of freedom in Germanic Christianity.
The story Hegel tells also applies to particular minds, for each reflective 
individual is able to recapitulate the educational journey in his own 
consciousness, up to that stage which the generic human consciousness has 
reached in his lifetime.149 In The Philosophy of Right he states
As a thought of the world, it (philosophy) appears only at 
a time when actuality has gone through its formative 
process and attained its completed state. This lesson of 
the concept is necessarily also apparent from history, 
namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity 
that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs 
this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in 
the shape of the intellectual realm.1'0
Such a philosophy can, he tells us
recognise in the semblance of the temporal and transient 




The reality of everyday bourgeois political and social life was of the utmost 
importance to Hegel. Hegel’s work is characterised by his struggle to 
overcome the dichotomies and myriad of oppositions he saw in the world 
around him. Not least of these oppositions was the tension between the 
particular needs of the individual and the universal needs of the state. In 
Hegelian terminology this may be termed the dialectic between particularity 
and universality. Hegel was concerned with resolving the split between civil 
and political life; that is economic man fighting for his particular interests 
and political man as a citizen of the state, the universal. Hegel’s idea was 
that the individual achieved freedom when particular economic will was 
preserved within the universality of a political community.
The individual could only achieve freedom by being a responsible and self- 
reliant participant in a state which he both respected and obeyed. This he 
believed would be the unity of subjective will and objective order. For Hegel 
genuine selfhood was only possible in a well-ordered state and a well 
ordered state was only possible if its constituent parts have achieved genuine 
selfhood. For Hegel the state comes about not to maintain power, wealth and 
status for the few at the expense of the rest; instead he insists that it is the 
self-awareness of the individual citizens which creates the state. He states 
that private and public needs and interests are fused; the core of the state is 
subjective, but the subject is objective/universal through membership of the 
state.
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Chapter 4. Marx: Return from Egoistic Natural Rights to 
Communal Natural Law.
4.1 Marx: Universalist Rationality
Marx replies in criticism of Hegel that the truth about the bourgeois state is 
the existence of a tension between the existent and the ideal or inverting 
ideological. The essence of the ruling bourgeois class is its search for its own 
particular interests (profit, interest and rent) and its opposition to real 
universal rationality or universal justice in the ideal of communism. This is 
belied by its appearance as a protagonist of ideal universality, of 
classlessness, of egalitarian membership of the market and the state, as 
against the hierarchical social and political status of feudalism.
Marx believed that previous pretended universality like that of Hegel’s 
rationalisation, idealisation, “transfiguration and glorification” of early 
bourgeois “man” and the world he created, private property and the market, 
especially in the kingdom of Prussia, has been distorted owing to the 
exploitative nature of the capitalist class and private property.
The aim of Hegel’s idealism (not to be confused with Plato’s idealism), 
according to Marx, was to idealise existing reality; that is, to show that the 
highest possible ideal, therefore the will of God, was already realised. Marx 
criticises Hegel for such a closure because it confuses something finite with 
eternal truth; Hegel uncritically accepts the Prussian state as the incarnation
90
of the divine idea. Hegel universalises the particular by infinitising the 
finite. Marx says that Hegel is guilty of both uncritical idealism and 
uncritical positivism; he both idealises the Prussian state and accepts it as it 
is without criticism. Marx, following Feuerbach, criticises the inversion of 
subject and predicate in Hegel’s philosophy, where man as a real subject is 
turned into a predicate of a universal substance, the Idea.
This uncritical mysticism is the key both to the riddle of 
modern constitutions...and also to the mystery of the 
Hegelian philosophy...this point of view is certainly 
abstract, but the abstraction is that of the political state as 
Hegel has presented it. It is also atomistic, but its 
atomism is that of society itself. The point of view cannot 
be concrete when its object is abstract. 153
Referring to Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s inversion (transposition) of 
subject and predicate Marx wrote in the “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts” “Feuerbach founded true science and genuine materialism in 
the relations of ‘man to man’ [I to thou]”.134 So for Marx it is not the case 
that material reality is the product of the Idea but vice versa. Hegel conjures 
the finite out of the infinite. What Hegel does, says Marx, is “to fasten on 
what lies nearest to hand [i.e. the Prussian state] and prove that it is an actual 
moment of the idea”.133 Lucio Colletti quotes Hegel as follows, “The state is 
the divine will, in the sense that it is mind present on earth, unfolding itself 
to be the actual shape and organisation of a world”.136 On the contrary, says 
Marx the state is the tool of a particular interest group; the bourgeois class. 
“Just as religion does not make man, but rather man makes religion, so the
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constitution does not make people, but the people make the constitution”.158 
Marx breaks new ground in his analysis of Hegel by exposing a radically 
new level of problem altogether. This surpasses Feuerbach’s analysis of 
Hegel and is a crucial turn in Marx’s thought. To quote Colletti,
From this insight there follows a radically new analysis. It 
is no longer accurate to say only that the concept of state 
Hegel offers us is a hypostatised abstraction; the point 
becomes that the modern state, the political state, is itself 
a hypostatised abstraction.139
So it is not just a matter of turning Hegel’s philosophy the right way up but 
of turning the social world itself the right way up.160 Hegel sought to end 
man’s alienation through philosophy but Marx sought to do this in the 
revolutionising of humankind and society.
Marx insists that present needs should be met before human beings turn their 
minds towards some perfect future society. This is why Marx’s work was a 
critique of the present before being a prediction of the future. For Marx there 
is no point in writing in detail about the goods a future society will provide 
when a majority in the present world live in conditions where they have 
barely enough food to survive. By drawing attention to the misery faced by 
the proletariat under the capitalist system, Marx showed the necessity of 
changing the present mode of production.
If we change a system which promotes selfishness to one which promotes 
co-operation, especially in production and distribution, this will have an
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impact on how we live, think and act. It would create change, revolutionary 
change which would allow our teleological nature to flourish further. Marx 
describes the removal of capitalism’s enforced production relations and 
alienated mode of being as like a re-birth or realisation of our true nature — 
creative, communal, social, loving. This rationality for Marx is the true 
meaning of the productive (good) life. For Marx this is the call for 
philosophy to be abolished but at the same time realised (actualised).161
Marx’s criticism of Hegel is radically different from that of the young 
Hegelians (Hegelian left) who mistakenly saw the problem as a contradiction 
between the principles and the conclusions of Hegel’s philosophy. For the 
young Hegelians the principles are revolutionary and the conclusions 
conservative. For them, that is because Hegel made a personal compromise 
with the Protestant Prussian State. His closure of philosophy was premature. 
The main point of this line of interpretation is that, according to the Hegelian 
left, the celebrated Hegelian identity of the real and the rational should not 
be understood as the observation or consecration of an existing state of 
affairs, but as a programme to be actualised.
However, its actualisation for them merely meant a secular atheistic state 
with a constitutional monarchy and no established religion. This they 
believed would be the true universal state, Mind (Spirit, Geist) unfolded in 
history. For them this would be the actualisation or closure of philosophy. In 
reply to Bauer’s “On the Jewish Question” which denied Jews the right to 
campaign against religious discrimination against them in politics on the 
grounds that the revolutionary task was to campaign for atheism in politics, 
Marx replied bitterly that confinement to the political was not revolutionary.
93
Political demands for secularism had been met elsewhere (America) and had 
not brought about human liberation. Real liberation would come from the 
workers’ social and economic struggles such as those of the Silesian weavers 
whom the Young Hegelian, Ruge, condemned as “mere stomach-filling”.
The Young Hegelians blamed such workers for degrading the honourable 
struggle for political rights into the gross material struggle for food. Marx’s 
stinging reply to Ruge’s article on “The Kingdom of Prussia and Social 
Reform” was that the universal, therefore human (or inhuman) relationship 
was on the material earth of production, not in the ethical “heaven” of 
citizenship. For Marx stomach-filling (which is of the earth) is not alienated.
In Hegelian idealism there is a myth that a change in consciousness is all that 
is required in order to free man from his alienated state. For Hegel the 
human task lies in “seeing the rose in the cross of the present”, we must 
come to recognise that the actual is rational. The ‘True Socialists’ came to 
regard revolution as a simple matter of changing minds. The Kantian stance, 
which perceives the material (nature) as something below a truly human 
level (mind), is maintained throughout.
Each of these fails to comprehend what seemed so striking to Marx, that is, 
the practical nature of human activity whose aim is the realisation of our true 
nature — of humanity in its richest form. Contrary to this, Hegelian idealism 
attempts to console individuals, rather than practically changing the actual 
circumstances that human beings find themselves in. For Marx the ultimate 
realisation of the Hegelian idea of the state as universal reason implies that, 
once the state is truly universal, it ceases to exist as a differentiated organism
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and acts as a unity or totality. Hegel’s adoption of the bureaucracy as the 
‘universal class’ hypostatises a given historical phenomenon (early 
bourgeois man) into a self-fulfilling norm. Marx challenges the Hegelian 
idea’s hypostasis in the German state, and sees the proletariat, the class with 
no other to exploit, as the potential for a real embodiment of the universal. In 
the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction”, Marx expresses 
this universalism when he mentions the proletariat for the first time. He 
writes that a class must be formed
...with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not 
a class of civil society, a class {Stand) which is the 
dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal 
character because of its universal suffering and which 
lays claim to no particular wrong because the wrong it 
suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general; a 
sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a 
historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not 
stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in 
all-sided opposition to the premises of the...political 
system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate 
itself from - and thereby emancipating - all other spheres 
of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity 
and which can therefore redeem itself only through the
total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society
162as a particular class is the proletariat.
In The Holy Family Marx stresses the inhumanity of the proletariat's
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situation:
In the fully-formed proletariat the abstraction of all 
humanity, even of the semblance of humanity, is 
practically complete; since the conditions of life of the 
proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society 
today in their most inhuman form.
The universalistic nature of the proletariat continues to appear in Marx’s 
later writings. It recurs in the Preamble to the General Rules of the 
International, drafted by Marx in 1864.164 It also lies behind Marx’s 
criticisms of Proudhon’s mutuality, and Bruno Bauer and the ‘True 
socialists’ version of the role of the masses in emancipation.163 Shlomo 
Avineri writes: “The disdain of Bauer and his disciples for the masses and 
their tendency to avoid complicity with the proletariat were motivated by a 
fear lest the general vision of liberty be replaced by advocacy of a particular 
class and espousal of its cause. For Marx, however, the proletariat was never 
a particular class, but the repository of the Hegelian ‘universal class’.” In 
1870, Marx criticises the British labouring class because he sees its inability 
to universalise its experience as its major weakness.166
However, universalising is not the imposition of uniformity; for humans 
there are always different situations due to e.g. climatic location or differing 
abilities and disabilities which would need specific prescription in order to 
help humans live well, (large families, medical conditions, isolated areas, 
culture, ethnicity, sexuality), there would also be certain givens or needs 
(food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, education and love which includes
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justice) which if not provided would in fact lead to dysfunctional or partial 
human living — in short an inhuman life.
Under the capitalist economic system we are forced to submit to economic 
laws which are alien to us. This results in reducing the lives of vast swathes 
of humanity to starvation or beggary167 and the ontological disaster (spiritual 
death) of reification (becoming a thing). Marx often used morbid language to 
describe the exploiters, and to stress how inhuman they had become. The 
capitalist is like a vampire or werewolf lusting after the living blood of 
labour.169 Dead labour (i.e. capital including machinery, raw materials and 
commodities) lives off living labour. As Marx puts it
in its blind unrestricted passion, its werewolf hunger for 
surplus-value, capital oversteps not only the moral, but 
even the merely physical maximum bounds of the 
working-day. It usurps the time for growth, development, 
and the healthy maintenance of the body. It steals the time 
required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It 
haggles over a meal-time.170
Bourgeois society is inhuman because it does not allow us to realise our 
nature: sociability in free, conscious, creative activity. Marx insists that the 
proletariat’s overcoming of inhumanity would be the realisation and 
actualisation of man as a “universal, therefore free being”, “understanding 
things according to the laws of their species and creating according to the 
laws of beauty”.171
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When, in the course of development, class distinctions 
have disappeared, and all production has been 
concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the 
whole nation, the public power will lose its political 
character... In place of the old society, with its classes and 
class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which 
the free development of each is the condition of the free
172development of all.
Marx’s historical materialism culminated in the claim that only the 
proletariat could and would produce a classless society which would inscribe 
on its banners: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs”. For Marx this social revolution can only be carried out by a class 
whose claims represent universal needs; this class is the proletariat. Marx 
describes the proletariat as genuinely the universal class because it is nothing 
but humanity. Later he realised that the Russian peasantry in the form of 
the agrarian commune could fulfil the same potential.
Because the proletariat is propertyless and suffers the “total loss of 
humanity” and as such has no other class to exploit, Marx believes that they 
can genuinely be called the universal class and for that reason they must 
fight to attain pure rationality (justice, spirituality). This rationality would 
include common ownership and control of resources, production for the 
common good according to ability, distribution according to need rationally 
and democratically agreed in institutionally encouraged good will. Marx 
writes:
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No class in civil society can play this part unless it can 
arouse, in itself and in the masses, a moment of 
enthusiasm in which it associates and mingles with 
society at large, identifies itself with it, and is felt and 
recognised as the universal representative of this society.
Its aims and interests must genuinely be the aims and 
interests of society itself, of which it becomes in reality 
the social head and heart. It is only in the name of the 
general interest that a particular class can claim general 
supremacy...that genius which pushes material force to 
political power, that revolutionary daring which throws at 
its adversary the defiant phrase: I am nothing and I should 
be everything.174
He repeats the same claim in the German Ideology . Consequently he 
interpreted the Paris Commune as an attempt to replace the illusory 
universality of a partial state by an association truly universally orientated. 
The Commune was based on universal suffrage and was an example of the 
dissolution of the distinction between the state and civil society.
Any alleged class relativism of Marx is thus a misunderstanding. He actually 
wanted to see an end to all systems of “justice” which are class relative. For 
Marx, the proletariat is the universal class, and the answer to class relativism 
because it aims at classlessness. It will replace class relativity with an 
immediate relation to the proletariat’s own realised essence, which is 
humanity. The realisation of this would be the universal justice or rightness 
of humanism, as it would simply be for the good of all of humanity, and
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would be truly rational, hence just, because it would end forever the use of 
power, and of systems of “justice” to legitimate it. This universal rationality 
does not wish to dominate and exploit any particular class; classlessness is 
not the wielding but the abolition of power.
4.2 Communism As Humanism
In the political debate over whether there is such a thing as a just society, 
conflicting views of human nature play a key role. Marx can be interpreted 
as holding a view of human nature that is at one and the same time critical of 
all historically static notions and yet not given over to relativism because he 
still affirms there is human nature in general. More importantly he held that 
the specific function of humanity is its openness to the validity claims of 
universality and the good, whereas the bourgeois view of human nature 
rejects this specific function and confines humanity to the particular and the 
pleasant (or painful). This division over human nature parallels the conflict 
between the rational recognition of natural objective values, and their 
rejection in relativism.
Marx believed that humanity both communally and individually could only 
become authentic or truly human when the universal class rise to the 
ontological level by establishing communism or humanism or naturalism. 
This idea of justice for Marx could be viewed as liberation and rationality for 
the human race. He did not use the terminology of justice, possibly because 
he did not want to contaminate his work with the quid pro quo ‘justice’ of 
the bourgeoisie. However, (as we shall see) like Plato’s ideal, Marx’s 
communism is ontological justice. There is a lot of clear evidence that Marx
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did not reject the idea of a human nature. 176 To give an example of this Marx 
says that
...man is not only a natural being; he is a human natural 
being; i.e. he is a being for himself and hence a species­
being, as which he must confirm and realise himself both 
in his being and in his knowing.
For Marx as much as for Plato the pursuit of goodness is not subjective, 
arbitrary or selfish but is rather is for the objective good of the species - the 
Golden Rule’s advocacy of loving others as you would have others love you. 
For both, a new and “truly human morality” and ontology are identical and 
consist in cultivating the shared goodness which is true community. Both 
Marx and Plato in the Republic's first (healthy, not the second, feverish) 
society, share the belief that only in a community of direct producers is it 
possible for human creative potentialities to come to the fore and therefore 
become fully human and rational or spiritual. The community-oriented 
virtues, not only of Plato and Aristotle and of the mediaevals but also of 
Marx, are not compatible with the version of modernism which is connected 
with the needs of the individualist and therefore relativist capitalist class.
Marx, just like Flegel and Kierkegaard, holds that people ought to relate to 
each other on the basis of their own particular, but spiritually integrated, 
individuality. Marx demands that people live up to the Golden Rule; we must 
have in ourselves qualities correspondent to those that we seek in others. If 
we want trust from another, then we should ourselves be trustworthy; if we 
seek helpfulness, love, kindness, we ourselves should be helpful, loving,
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kind.
Marx’s thought is a rejection of mechanistic thinking and a return to 
dialectical thinking. His use of Aristotelian methodology in his rejection of 
Cartesianism and subsequent dualisms are evidence of his reliance on the 
earlier dialectical tradition. Marx’s whole concept of nature is an Aristotelian 
one of development of potential. He writes that the human being “acts upon 
external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his 
own nature”. For Marx the very concept of history is one of a world- 
creating process.
Humanity has a conscious life activity as opposed to mere animal instinct. In 
this it is correct to say that the individual is a self-conscious social being by 
nature. However, this is negated by capitalism. In the first volume of Capital 
Marx stated the implications of the process of labour,
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man 
and Nature participate, and in which man of his own 
accord starts, negates, and controls the material reactions 
between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to 
Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms 
and legs, heads and hands, the natural forces of his body, 
in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form 
adopted to his wants. By thus acting on the external world
and changing it, he at the same time changes his own
. 180nature.
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Marx uses the concept of need to refer to the potentialities of species being. 
His aim is a radical egalitarianism: a universal account applicable to all 
humans and not merely relative to some or other groups or individuals. For 
to establish what human nature is, is also to establish what it is for humans to 
live well. Marx believed that man should labour to fulfil his “true needs”, 
including the need for truly loving, social relationships. In the capitalist 
division of labour however, labour ceases to be the vehicle for satisfying and 
fulfilling our human needs. Instead for the majority of the species, labour is 
alienated into becoming as Marx said in the “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts” a means to the basic “means of life” — a means to merely a 
subsistence living, barely human.
Marx’s thought may be regarded as a type of materialism as distinguished 
from Hegelian Idealism. But his position is more appropriately characterised 
as a form of naturalism, which is to be contrasted with the ontologies and 
anthropologies of both idealism and materialism.
We see how consistent naturalism or humanism differs
both from idealism and materialism and is at the same
181time their unifying truth.
Marx’s naturalism is materialism to the extent that he believes that the “real 
world” is fundamentally the world of nature; that man is to be conceived first 
of all as part of nature, a natural being existing alongside and among other 
natural objects and that consciousness is a faculty of this natural being by 
means of which it is present to other natural objects and to itself. But Marx’s 
naturalism, as he points out in the theses on Feuerbach, also agrees with
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some aspects of idealism. He holds that man is what he is by virtue of having 
passed through a course of development which must be understood in its 
own special terms (not only in terms of social categories, but also in terms of 
claims to rational validity) rather than in terms appropriate only to the 
understanding of mere inorganic and organic nature.
For Marx therefore humanity as it now exists is part of nature, but a being 
which transcends the purely material order, and makes use of the rest of 
nature as a means to the realisation of distinctively human purposes. Marx’s 
understanding of human nature is Aristotelian — the development of the 
substance’s potency towards its telos, according to its form. “ Marx quotes
183with approval Aristotle’s definition of man as naturally a zoon politikon, 
and agreed with Aristotle that the making of money by using money was 
against human nature.184 As Marx says
Money, which is the external, universal means and power 
— derived not from man as man and not from human 
society as society — to turn imagination into reality and 
reality into mere imagination, similarly turns real human 
and natural powers into purely abstract representations, 
and therefore imperfections and tormenting phantoms, 
just as it turns real imperfections and phantoms — truly 
impotent powers which exist only in the individual’s 
fantasy — into real essential powers and abilities... It 
transforms loyalty into treason, love into hate, hate into 
love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master,
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master into servant, nonsense into reason and reason into 
nonsense.183
For Marx communism is the reconciliation of essence and existence. In his 
notes on James Mill, Marx first shows the wage relationship to be a source 
of human alienation. He then shows what communist or true human 
production would be like. In this passage Marx makes clear a number of 
things about human, social, loving production.187 Firstly, I express my 
individuality in my product, secondly it is another human being’s enjoyment 
of my product which satisfies me. Thirdly, the aim of production is use 
values which are produced for other people. Production in communism will 
therefore have a generous aim. Fourthly, rather than the result of production 
alienating the producer, we appear like so many mirrors in which we see the 
reflection of our nature as communal beings who produce for each other.
In true human production as described by Marx, the producer produces in 
order to give. There is no attempt to subject the Other to an exploitative 
relationship as in capitalism. Marx’s position is very close to E. Levinas’s 
view of the I-Thou relationship (Levinas wrote that “to recognise the Other 
is to recognise a hunger. To recognise the Other is to give”). Communism 
for Marx is the institutional structure which is both the material expression 
of, and a support for, our being what the Germans call “mensch”, which 
facilitates the virtue of humankindness. What it is to be mensch is illustrated 
by Marx in its contrast with the callous bourgeois attitude to begging.189
For Marx, unlike for the bourgeoisie, human nature is no barrier to achieving 
communism. This approach is contrary to the Sophistic or Hobbesian
105
approach which would argue that the innate selfishness of humans is what is 
natural and rational. This ontological “fact” ultimately rules out the 
establishment of communism. Marx understood that humans will exhibit 
selfishness in a society geared toward the competitiveness of the market, but 
he also fully understood that these circumstances are changeable; they are 
only conditioned by the capitalist system.
As Norman Geras writes
Marx is challenging what he considers to be a false 
generalisation of attributes which are historically formed 
and culturally specific. He is seeking also to expose...its 
conservative ideological function. It should be obvious 
that to challenge a false or a conservative concept of 
human nature is not to impugn all concepts of it. To 
question whether certain, named characteristics are 
permanent and natural ones is neither to say nor to imply 
that there are not permanent and natural human 
characteristics.190
As the sixth thesis on Feuerbach puts it “Feuerbach resolves the religious 
essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction 
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social 
relations”.191 For Marx while the human essence is not fixed, neither is 
human nature merely relative to class. The classless humanity which the
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particular class which is the proletariat would bring about would be the 
achievement of universal humanity.
Marx’s location of universality (spiritual rationality) has come under fire for 
its claim that only the proletariat as universal class is justified in a 
revolutionary struggle, v/hich would be to achieve a communist mode of 
production. It has only lately been noticed that in the last decade of his life 
Marx was turning to the Russian peasantry as a potential universal class.192 
That development on Marx's part should lead us to a proper understanding of 
his concept of the universal class, which may help to answer the problems 
raised by the contemporary conflicts between the particular and the universal 
evidenced in “communitarianism”, the “new social movements”, “identity 
politics”, and postmodernists’ concerns about closed totalities. These at their 
best demand recognition of the validity of struggles for justice on the part of 
particular identities and cultures, treating the working class as just one 
particular section of humanity among the many particular sections of the 
oppressed. They protest against the imposition by a party and bureaucracy 
which could be seen as only alleged representatives of the working class, of 
a supposed universal good. This could be seen as a privileging of the 
particular subjective interests of that class, presented as the only objective 
good, not as relative but as absolute. They would be imposed at the expense 
of the good of other particular oppressed communities; for instance, at the 
expense of the Irish people’s determining their own future. This is similar to 
the problem of the imposition of the Anglo-American culture as universal on 
the Quebecois, as presented by Charles Taylor. An extreme example of such 
an imposition would be Stalin’s substitution of the alleged absolute reason, 
which is in fact only the particular will of the leader of the party of the
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working class of Russia, as the embodiment of reason not only for Russia but 
for the rest of the human race. These are examples of the failure to recognise 
identity and difference, unity and multiplicity, universality and particularity, 
within the totality of the human race.
However, what can be said of Stalin and of many Marxists with regard to 
this point, cannot be said of Marx. Far from saying that the international 
working class’s achievement of communism was the only thing that 
mattered, Marx believed nations like the Poles and the Irish have a right in 
their national struggles to establish their own particular identities free from 
the oppression of colonial powers in the name of a supposed universality. 
Engels argued that the Irish and the Poles “have not only the right but even 
the duty to be nationalistic before they become internationalistic”. Also, 
Engels comments
the Irish formed a distinct nationality of their own, and 
the fact that they used the English language could not 
deprive them of the right, common to all, to have an 
independent national organisation within the 
international.194
Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht fell into the trap of not recognising 
the importance of particularity when they denied the Poles and the Irish the 
right to a national struggle. They thought that the Poles should be treated the 
same as the Russians, and the Irish the same as the British, because as 
workers they were all part of the one universal class: to act otherwise would
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be to put the particular before the universal. But this argument is obviously 
against not only the spirit but the letter of Marx’s own writings and is an 
example of the corruption of Marx’s thought by Marxists.
A similar imposition was attempted by the “Marxist” Official I.R.A. in the 
early 1970’s, which forced a split that severely weakened not only the 
national struggle, but, in addition, the possibility of building an effective 
revolutionary social movement in Ireland. This has led them for instance to 
support Orangeism against the struggle for Irish independence. Like 
Luxembourg they believed that the British presence in Ireland which stopped 
unification of Ireland was no longer important: only the alleged unification 
of the working class was important.
What they attempted in Marx’s name was to claim a universal “rationality” 
which was contrary to Marx’s expressed views. A particular identity must be 
recognised before or together with a universal class position, as Marx 
showed in his recognition of the rights of the Irish working class to 
autonomous recognition in the I.W.M.A., against English trade unionists’ 
chauvinism.
Marx's criticism of Hegel could be expressed in contemporary terms along 
the lines that Hegel's system was a closure of philosophy and that Marx’s 
philosophy remained an open one. But it could be argued that Marx's own 
philosophy merely postponed the closure, to the future date of the victory of 
the proletariat. There are grounds for such a claim; for instance Marx said 
that communism would be both “the abolition and the actualisation of
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philosophy”;193 he also claimed that communism was the “solution to the 
riddle of history”196 and “the end of pre-history”.197 Among claims that there 
is a closure in Marx's thinking there are two different versions: one, that 
there is a mechanistic closure, and the other, that there is an idealist one.
Is there a mechanistic closure in Marx's thought? The famous 1859 Preface 
to The Critique of Political Economy is perhaps the most appropriate place 
to look. The Preface is primarily an introduction to Marx's publications on 
economics which culminated in the four volumes of Capital. “Marxists”, 
such as Plekhanov and Kautsky, argue that the Preface represents much 
more than a meagre prelude to Marx's thought. They use it to postulate the 
idea that the economic base determines the superstructure which is made up 
of political and legal institutions. Change in society is considered by them to 
be the consequence of developments in material productive forces and the 
technical division of labour which alone are considered bona fide 'relations 
of production'. This is how they understood “no social order ever perishes 
before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have 
developed”.198
Plekhanov thought that capitalism was a universally necessary relation of 
production that all forms of society would at some stage pass through, and 
that this should be seen as a natural and progressive occurrence. This is a 
mechanical process which culminates or closes with communism. He took 
Marx's work to imply that capital had a universal nature, regarding it as the 
necessary consequence of the development of social forces, and that the 
expropriation of the peasants was “necessary” to bring about the
socialisation of the workers. This is the belief that social mechanism is a 
scientific truth on a par with the law of gravity.
Mechanists believe that the 1859 Preface uncovers the central tenets of the 
material conception of history and represents the starting point which Marx 
builds upon. For them, it states that the economic base determines the 
superstructure which is made up of political and legal institutions. The 
superstructure includes forms of consciousness which are considered as an 
effect of the base. The base is specifically economic whereas the 
superstructure is made up of the political (non-economic) institutions. 
Change in society is considered to be the consequence of developments in 
material productive forces.
A technological determinist interpretation of change denies the possibility 
that we can avoid the capitalist mode of production, as this mechanism 
insists that technology is the only way to communism. The material 
productive forces are therefore assigned explanatory primacy and we reach 
closure or completion when all nations pass through the technological stage: 
only then could communism be possible. Technological determinism, 
though considered functionally, rather than causally, is for some mechanistic 
Marxists the only approach to understanding how society operates. In The 
Poverty of Philosophy Marx asserts "the hand-mill gives you society with 
the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist".199 
Mechanists identify this as being the essence of Marx's thought. For G. A. 
Cohen Marx is best understood in functionalist terms; technology is the 
central dynamic force.200 Mechanism excludes moral values, and analytic 
Marxists are in that tradition when they try to reduce moral struggles to self-
interested ones, and follow Allen Wood in interpreting Marx as an anti­
moralist.
Engels in 1886, three years after Marx’s death, said, in his Ludwig 
Feuerbach, that there were two great camps in philosophy, the idealists and 
the materialists, and that the materialists were right. For “Marxists” like 
Plekhanov and Kautsky this became evidence to support a closed 
mechanistic interpretation of Marx’s thought. The highly influential 
pamphlet was no doubt the chief intellectual source of much Marxist 
thought: in Engels's account we find a wholesale and uncritical rejection of 
idealism in favour of its opposite materialism, which will lead to 
communism. The mechanists argue strongly that this is a determinist history 
of an irreversible development whereby means of production automatically 
cause changes in relations of production. This is also a theory of stages of 
utilitarian progress which each society in turn inescapably has to pass 
through — or be put through. However Marx insists that his historical 
account of the genesis of capitalism in Capital should not be read as a 
universal law. In a letter to the Russian journal Otechestvenniye Zapiski in 
1877 Marx insists that:
The chapter on primitive accumulation does not pretend 
to do more than trace the path by which, in western 
Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the 
womb of the feudal economy. But that is too little for my 
critic. He feels he absolutely must metamorphose my 
historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western 
Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the general
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path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical 
circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it may 
ultimately arrive at the form of economy which ensures, 
together with the greatest expansion of the productive 
powers of social labour, the most complete development 
of man. But I beg his pardon. He is both honouring and 
shaming me too much.202
This mechanistic unilinear view of history as progress in freedom, the 
“Whig interpretation of history”, sees stages in progress, not as a matter of 
the past, but as an essential and still today a relevant part of the present. It 
includes the absolute progress in Enlightenment from the Catholic stage to 
the more enlightened (in Weber’s terminology “rational’) one of 
Protestantism. This also in turn leads to the stages of Deism, freethinking 
and atheism. Each historic stage, wherever and whenever it appears, has to 
be jettisoned in favour of its historic successor. This has led Marxists for 
instance to support reactionary Orangeism against the struggle for Irish 
independence.
The mechanistic approach demands imposition by representatives of the 
industrial working class of a universal good; namely the interests of that 
class, seen as the only good and imposed at the expense of other particular 
goods. Therefore, Stalin becomes the possessor of the supremely rational 
will as the leader of the party of the working class of the country of the 
revolution. That can be interpreted as the embodiment of reason for the rest 
of the human race — justifying the closure of philosophy.
Marx on the contrary sees the essence of the proletariat as its 
propertylessness — it has no other class to exploit. He believes that it can 
therefore genuinely be called the universal class, and that it can attain pure 
rationality. This version of rationality claims that it is only the universal 
class itself which can in its revolutionary struggle achieve humanist 
emancipation, the infinitude of the human telos.
Is Marx's thought, then, an idealist closure? For Marx the proletarian class 
united by its universal suffering of total injustice has within it the means 
(revolutionary activity) to redeem itself and to redeem humanity; by 
liberating itself it will liberate the whole of humanity. Marx views this as a 
dialectical culmination; he refers to it as the rational kernel in the mystical 
shell of Hegel's dialectical philosophy.
Communism is the genuine resolution of the conflict 
between man and nature, and between man and man, the 
true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, 
between objectification and self-affirmation, between 
freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It 
is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to 
be the solution.203
Marx’s early writings are imbued with Feuerbachian humanism, and there 
are resonances of idealism, but they must be radically distinguished from 
Hegelian Idealism. For Marx the fundamental distinguishing feature of his 
thought — which he says is "neither materialism nor idealism, but the 
unifying truth of both" — is that it is dialectical. His position is more
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appropriately characterised as a form of naturalism, which is to be contrasted 
with the ontologies and anthropologies of both idealism and materialism.
So Marx’s naturalism and humanism (which for him is synonymous with 
communism) is to be distinguished both from idealism and materialism and 
at the same time contains an element of truth from both. Marx’s naturalism 
is at one with materialism to the extent that he believes that the ‘real world’ 
is fundamentally the world of nature; that man is to be conceived first of all 
as part of nature, a natural being existing alongside and among other natural 
objects and that consciousness is a faculty of this natural being by means of 
which it is present to other natural objects and to itself. But Marx’s 
naturalism also agrees with some aspects of idealism. He holds that man is 
what he is by virtue of having passed through a course of development 
which must be understood in its own special terms (in terms of social 
categories) rather than in terms appropriate to the understanding of mere 
inorganic and animal nature. Man thus is what he has made himself to be, 
through his own activity, which, at least collectively considered and in 
relation to the laws governing mere things, is free and self-determined. For 
Marx communism is the reconciliation of essence and existence and the end 
to all dualisms: this could be interpreted as a closure or completion of both 
philosophy and history. However, such an interpretation would be mistaken.
The aim of pre-Cartesian dialectical thought was to achieve an 
understanding of the relationship between the finite and the infinite. It could 
be argued that the investigation of this relationship leads to the knowledge 
that a closure in the sense of a totalising understanding of philosophy is
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impossible. For dialectical thinkers this does not signify despair or breed a 
sense of futility regarding the attempt to form such an understanding; rather 
this truth merely states that we can know something of the relationship 
between the finite and the infinite, and that this understanding can be 
enriched and clarified by the use of reason, but it can never be total or 
absolute. The acceptance of this inaugurates both negative theology and 
negative dialectics.204 Plato affirms this in discussing The Good beyond 
being and starts a tradition which in Aquinas for example, is intellectually 
impelled to understand the relationship between man and the Good. It also 
understands that while we can move closer to the truth we can never fully 
possess a knowledge of God’s nature or essence. In short this tradition 
admits that we can never know the totality of being.
The statement “Religion is the opium of the people’ (while taken out of its 
context i.e. religion is “the sigh of the oppressed”, “the soul of a soulless 
condition” and “the heart of a heartless world”)" raises the question of how 
Marx can be said to be in a dialectical tradition whose function was to 
investigate the true relationship between the finite and infinite. Is religion 
itself a closure of philosophy? The answer to these questions must involve 
investigating the difference between Plato’s dialectic and Marx’s, or the 
origins of dialectics and the present inheritor of that tradition.
For the dialectical thinker, things, persons and institutions are measured by 
their essence — the finite only has value in its relation to the positive perfect 
infinite (the Platonic Idea), through universal thought or mind. Reason’s role 
is to understand or grasp the ideal, the just or the good — what should be, or 
the potentially perfect. In doing so reason grasps the nature of reality; not
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only what actually is or what actually exists in the material world but also 
what ought to be — the best, the truest, the most perfect -- the ideal. This 
dialectical ontology and epistemology is not based on a quasi-Manichaean 
dualism between matter and mind, finite and infinite, nature and spirit. 
Rather such an understanding is reached in terms of a rational totality which 
is hierarchical and inclusive; in short dialectical. For dialectical thinking, 
thought and being are thus distinct, yet essentially related. It aims at a 
unitary godlike understanding of being where the value of anything is its 
measuring up to its truth. This dialectical unity of fact and value is 
connected with the unity of theory and practice. Therefore insight into it 
requires not only intellectual but moral change and even ontological change 
— a change in being.
Marx expected this kind of change from the proletariat: a change from the 
alienated possessive, exploitative bourgeois mode of being, to the generous, 
loving or truly human and communal being of communism. For both Plato 
and Marx the rational and natural aim is being, not having; and love is 
dialectically, as in Plato’s Symposium, both desiring and giving. Flappiness 
and justice are self-realisation in community -- shared growth in goodness. 
When this communal essence is realised then individuals will be truly 
bonded; they will not relate to each other in terms of pre-social individually 
chosen ends, in pursuit of separate interests.
Marx’s vision of humanity and nature, humanism, is the antithesis of the 
Cartesian dichotomy of mind (human) and matter (nature). Marx’s thought 
can be seen as a development of the thought that precedes the Cartesian 
dichotomy, that is, of Plato and Aristotle and Aquinas rather than that of
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Hobbes, Kant and Bentham. This fusion of humanism and naturalism is the 
objectively proper flourishing of humanity and is not a question of 
possessive rights but of true being. Marx’s thought shares in the classical 
non-reductionist dialectical natural law tradition’s vision of nature as 
emergentist and orientated towards infinite value. For him this would lead 
to communism or humanism and would open up infinite possibilities for 
humanity which are stunted, thwarted and limited by an economic system 
which produces for profit. Against mechanists and Hegelian idealists Marx 
states that communism is not the goal of history, rather it is the end of pre­
history and the start of History proper. This is not a closure therefore: it is a 
new beginning which opens up the latent potential humans have for creative 
production.
Marx’s whole concept of nature is of potential development. As he puts it
Nature is man’s inorganic body, that is to say nature in so 
far as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature, i.e. 
nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing 
dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s 
physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means 
that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.
Marx is not only anti-Cartesian, he actually returns to the pre-Cartesian, 
praising Aristotle for insights into not only economic but political and moral 
realities. Marx attacks moralities on both sides of the Cartesian dichotomy, 
Hobbes and Bentham on the hedonist side, Kant on the “ascetic”. In contrast
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to the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and matter Marx said, “thought
208and being are indeed distinct, but they also form a unity”.
For Marx capitalism is the real closure of thought and society because it is 
the imposition of class rule, relative to the interests of a particular class, in 
the name of universal justice. Capitalist society presupposes the antagonistic 
interests of different classes as well as different individuals. But the finite 
interest of one particular class is given infinite, absolute value. This critique 
of the imposition of a false universal is the valuable core of postmodernism, 
which offers a similar criticism of Hegelianism and Stalinism, in the name of 
difference and against totalising identities. This is important, but it is one- 
sidedly against any possible principled unity, and is prejudicially anarchistic. 
Firstly it must be said that post-modernism is merely an extension of 
modernism (which is basically what Engels called ‘anarchy of production’). 
The essence of this has been brilliantly captured by Stanley Rosen who says 
that “Postmodernism is Enlightenment gone mad”.209 Some of its criticisms 
e.g. of Stalinism are valid; the problem is that they are done in the name of 
relativism or anarchism. Also as we have seen they are not valid criticisms 
of Marx; in fact postmodernists often echo without acknowledgment Marx’s 
own arguments against bourgeois modernity. These could also be used 
against the corrupted mechanistic social-engineering modernism which, with 
the help of its geo-political antagonist imperialism, prevailed in the U.S.S.R.
Postmodernism aimed to do to the “communist” priesthood in Moscow, what 
modernity did to the old priests and Kings. But it fails to equally recognise 
that capitalists like General Motors or Shell are similarly the new “priests” 
on the other side and as such they equally need to be challenged.
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Postmodernism is the new iconoclasm which seeks to deal the last blow to a 
religion which they claim came from Hegel through Marx to Stalin. Like 
Voltaire, it is suspicious of ‘priests”; it despises authority and rejects its 
claims to rationality — but only by rejecting in principle any possibility of a 
unifying rationality. Like the Protagorean position adopted by Mackie it 
adopts a completely relativist ontology—there is no right (reasonable) thing 
to do other than following your own pleasure.
4.3 Marx and the Capitalist Economy
While Marx employed the methods and key concepts of the economic
science of his day in analysing capitalism (especially the labour theory of
value), he embedded that explanation in a higher-order philosophical theory
of the economy. This latter theory, derived from the Aristotelian account of
the household economy, seeks to situate the economy in an overarching
account of the community. Also for Marx, the fitting function of economic
life in a community should be rational, a means to the realisation of its
higher (non-economic) purposes. As Marx says, a truly human economy
“...is a means to a final goal which lies outside circulation, namely the
210appropriation of use-values, the satisfaction of needs”.
In many of his works on economics, Marx credits Aristole with providing 
the key insights for his own critique of political economy. In Capital vol.l 
Marx writes
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Aristotle’s genius is displayed precisely by his discovery 
of a relation of equality in the value-expression of 
commodities. Only the historical limitation inherent in the 
society in which he lived prevented him from finding out 
what “in reality” this relation of equality consisted of.
Marx made specific reference to the importance of Aristotle in his own 
thinking at every stage in his intellectual development. This is of crucial 
significance, as these acknowledgements provide clear evidence that the 
form and substance of Marx’s own theories are to be understood within the 
broader cultural and philosophical traditions of classical antiquity.
He mentions Aristotle thirty three times in his doctoral dissertation On the
213Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, 
and twenty times in his notebooks on Epicurean philosophy. He connects 
his theory of production and consumption in the Grundrisse to Aristotle’s 
theory of potentiality and actuality in the Metaphysicsand he refers to 
Aristotle eight times in A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy. In the first volume of Capital he acknowledges Aristotle as the
••216 • • “greatest thinker of antiquity” and as crucial to the development of his
labour theory of value. There are many other specific references in Capital
to Aristotle’s theories such as that of value. Michael De Golyer’s article in
Marx and Aristotle affirms that for Marx
Value was...the material basis, as well as the concept, 
from which all else derived. Even while Hegel’s Logic 
and its philosophical methodology undoubtedly
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influenced Marx, the Logic presupposed a familiarity 
with the development of logic to its author’s time; and in 
the history of that growth, Aristotle as the “Father of 
Logic” stands squarely at its inception. Even economics - 
in the minds of many readers, Marx’s major fixation - 
finds a significant portion of its earliest source in 
Aristotle.218
Marx borrowed from Aristotle the distinction between use value and 
exchange value, the distinction between the economics of the household 
economy (trade and barter) and the commerce of chrematistic economy 
(exchange for profit as merchants’ capital and interest-bearing capital). He 
used Aristotle’s ideas about the political and social nature of man, and the 
relation between leisure, slavery and technological development.
Central elements of the Aristotelian critique of an economy given over to 
Midaslike acquisition also find their way into Marx’s evaluation of 
capitalism, and the ideal of the ancient oikos (household) forms one of the 
core parts of Marx’s theory of communism as the new household economy. 
The Greek household economy offered Marx a glimpse into a world in 
which the economy was put to the service of human ends and in which it was 
their designs and not the uncontrolled, autonomous workings of the market 
that shaped relations between persons.
At the most fundamental level, the contrast between C-M-C and M-C-M’ 
formations—drawn from the Aristotelian distinction between oikonomike 
and chrematistike, Kapelike and tokos—had two functions for Marx. First, it
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schematised the key differences between the need-orientated pre-capitalist 
economy and its surplus-directed successor. Second, it provided for Marx (as 
it had also for Aristotle) a normative dividing line useful in marking out, on 
the one side, an economy that was governed by human purposiveness and, 
on the other side, an economy that ruled over and consumed the persons 
engaged in it. Thus Marx would write “Men once more gain control of 
exchange, production and the way they behave to one another”. W.J. 
Booth points out that
The oikos economy’s quality of being subordinated to 
human rule, and its being in the service of an end outside 
of production and circulation, unquestionably appealed to 
Marx and gave him a part of the foundation for his theory 
of communism.220
Marx sought to capture the second type of economic formation in his 
“general formula” of capital—M-C-M’—indicating that the driving purpose 
of the economy (M’) was the unlimited acquisition of embodied surplus 
value. This manner of understanding capitalism was also taken from 
Aristotle, and especially from his idea of the chrematistic life, chrematistike 
(the art of acquiring money wealth) which he contrasted with oikonomike. In 
Capital vol. 1, Marx states
Aristotle contrasts economics with ‘chrematistics’. He 
starts with economics. So far as it is the art of acquisition, 
it is limited to procuring the articles necessary to 
existence and useful either to a household or a
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state.. .Therefore, as he goes on to show, the original form 
of trade was barter, but with the extension of the latter 
there arose the necessity for money. With the discovery 
of money, barter of necessity developed into... trading in 
commodities, and this again, in contradiction with its 
original tendency, grew into chrematisics, the art of
92 ]making money.
Marx in the first sentences both of Capital, Vol. I and of the Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy states that “The wealth of societies in 
which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an ‘immense 
collection of commodities’”. For Marx it is the same forces that produce 
both poverty and wealth. Both are the consequences of systematic human 
action. Marx did not see communism in distributive terms. Moral and 
political philosophers in the analytic tradition, who prefer to single out for 
treatment “issues” such as abortion and nuclear weapons as totally separate, 
think of “poverty” as an isolated social problem, and one which could be 
overcome by a localised redistribution of ‘wealth’—meaning money. But 
this is not what Marx, Aristotle or Aquinas understood as the meaning of 
wealth. The distinction between use-value and exchange-value (what 
Aquinas following Aristotle calls the difference between natural and 
artificial riches) is foundational to the early Western tradition. Marx stands 
squarely in that tradition. This is why R.H. Tawney calls Marx “the last of 
the schoolmen”.224
This tradition has a rich dialectical, teleological, social ontology of 
humanity, which is shared by Marx. George McCarthy in Dialectics and
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Decadence draws attention to the importance of this insight for Marx:
Out of Aristotle’s critique of unlimited and unnatural 
wealth acquisition flows Marx’s whole rejection of 
bourgeois economics and commodity exchange. Aristotle 
is very helpful to Marx in the development of his theory 
of circulation and commerce. However, Marx must reach 
past the limits of Aristotle’s understanding of 
commodities and money into the areas of the creation of 
surplus value, profit accumulation, and the social modes 
of capitalist production.225
For Marx communism will only come about with the ending of the alienated 
division of the political, the economic and the moral (the unity of which was 
thought by Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas to be an absolutely essential part of 
rationality). Marx’s understanding of a social totality derives both from 
Hegel’s concept of totality and Aristotle’s concept of society as an organic 
whole.
At the same time, the novelty of Marx’s appropriation of the idea of the 
household economy must be recognised. In fact it was a transfiguration, and 
was due to the importance Marx attached to autonomy and to his profound 
hostility to the absence of freedom and the presence of hierarchy which he 
associated with the despotic nature of the ancient household economy. 
Because of slavery, however, Aristotle unlike Marx could not base his ethics 
on the injustice of commodity production, and the social and economic 
relations whereby labour power itself becomes a commodity. In Capital vol.
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1 Marx reveals that the commodification of labour power into abstract labour 
is the necessary condition for a solution to Aristotle’s problem; for it is only 
in the fully developed form of commodity production that the secrets behind 
it become visible. As McCarthy puts it
Marx is indebted to Aristotle’s view of society. That is,
Marx’s whole critique of political economy as reflected in 
the values of liberalism and structures of capitalism are 
ultimately based on his reading of Aristotle’s critique of 
false acquisition and moneymaking. What Marx has done 
is to rewrite and update Aristotle’s works on ethics and 
political theory for the modem audience. The new theory 
is a neo-Aristotelianism informed by German idealism, 
nineteenth-century political economy, and French
99 Asocialism.
For Marx the emergence of capitalism meant a shift from the predominance 
of use value, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, to 
exchange value and to the search for ever-growing surpluses. In place of the 
direct relations of domination and servitude characteristic of the precapitalist 
world, human relations in capitalist society are mediated via exchange and it 
is just this pervasive presence of exchange that sets the real basis for the 
“freedom” and “justice” of bourgeois society.
Marx repeating Aristotle states, “The circulation of money as capital is...an 
end in itself... The circulation of capital has therefore no limits”. Marx’s 
crucial distinction between use-value and exchange value is connected to the
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distinction between useful (or concrete) labour and abstract labour. Our 
labour-power is our capacity for useful concrete labour, whose products have 
a use-value; in order to create exchange-value it must be bought and used as 
abstract labour. Use-value is for Marx a transhistorical category, which may 
be applied within all modes of production. Exchange-value by contrast, has 
nothing to do with the intrinsic qualities or usefulness of goods; it merely 
expresses the tradability, the market value, of any commodity.
Marx condemned Ricardo’s approach to capitalism:
Ricardo in his book (rent of land): Nations are merely 
workshops for production, and man is a machine for 
consuming and producing. Human life is a piece of 
capital. Economic laws rule the world blindly. For 
Ricardo men are nothing, the product everything.
Marx was also opposed to the ‘state socialism of people like Ferdinand 
Lassalle of the German Workers Party whose politics was confined to 
bargaining with Bismarck for reforms like an old age pension, and in general 
better treatment of workers within the bourgeois system. Marx thought that 
the approaches of the Ricardian and Lassallean socialists were worthless 
because they could not achieve the emancipation of the working class.
Marx showed the difference between an economy oriented to objective 
universal human need and an economy oriented to “preference satisfaction”, 
which for the capitalist is the accumulation of value. The latter depended on 
exploitation, which Marx showed to be the defining characteristic of
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capitalism. In the market, the capitalist and the free labourer appear to make 
an equal exchange between a day’s labour and the day’s wage and the 
labourer is said to receive the full value of his day’s labour. He uncovered 
the hidden essence behind this appearance.
For Marx the extractive power of the capitalist is based on ownership of the 
means of production. He shows that in the bourgeois mode of production 
labour-power becomes a commodity and that behind this mode of production 
lies a trick. Under capitalist production those who do not have access to 
other means of production and who cannot sell the produce of their labour 
must instead sell their ability to labour, or labour power. It becomes a 
commodity which the capitalist uses to produce other commodities. But it is 
also the source of the phenomenon Marx registered in the “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts”, that under capitalism the rich become richer and 
the poor become relatively poorer.
We shall start out from a present-day economic fact. The 
worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the 
more his production increases in power and extent. The 
worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more 
commodities he produces. The devaluation of the human 
world grows in direct proportion to the increase in value 
of the world of things. Labour not only produces 
commodities; it also produces itself and the workers as a 
commodity and it does so in the same proportion in which
229it produces commodities in general.
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Marx discovered how the capitalist is able to buy the elements of production 
— raw materials, instruments of labour and labour-power — and sell the 
commodities produced at their apparent values, yet is still able to create a 
sum of value additional to that laid out in his original purchase. The 
additional sum is surplus value which becomes profit, interest and rent, the 
end result of the process.
In the capitalist market place, the alleged “value of labour”— or ‘a fair 
wage’— is said to be settled by the forces of supply and demand, in ‘free, 
fair, and open competition’. However, in capitalism the class nature of 
exploitation is not immediately clear. It gives the impression that two 
individuals meet and freely exchange. In reality however the relationship is 
between two members of antagonistic classes. The capitalist tricks the 
worker into thinking that s/he is exchanging labour for wages, and that s/he 
is being paid for each hour of the day that s/he has been employed. This 
enables the capitalist to exchange wages for the use of labour-power as 
labour—which alone has the power to increase the value of other 
commodities.
The use-value of labour-power to the capitalist is that it can be used as n 
hours’ labour, which generates a value exceeding the value of the wages paid 
for it. The capitalist consumes n hours’ labour which produces n units of 
value, while only a fraction of n (x/yn) units of value are returned to the 
worker as wages. The capitalist pays the worker only the value created in 
part of the day’s labour, what Marx calls ‘necessary labour’ — that part of the 
day’s labour which is necessary to create the value embodied in the wage. 
The capitalist therefore only pays the worker for a fraction of the day’s use
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of labour-power. The rest of the day’s labour remains unpaid, but it produces 
surplus-value, which is realised as profit, interest and rent.
The value of labour power is determined, as is that of every other 
commodity, by the labour time necessary for its production, and when 
necessary its reproduction. Wages are therefore paid to the worker only at a 
subsistence level, what it costs to produce the worker’s labour power, and 
through his/her family, to reproduce the supply of labour-power.
The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with 
which we started, has now become turned around in such 
a way that there is only an apparent exchange... The 
relation of exchange subsisting between capitalist and 
labourer becomes a mere semblance appertaining to the 
process of circulation, a mere form, foreign to the real 
nature of the transaction, and only mystifying it.
Marx exposes the wage relationship as the theft (i.e. taking without 
recompense) of surplus labour.
Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is 
paid, while the other part is unpaid, and while that unpaid 
or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which 
surplus value or profit is formed, it seems as if the
231aggregate labour was paid labour.
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For Marx the trick of extracting surplus value replaces the chains of chattel 
slavery and the socio-political hierarchy of feudal serfdom, by persuading 
the worker that s/he is a free agent in a fair market engaged in relations of 
justice with other free and equal human beings. Marx unmasked and de­
mystified this process by showing that this is robbery and compulsion under 
the pain of death. This involves a double deceit (or confidence trick) by the 
capitalist.
As we have seen Marx brilliantly exposes the capitalist’s ‘sleight of hand’ by 
showing that the origin of surplus-value is unpaid labour, unrequited labour 
time. Indeed the capital out of which the wage itself comes is the surplus 
value which has been created in previous unpaid labour time. So in the final 
analysis Marx says that: ‘ the whole thing still remains the age old activity of 
the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money
232he has stolen from them’.
A. The First Trick.
The everyday deceptive appearance is that there seems to be an equivalent 
exchange of wages/labour, a ‘fair’ exchange. This is pure illusion, generated 
by the practice of paying by the hour. For it leaves unanswered the question: 
where does the capitalist’s profit come from? The answer is that it comes 
from extortion. It is not CMC, an exchange of equivalents, of commodities 
of equal value. It is MCM’; that involves, firstly, the exchange of two 
commodities of equivalent value, wages (M) for the unique commodity 
labour-power (C); but secondly, the subsequent use of labour-power as
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necessary and also as surplus labour. It therefore involves slavery, the 
extraction of surplus labour which is unpaid, unrequited. Indeed, since the 
use of labour-power, not only for surplus, but even for all labour, necessary 
and surplus, is paid for out of previous profit, created by previous surplus 
labour, the capitalist obtains all labour free, gratis and for nothing. This is 
nihil pro quo, the height of commutative injustice. It is also the necessary 
result of the distributive injustice of the prior distribution of means of 
production, which ensures that out of the value created by labour the worker 
receives wages, while profit goes to the owner of capital, interest to the 
owner of finance capital, and rent to the land-owner (the former, and in 
Marx’s day still a current, ruling class—which in the House of Lords last 
used its power in 1912 to block the Irish Home Rule Bill).
Foolishly the Ricardian Socialists want the ‘full proceeds of labour’ from the 
employer - impossible in the capitalist system, which is why Marx calls them 
utopian. The difference between the Ricardians and Lassalleans on the one 
side and Marx on the other, is that Marx does not demand justice within the 
wage relationship as they do, because for him the dual reality is (i) at the 
market level the value-equivalent exchange of wages for the commodity (and 
means of production) labour-power—as ‘fair’ an exchange as buying or 
selling a car, but also (ii) at the production level the use of labour-power as 
labour, by its new owner the capitalist, to make profit out of it (also interest 
and rent). The capitalist is fully entitled to this within the economic system; 
it is as ‘fair’ as using a newly bought car as a taxi, to make profit out of it.
B. The Second Trick.
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Even the equivalent exchange (in the market) of the commodities, labour- 
power and wages, is an illusion if it is thought of as an equal exchange of a 
normal commodity, since labour-power is a unique commodity. The seller of 
labour-power does not seem to lose freedom or justice, since the subsequent 
use of surplus labour belongs to the capitalist by way of bourgeois property 
rights. The buyer of labour-power is fairly entitled to use labour-power as 
s/he wants, as the buyer of a car is entitled to use it as a taxi. But what the 
capitalist wants is to force the worker to work for longer than it takes to 
produce the value embodied in the wage. Thus labour-power is not a normal 
commodity, since not only is it ontologically the seller’s alienated life- 
essence, but economically it produces more value than it fetches.
Is the theory of exploitation morally neutral? No: it reveals two levels, one of 
exchange and one of production and it shows that the level of production 
involves the opposite of exchange. The ‘fair’ and ‘classless’ form of the 
exchange part of the relationship conceals the material (class part) 
relationship, its content, which is exploitation. In fact Marx’s use of the 
conquest metaphor expresses the truth that the worker is working for 
nothing, which is unjust like all other forms of slavery.
The wage relationship is not freedom or justice; it is exploitation. But this is 
an economic right by the standards of bourgeois ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’. It is 
a move in the capitalist game - it does not require cheating. So there can be 
no internal criticism of the wage relationship. Workers should demand a new 
game, not new dice. The bourgeoisie glorifies this relationship as de jure the 
highest justice and rationality. But this ‘rationality’ is disputed by Marx both 
epistemologically and ontologically, procedurally and substantially. Marx
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explains in Wages, Price and Profit that the wage can never rise above
233subsistence level. Wholly other factors than justice decide the wage. The 
wage is an outcome of the bitterest struggle. In the fight the worker cannot 
appeal to bourgeois justice. Marx believes that every class calls its “justice” 
‘natural’ and ‘human’, but that the proletariat (the last class) is the first class 
genuinely entitled to speak of its mode of production—communism—as 
‘naturalism’ and ‘humanism’, because it is a classless mode.
4.4 Alienation: Background and Roots in Marx.
The concept of human alienation and de-alienation can be found in the 
Judaeo-Christian myth of fall and redemption. The concept of alienation also 
found expression in the Old Testament concept of idolatry. Marx’s critique 
of fetishism can be seen as akin to the critique of idolatry. When Moses 
came down from the mountain the people had built a golden calf to which 
they attributed magical powers and which they worshipped. Marx similarly 
realised that in capitalism, human beings are ruled by their own creation. 
Capitalism was also produced by human beings but it actually degrades them 
to an even lower level than the lost tribe in the desert. For Marx capitalism is 
even worse because it really becomes the master over human beings, 
dictating not only how they live but whether or not they live at all.
Marx's philosophical thought was both influenced by and a reaction to Hegel 
and Feuerbach. Hegel, in his philosophy, sought to end man's alienation 
from God. Hegel conceived of man realising himself as God. He believed 
that once man conceives of himself as a spiritual being which is part of an
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absolute Spirit (Geist) man can now conceive of himself as God. Human 
destiny would now be to establish a concrete human divinity. This would 
come about when the world of actual, concrete existence was fused with 
Hegelian philosophical insight, ending man's alienation from God.
For the young Marx Hegel seemed to offer an escape from dualism and 
pointed instead to the Idea within reality itself. For Marx this meant that man 
was now able to shape his own destiny; God now dwelt on earth; dignity 
was now vested in man and history.
But Marx was greatly influenced by Feuerbach, who sought a kind of 
Hegelianism devoid of any trace of religious mystification. Unlike Hegel, 
Feuerbach regarded alienation234 as an altogether negative phenomenon233 
and he criticised Hegel for presenting a rational Christianity . For 
Feuerbach our knowledge of God is merely a reflection of our knowledge of 
ourselves; the whole notion of God is a figment of man's imagination and 
through religion man projects his own positive attributes onto a purely 
imaginary divinity.
For Feuerbach it was not a case of seeing a divine idea within man. He takes 
as his subject Hegel's predicate: man is not a manifestation (or creation) of 
some mysterious idealistic process but rather the'mysterious idea (i.e. God) 
is the creation of man.
While Marx owes much to Feuerbach and his analysis of Hegel he 
criticises him for concentrating too much on religion; for Marx religion is a 
symptom of and not the cause of man's alienation" .
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Religious suffering is at one and the same time the 
expression of real suffering and a protest against real 
suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless 
conditions.239
Now that man's alienation has been unmasked in its sacred form Marx says it 
is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to 
unmask man's self-estrangement in its secular (unholy) form240.
Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, 
the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the 
criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.241
Marx agrees with Feuerbach that man is alienated through religion but Marx 
sought to identify the manifold alienations of man. Marx saw the radical and 
original source of man's unhappiness and alienation as the exploitation of 
man by man242.
Alienation for Marx is not a feeling. It is a way of being, or rather non-being. 
In the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” Marx recognised that 
people were alienated in capitalist society. This can be summed up under 
two broad headings. Firstly there is alienation of the human being as a 
worker and secondly there is alienation of the person as a social being. The 
worker is alienated from the product s/he produced, s/he is also alienated
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from in the act of production itself, s/he is alienated from his/her species 
being and finally from his/her fellow human being.
For Marx the very concept of history is one of a world-creating process. 
Humanity has a conscious life activity as opposed to mere animal instinct. In 
this it is correct to say that the individual is a self-conscious social being by 
nature243. However, this may be negated by capitalism.
In the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” Marx encountered the 
question of the objectification of the species life of humanity. Marx outlines 
the inherent social nature of the labour process as the specific species-nature 
of humanity. Humanity when seen in this light has the profound creative 
ability to construct the future. Marx claimed there was a division of labour in 
each epoch into unequal sections controlled for the benefit of the ruling 
class, to the disadvantage of the producers. The disintegration of primitive 
communal production initiates the conditions suitable for the emergence of 
private property and with this comes the perennial division of exploiters and 
exploited.
The division of labour is the economic expression of the 
social nature of labour within estrangement...the division 
of labour is nothing more than the estranged, alienated 
positing of human activity as a real species-activity or as 
activity or man as a species-being.
Human beings were regarded by Marx as universal and free beings in that 
they were conscious of themselves as members of their own species and
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could regard the whole of nature as their inorganic body245. While animals 
produce one-sidedly as a result of physical need, human beings produced 
many-sided in accordance with the ‘laws of beauty’246. In capitalism 
however, the worker is not creative. Mechanisation turns work into a kind of 
torture and “deprives the work of all interest”247. The worker now becomes 
an appendage of the machine and his or her individual skills are no longer of 
any importance. As Marx puts it,
What constitutes the alienation of labour? Firstly, the fact 
that labour is external to the worker, i.e. does not belong 
to his essential being; that he therefore does not confirm 
himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable 
and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical 
energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence 
the worker feels himself only when he is not working; 
when he is working he does not feel himself. He is at 
home when he is not working, and not at home when he is 
working. His labour is therefore not voluntary but it is 
forced labour.248
Since the work is felt as degrading and not as an affirmation of individuality, 
the worker has no interest in the object s/he creates. Work is experienced as 
a miserable toil and human life appears to begin only where work ends. 
Under capitalist production those who do not have access to the means of 
production and who cannot sell the produce of their labour must instead sell 
their power to labour. In the production process Marx sees the wage 
relationship as concealed theft and a source of human alienation. He is
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concerned with the conditions under which work - which is not alienated - 
becomes alienated. For Marx labour, productive life is man’s species life. 
Our labour power is our vital species activity, it is what defines us as human; 
it is our ability to interact with nature249 and each other and shape our world 
and ourselves. However, in capitalism both the product and activity of 
production are alienated from and alien to the individual producer. As 
Richard Schacht puts it,
Marx terms labour “alienated” when it ceases to reflect 
one’s own personality and interests, and instead comes 
under the direction of an “alien will”, i.e., another man.
As in the case of the product, he holds that it is the 
surrender of one’s labour power to another man which 
severs the connection between one’s labour and one’s 
personality and interests...The alienation of labour and its 
“surrender” are so intimately related for Marx that he 
often employs the two formulations inter-changeably.
In capitalism the workers neither raise their products in their imagination nor 
create according to the laws of beauty. All individuality is left behind. In 
capitalism therefore the worker is alienated both in the process of production 
and from the end product of the process. Marx condemned capitalism 
because in that mode of production the life activity of human beings, the 
ability to create, becomes for them the very thing which holds them in 
submission, instead of a liberating force. Although all classes in capitalism 
are alienated to some degree, one class in particular is alienated and this 
class is the proletariat. Members of the proletariat have no property but their
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labour power which they must alienate, sell to the capitalist in order to stay 
alive. It is because the workers are forced to surrender themselves to another 
yoke (an alien will) that his/her personality becomes separated or alienated. 
Labour power (our vital species activity) is forcibly alienated and becomes a 
commodity (like any other) which the capitalist uses to produce other 
commodities . In Capital Marx wrote that,
the domination of the capitalist over the worker is thus 
the domination of the thing over man, of dead labour over
252living labour.
Marx insists that present needs should be met before human beings turn their 
minds towards some perfect future society. This is why Marx’s work was a 
critique of the present before being a prediction of the future. For Marx there 
is no point in writing in detail about the goods a future society will provide 
when a majority in the present world live in conditions where they have 
barely enough food and clothing to survive. By drawing attention to the 
misery faced by the proletariat under the capitalist system, Marx showed the 
necessity of changing the present mode of production.
However, capitalism obstructs, stunts and alienates this natural dependency. 
The onset of capitalism changes this ontology as each human being is looked 
upon as an atomistic human individual. Marx criticises the modern world 
which puts
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egoism and selfish need in the place of these species- 
bonds and dissolves man into a world of atomistic
9 S’}individuals with hostile attitudes toward each other.
Marx criticised the atomistic view of man in the capitalist world. He talks 
about the egoistic indi vidual inflating himself to the size of an atom.234
The way human beings relate in capitalism, the fact that they produce for 
profit and not for the needs of other human beings, is not natural. Egoistic 
man is motivated solely by self-interest. Instead of regarding other men as 
his fellows, he regards them as his rivals and adversaries: he is hostile to 
them. This is not natural — it is alien. Nevertheless economists before Marx 
liked to present the individual of capitalism as the natural human being. 
They argued that the relations between individuals today are natural 
relations. This belief was found by Marx to be very naive. Marx made it 
clear that while he viewed human beings as social by nature, he also viewed 
them as individuals: but for Marx true individuality can not be realised in 
isolation from other individuals. He wrote that
man is a Zoon Politicon in the most literal sense: he is not 
only a social animal, but an animal that can be 
individualised only within society. Production by a 
solitary individual outside society...is just as preposterous 
as the development of speech without individuals who
9 S Slive together and talk to one another.-
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Marx regarded human beings as social by nature. He hoped for a society in 
which individuals wanted to create for others, where individuals wanted to 
give and not merely take. The communist individual by the nature of his/her 
society will be a generous individual and his/her behaviour may resemble 
that of the good Samaritan. For Marx this social revolution can only be 
carried out by a class whose claims represent universal needs; this class is 
the proletariat. Alienation can only be transcended with the creation of a 
communist society, which will enable us to regain and unify these natural 
human endeavours, and regain and unify ourselves, becoming authentic or 
truly human.
4.5 Contradictions of Capitalism as Culmination of Alienation.
Marx thought that the distinction of use-value and (exchange) value is the 
source not only of an understanding of the mechanism of political economy, 
but also of a humanist critique of the alienated capitalist political economy. 
This is an example of Marx’s naturalism, which involves the value- 
implication, in terms of humanism, of a materialist (realist) understanding. 
The concealed origin of the conflict between use-value and value is shown 
by Marx to be in the very nature of the commodity itself. But it develops into 
a visible contradiction in the form of the recurring economic crises of 
capitalism.
In general what happens in a crisis is that production for value ceases 
because it is unprofitable, even though there is a human need for the 
products, that is, they would still have use-value. Crises are caused both by
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the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and by overproduction, which occurs 
when there is no value (purchasing power) available in the market. They are 
a demonstration in the real world of the enormous potential for alienation of 
the system of production for (exchange) value. Crises show the irrationality 
of capitalist commodity production: that is they show the irrationality of 
capitalist rationality. It is not simply that bourgeois rationality, which is 
profit-making, is self-defeating in that as Marx says capital is a barrier to 
itself. More importantly, it is a contradiction of the human essence which 
reveals itself tangibly in the evidence of rotting food and starving people. All 
of this takes place because capitalist rationality is relativist; it is based on 
particular pleasure, not the universal good. True rationality on the contrary is 
spiritual and unifying.
Marx wished to show workers that the allegedly natural ‘economic laws" of 
the bourgeois market are an ideological disguise for the scientifically 
ascertainable exploitative economic laws of bourgeois production to which 
they are subject every day. Science studies the “inner nature” and the “real 
motions” of a thing. It does not stop with perceptible motion, with mere 
contemplation. Marx was the first to try and formulate a science useful to 
revolutionary practice, when he wrote in 1845: “The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in different ways, the point is to change it”. The 
workers need to comprehend the real connection which is hidden behind the 
outward appearance, for we have to understand what we want to change.
To understand the basic structure of a social relationship scientifically, we 
cannot rely on common sense (everyday) ways of thinking. Norman Geras 
shows that Marx held the realist theory of science (akin to that of Roy
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Bhaskar), that science is the discovery of the essence behind the 
appearance. To comprehend a social phenomenon means to recognise its 
real essence. To achieve this understanding it is not enough just to describe 
the surface facts. We have to comprehend the inner connections and study 
their function in the complete system.
This truth is illustrated by Marx with an example from natural science. Every 
morning the sun rises in the East and every evening it sets in the West; this is 
at least how it appears and from this appearance people for thousands of 
years drew the conclusion that the earth was the fixed centre of the universe, 
around which the sun and all the other stars revolved. Copernicus, Kepler 
and Galileo proved the appearance wrong. So natural science clarified a 
causal power that was hidden, it unmasked laws which existed below the 
surface. Similarly Marx sought to uncover the hidden laws which governed 
human social life. Marx makes the comparison with natural science when he 
writes about the capitalist economy:
A scientific analysis of competition is not possible before 
we have a conception of the inner nature of capital, just as 
the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies are not 
intelligible to any but him, who is acquainted with their 
real motions, motions which are not directly perceptible 
by the senses.258
In capitalism the interdependence of the producers is hidden behind the 
exchange of commodities. It is not a transparent relationship of personal 
dependence like that between the feudal landlord and serf, because now
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social relations between people take the form of a relationship between 
things. Work is carried out by each producer in total independence of the 
others; the essential social character of the producer’s labour manifests itself 
only in the eventual process of exchange; whether a worker’s labour is 
valuable or not cannot be known until the product is sold, which may never 
become known to the worker.
By the value form Marx means the form of appearance of value. Value does 
not appear as such in the single individual commodity. Only if a commodity 
enters into exchange relations with others does it acquire, in the exchange- 
value it has against others, a form of appearance of its value: “We may twist 
and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it as 
a thing possessing value”. For example a coat as a commodity only takes 
on the form of value when it is produced as a commodity for exchange. If it 
were simply produced to wear (for use, or as a use-value) then this would 
have nothing to do with value, only with the use-value it has for the wearer, 
because it fulfils a genuine human need. Exchange or circulation is therefore 
the process through which the value-form develops “from its simplest, 
almost imperceptible outline to the dazzling money-form”.
After more than a decade of study in the reading room of the British 
Museum, as well as informed observation of the economic fluctuations of the 
day, Marx reached a deeper understanding of the contradictions of 
capitalism, manifested in the scramble for profitability and the outbreak of 
periodic crises. Marx deals with these problems under two headings. In the 
first he was concerned with the tendency, known since Petty but never 
explained, of the rate of profit to fall, a long run tendency placing chronic
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stress on the system. In the second he was concerned with the discrepancy 
between the production of surplus-value and its realisation; in other words he 
addressed the question of why crises broke out when they did.
In Theories of Surplus Value he wrote of the two forms of the destruction of 
capital v/hich were symptomatic of crises. First, physical destruction such as 
rusting machinery, and second, depreciation of value as a result of the fall in 
prices of the commodities. Marx showed that at this stage finance capital 
enriched itself at the expense of industrial capital.
The theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall attempts to reveal the 
contradictions of capitalism at the level of the moving system as a whole. 
Marx summarised the expansionist dynamic of capitalism as ‘the need to 
improve production and extend its scale, merely as a means of self- 
preservation, and on pain of going under’, and the system operated under 
conditions which had become a ‘natural law independent of the producers’
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and which was ‘ever more uncontrollable’. Marx argued that the 
expansionist dynamic necessarily involved massive and regular dislocation, 
and any periods of equilibrium were only won after the violent purge of a 
major crisis. He believed that the pressures which the system brought on 
itself provided the long-term tendency which rendered crises inevitable.
Marx saw that the true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself, for 
attempts to valorise capital come constantly into contradiction with the 
methods of production necessary for the unlimited expansion of capital. 
Crises themselves were, in a temporary way at least, resolutions to the 
contradictions of capitalist production, resolutions which were carried
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through at an enormous cost in human life, great waste and hardship. They 
were violent solutions for the existing contradictions which, for the time 
being, restored the disturbed balance. Marx makes no attempt to hide his 
hatred for the system. He states that the system depended on the 
dispossession and impoverishment of the great mass of producers and 
insisted that the whole process was perverse and alien because production 
only extended when it could produce a profit and not in order to satisfy 
human needs. He demonstrated that the propensity of capitalism to develop 
the powers of production and to create a world market — its ‘historic task’ — 
was in ‘constant contradiction’ to its ‘social relations of production’.
Can such a conclusion be justified when capitalism continues to survive 
crises and dramatically increases the intensity and scope of its production 
over one hundred years after Marx’s death? The continued existence of 
capitalism does not in itself vitiate Marx’s arguments about its contradictory 
nature. Marx considered that if a stage of perfect monopoly was reached then 
production would cease. However, the modern system of production is still a 
considerable way from a position of exclusive monopoly and it would be 
entirely wrong to think that Marx envisaged a ‘breakdown’ to come about 
for purely economic reasons alone. Clearly market mechanisms can be 
maintained by force, by government use of anti-trust legislation. While the 
centralisation of capital and the widespread intervention of the state in the 
market have contributed to the continued expansion of the system, neither 
attempt to overcome the innate contradictions has been able to prevent 
international crises. However the intervention in the market by governments 
at least opens up the conditions for political action to secure a rational, 
human system of planned production for need.
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4.6 Marx and Justice.
Allen Wood and Robert Tucker argue that Marx did not criticise capitalism 
for being unjust. According to Wood, Marx says that the justice or 
injustice of an economic transaction just is its corresponding or failing to 
correspond with the rules of the prevailing mode of production. Wood’s 
theory is not condoning capitalist exploitation. But he writes that
although capitalist exploitation alienates, dehumanises 
and degrades wage labourers it does not violate any of 
their rights, and there is nothing about it which is 
wrongful or unjust.264
However, he argues that for Marx justice is merely a juridical concept. The 
juridical point of view is, says Wood, ‘essentially one sided’ and if we adopt 
it to try to change the overall social reality, we have a distorted conception of 
that reality. Wood argues correctly that any talk of just distribution within a 
capitalist system is pointless. For in capitalism, distribution is ultimately 
determined by production and if the capitalist exploits the worker, such is the 
nature of capitalist production.
But if not in the cause of justice, why then did Marx condemn capitalism? 
Wood argues that Marx’s condemnation of capitalism is not moral; in fact, 
that Marx’s critique of capitalism is “immoralist”. He maintains that Marx 
condemns capitalism in the light of certain values such as freedom, self-
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realisation and community. Wood does not believe that human will and 
values have no role to play in revolution; he does not ascribe to Marx some 
deterministic viewpoint, according to which ‘objective’ economic laws 
propel capitalism towards its own demise. Wood, unusually among 
interpreters of Marx, points out that Marx does not think that any science, 
including his own, is value-free.
But Wood claims that Marx observed a distinction (which Wood asserts is 
widely recognised) between moral and non-moral goods. Moral goods 
include such things as the fulfilment of duty, right, justice and virtue, while 
non-moral goods include freedom, self-realisation, community, health, 
comfort etc. Non-moral goods satisfy our needs and wants, whereas moral 
goods tell us what to do. Moral goods are pursued solely on account of the 
merit attached to them, whereas non-moral goods are desirable even when 
abstracted from praise or blame. Wood goes on to relate Marx on the one 
hand to Kant, who also recognised the difference between moral and non- 
moral goods, and on the other hand to Mill who, according to Wood, argued 
that the non-moral good is the overriding factor. For Wood this means that 
whilst Marx believed that capitalism was just he could nonetheless call for 
its overthrow.
But the immoralism thesis is completely mistaken about Marx. Marx 
complains of the division between political economy and “Cousin Morality” 
and attributes it to alienation.
It is inherent in the very nature of estrangement that each
sphere imposes upon me a different and contrary
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standard: one standard for morality, one for political 
economy, and so on. This is because each of them is a 
particular estrangement of man and each is centred upon 
one particular area of estranged activity.
Husami rightly points out that
Tucker and Wood misconstrue the Marxian sociology of 
morals by failing to note that elements of the 
superstructure, such as conceptions of justice, have two 
levels of determination. By focusing on the social 
determination of norms to the exclusion of their class 
determination, they are led to believe that for Marx a 
norm is just when it accords with a mode of production 
and unjust when it discords with that mode. They 
overlook Marx’s relation of moral conceptions within the 
same mode of production to the opposed social classes.
However, much of Wood’s thesis is highly pertinent. He quite rightly 
emphasises how bourgeois justice should be seen within a wider context of 
capitalist economic and social order. He also reminds us about the futility 
of appealing to capitalism’s own juridical structures if we seek revolutionary 
change. Marx does insist on seeing juridical and ideological structures as 
emanating from the economic base and that these structures will legitimise 
and perpetuate the exploitation at the heart of the wage relationship. But it 
cannot be concluded that there is no room for justice in Marx’s
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condemnation of and alternative to capitalism. Norman Geras insightfully 
points out that
There is a parallel to be noted here between Marx’s 
treatment of the apparent equivalence in the wage contract 
and his treatment of the freedom the worker enjoys in 
choosing to enter that contract. For the worker may 
appear to do this quite voluntarily and the sphere of 
circulation be therefore, ‘a very Eden of the innate rights 
of man...the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham’. But the reality is different...The 
supposed justice of the wage relation is comparable, then, 
to the workers’ freedom in it. It is an appearance whose 
real content or essence is a radically different one.
Marx’s point is not to say that the capitalist is justified but rather that the 
theft is ‘just’ in terms of bourgeois law. With Husami, a critic of Wood, we 
can ask why he thinks justice is class bound, yet freedom is not. We could 
further ask how community and self-realisation are not class bound. Wood’s 
comparison of Marx to Kant and to Mill is surely tenuous, as the view of 
human nature of both Kant and the utilitarians is the same bourgeois view of 
human nature as egoistic, selfish, a-social; this is what Meszaros calls “a 
socially motivated unhistorical assumption of absolutes”. It is only man 
formed by bourgeois society who is alienated and acts egoistically, but the 
bourgeois philosopher takes that deformation of human nature as the eternal 
nature of man. He stands outside of history and asserts that this is how man 
always will be. The particular bourgeois alienated version of man is
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universalised.271
The passage in Capital where Marx states that the theft of half a day’s labour 
may be good luck for the buyer but is ‘nowise an injustice’ to the seller 
seems to give irrefutable support to Wood’s argument. But Marx’s meaning 
in his choice of v/ords is precise; he does not say “nowise an injustice to the 
worker”. The wage can be just to the seller as seller, insofar as any buying 
and selling is just. But the theft of labour is unjust to the worker as human 
being.
Marx’s whole account here is ironic; in the next passage Marx speaks about 
the capitalist laughing and the worker fooled. He continues
Our capitalist foresaw this state of things and that was the cause of his 
laughter...The trick has at last succeeded; money has been converted into 
capital.272
Marx’s point here is that the relationship is not just but that the bourgeoisie
273call it so, in an attempt to trick the workers. Marx writes that
so long as one is a bourgeois, one cannot but see in this 
relation of antagonism a relation of harmony and eternal 
justice, which allows no one to gain at the expense of the 
other.
Marx refers to the “mysticism” of the wage relationship. Once we see 
beyond the mysticism we come to understand the trickery and illusion, the
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sleight of hand. Without the mysticism we can see that in fact capitalism is 
robbery and theft. Marx writes in the “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts”
Vis-a-vis his employer the worker is not at all in the 
position of a free seller...The capitalist is always free to 
employ labour, and the worker is always forced to sell
The worker has to enter into a contract with the capitalist; the appearance is 
freedom but the reality is compulsion. The worker is robbed of labour- 
power, his vital species activity, in order that the capitalist may go on 
making profit.
Husami states
Tucker and Wood sunder the bogus passage from its 
context and in consequence, fail to ask what Marx means 
by the “trick” of exploiting labour power... If the 
capitalist robs the worker, then he appropriates what is not 
rightfully his own or he appropriates what rightfully 
belong to the worker. Thus there is no meaningful sense 
in which the capitalist can simultaneously rob the worker 
and treat him justly. But Tucker and Wood, having failed 
to take note of the “trick” and its meaning, roundly - and 
falsely - declare that the worker, though exploited, is not
276cheated or robbed or treated unjustly.
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Against Allen Wood’s notion of justice as what suits a mode of production, 
Marx’s universal justice is about classlessness. This leads to a view of justice 
as equal to love and generosity in production based on human need, 
especially the greatest human need - the need for love. Marx following Plato 
in the dialectical tradition, was interested not only in a better theory of 
justice, but even more, in a theory of a better justice, a higher kind of justice. 
This is what he described as the realisation or actualisation of philosophy. 
Among Husami’s many convincing contributions to the debate is his view 
that
To begin with, Marx would tell Wood that the so-called 
juridical point of view is a pernicious abstraction: whose 
juridical point of view? Surely, the spokesmen of the 
capitalist class would want to evaluate capitalist practices 
from the standpoint of capitalist juridical relations 
because these relations are expressive of a system of 
private property which is in the interest of the capitalist 
class. And when they do, as in the labour contract, they 
regard wages as the price of labour (not of labour power - 
that is a Marxian distinction not found in capitalist laws); 
that is, they consider the worker compensated for the 
whole working day. Marx says that capitalist juridical 
relations mask the exploitation of the workers. Hence he 
did not base his evaluation of capitalism on these 
relations.278
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In communism there would be equality or justice in the real wealth of loving 
human relations. Therefore Marx criticised capitalism from a higher 
viewpoint. Under the capitalist mode of production the proletariat suffers 
universal injustice, ‘total loss of humanity’. Marx can validly use 
proletarian or post-capitalist standards, including standards of justice, in 
evaluating capitalism. He writes:
From the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, 
private ownership of the globe by single individuals will 
appear quite as absurd as private ownership of one man 
by another. Even a whole society, a nation, or even all 
simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not 
the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its 
usufructaries, and, like boni patres familias, they must 
hand it down in an improved condition.
For Marx, communism would be an end to all antagonisms and dichotomies. 
There would be no classes, no division between mental and manual labour, 
and no great inequalities in wealth. The establishment of communism would 
be as Marx states in his early writings both the abolition and realisation of 
philosophy, the “resurrection of nature”, and “the total redemption of 
humanity”.282
4.7 Marx: Freedom (Positive and Negative) and "The Rights of Man
One of Marx’s central objections to capitalism is that under it people are not
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free. Freedom is one of the central values of Marx, and the slavery of the
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overwhelming majority of mankind under capitalism is one of the central 
reasons for his vehement condemnation of it. Marx writes
Labour is life, and if life is not exchanged everyday for 
food it suffers and soon perishes. If human life is to be 
regarded as a commodity, we are forced to admit 
slavery.284
Capitalist society developed out of feudal society and its claims to freedom 
must be understood in this historical context. Capitalism is only ‘free’ in 
contrast to the compulsory guild membership, or ecclesiastical regulation, 
with the tariffs and prohibitions which characterised the mode of production 
which preceded capitalism. Capitalist society views itself as free because it 
permits competition which is free from these barriers. Hence for Marx “ it is 
not individuals who are set free by free competition; it is, rather, capital 
which is set free”.285
The freedom of capital is the freedom of the bourgeoisie to exploit the 
proletariat. The liberty which the bourgeois proclaim as human freedom is 
nothing but their freedom. For the proletariat the reality of this freedom is 
slavery. In Marx’s view reforms of the capitalist system which aim at 
extending or realising freedom as understood within capitalism are of no 
value. Under capitalism the proletariat live in inhuman conditions and are
only given enough of the necessities of life to keep them alive so that they
• 286may be exploited.
Capitalist society presupposes the antagonistic interests of different classes
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as well as different individuals; the lives of individuals under capitalism are 
one-sided and deformed; people are impoverished, both physically and 
spiritually by their work; and personal relations are dissolved into money 
relations. In Marx’s eyes freedom requires not simply the lack of social 
coercion; like Plato he believes in a life of self-development within rational 
and harmonious relations with others. In this sense Marx’s concept of 
freedom is social, collective and positive.
For Marx freedom is realised in different segments of our lives e.g. within 
our production and daily concerns, as well as at times when one is released 
from these. Freedom within the productive segment of our lives can only 
consist in socialised humans, ‘the associated producers’, rationally regulating 
our interchange with nature, bringing it under our common control, instead 
of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with
the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and
288worthy of, our human nature.
The bourgeois notion of freedom is a political, individual, and negative 
notion; individuals are free to the extent that they are not prevented by 
others or the state from pursuing any desires they may have. But Marx’s is a 
positive notion of freedom as rational self-government in community, the 
loss of which is alienation.
In his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin draws a distinction 
between negative and positive freedom. Berlin’s definition of negative 
freedom is a vacuum in which no obstacles obstruct the desires of the 
individual.
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I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no 
human being interferes with my activity. Political liberty 
in this sense is simply the area within which a man can do 
what he wants. If I am prevented by other persons from 
doing what I want I am to that degree unfree; and if the 
area within which I can do what I want is contracted by 
other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described 
as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved.... By being free 
in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others.
The wider the area of non-interference the wider my 
freedom.290
Negative liberty is understood as an absence of direct physical interference 
with acting in accordance with our choices. Hence chains, enslavement and 
direct physical domination are considered as impediments to negative 
liberty, but domination by withholding the means of life or the means of 
labour is not, as for Berlin these are outside of the province of liberty 
altogether. Here Berlin seems to be talking about the freedom of the ‘rights 
of man’ which Marx scathingly attacked in his article “On the Jewish 
Question”.- Marx criticised the atomistic view of man in the capitalist 
world. He talks about the egoistic individual inflating himself to the size of 
an atom. Marx states that in bourgeois society,
[T]he right of man to freedom is not based on the 
association of man with man but rather on the separation 
of man from man...The practical application of the right
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of man to freedom is the right of man to private 
property...The right of private property is therefore the 
right to enjoy and dispose of one’s resources as one wills, 
without regard for other men and independently of 
society: the right of self-interest.
For Berlin the notion of positive freedom is self-government or self- 
determination. According to Berlin, in desiring positive freedom
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be an 
instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of will. I 
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, conscious purposes which are my own, not by 
causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to 
be somebody, not nobody; a doer, deciding, not being 
decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external 
nature or by other men as if I was a thing, or an animal, or 
a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of 
conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising 
them.293
Marx in his criticism of the subjection of people to things and the 
subjugation of men to other men or, in the case of capitalists to their 
passions, which should be under their control, also clearly espouses positive 
freedom in this sense. In his speech to the People’s Paper he expresses it
159
In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. 
Machinery, gifted with wonderful power of shortening 
and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and 
overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by 
some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want.
The victories of art seem bought by loss of character. At 
the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to 
become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. 4
Berlin believes that these two forms of liberty are ‘not two different 
interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly divergent and 
irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life’. The self mastery of positive 
freedom which includes control of desires, passions, conflicts with Berlin’s 
definition of negative freedom, which is the absence of obstacles to fulfil 
these desires. If freedom is merely the absence of obstacles to the desires of 
the individual then freedom is compatible with determination by those 
desires — and unfreedom would be any impediment to the fulfilment of the 
desires which in fact determine our behaviour. So Berlin’s notion of negative 
freedom is compatible with determinism, whereas according to the positive 
notion of freedom, if something is determined then it is by definition not 
free.
Marx’s rejection of ‘the rights of man’ in favour of positive liberty is 
precisely a rejection of Berlin’s view of the primacy of an untrammelled 
negative freedom. However, Marx was in no way antagonistic towards 
individual freedom: as he emphasised, in communism ‘the free development
296of each is the condition for the free development of all’.
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Marx was concerned with the freedom of human beings to become human by 
becoming free from capitalist social relations. Marx’s conception of freedom 
includes the best of both the negative and positive aspects of liberty in a way 
that Berlin’s sharp division of freedom does not allow. The rejection of the 
bourgeois property-oriented ‘freedom’ of the ‘rights of man’ does not entail 
rejection of the freedom of the individual.
In Democratic Theory C.B. Macpherson criticises Berlin’s division of 
liberty. He accepts Berlin’s initial definition of positive liberty but rejects his 
definition of negative liberty because it is based on the egoistic view of man 
and society. He points out that when Berlin draws a distinction between 
liberty and the conditions of liberty, saying that the mere inability to attain a 
goal does not in itself denote a lack of freedom to attain it, Berlin seems to 
have held that the lack of ‘the means of life and labour’ is not a lack of 
freedom but rather a lack of the conditions necessary for exercising that 
freedom. If as a result of poverty someone cannot eat and as a result cannot 
work, then according to Berlin’s theory the person would still be free. For 
Berlin this is only a diminution of the conditions of freedom, not of freedom 
itself. This is because of the narrowness of Berlin’s definition of negative 
freedom — freedom from impediments to the carrying out of whatever one 
happens to wish.
Macpherson describes Berlin’s concept of negative liberty as being 
‘mechanical and inertial’ like Hobbes’s, involving isolated individuals in an 
atomised market in which everyone is competing with everyone else for 
everything else — the war of all against all." Berlin’s account of freedom is
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a result of his view of human nature.
Macpherson would agree with Marx that real community and freedom would 
only be possible when we consciously identify with each other, or share 
various experiences, ends, and activities. For if we only identify with our 
own private needs or desires then we are neither a member of a community 
nor free. We are only members of community by virtue of the fact that we 
treat others as an essential part of ourselves and thus identify with the needs 
and desires of each other. Self-development, self-mastery and freedom are 
only ever achievable when others play a part in our lives.299
Macpherson replaces Berlin’s two concepts of liberty with two concepts of 
power: developmental power and extractive power. Extractive power is the 
ability to extract benefit from others for yourself. Macpherson suggests that 
‘the measure of liberty is the absence of extractive power”.300 He defines 
negative liberty as immunity from the extractive power of others, while 
positive liberty is still individual self-direction and action. Macpherson now 
rephrases these as ‘counter-extractive liberty’ and ‘developmental liberty’. 
Unlike Berlin’s two concepts there is a close connection between the two as 
counter-extractive liberty is a prerequisite of developmental liberty.
Marx believed that the negative liberty of the rights of man involves the 
power to exploit. Because political life in capitalism is an abstraction from 
the real life of civil society, political freedom lacks real content. It is possible 
for an individual to possess negative freedom in this sense and yet lack the 
access to the means of subsistence necessary for freedom in its positive 
aspect. As Marx points out, “an Irish peasant is merely free to eat potatoes,
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bad ones at that, or to starve; except, of course, on those occasions when he 
is only free to starve”.301
From his early writings as a journalist until his later writings such as The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx was critical of talk about rights, 
precisely because truly just relations could not be realised in the capitalist 
world, whereas the realisation of property rights in the real world was 
precisely capitalism. Marx wrote that “the proletariat certainly cannot 
become interested in the present rights” but he repeatedly argued that they 
should campaign for certain demands; the right to vote, right of assembly 
and freedom of the press. While he rejects the ‘freedom’ of the ‘rights of 
man’, he does not reject negative freedom as such. Marx was concerned with 
the freedom of men to become human by becoming free from capitalist 
social relations. As Marx puts it:
Therefore not one of the so-called rights of man goes 
beyond egoistic man, man as a member of civil society, 
namely an individual withdrawn into himself, his private 
interest and his private desires and separated from the 
community. In the rights of man it is not man who 
appears as a species being; on the contrary, species-life 
itself, society, appears as a framework extraneous to the 
individuals, as a limitation of their original independence.
The only bond which holds them together is natural 
necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of 
their property and their egoistic persons.303
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Marx argued in “On the Jewish Question” that when reference is made to 
rights and justice it is usually for selfish reasons. For example in The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme he criticised the workers’ belief that they 
had a right to the entire proceeds of their labour; not only as nonsense 
(within the capitalist system) but also and very importantly as selfish. 304 
Marx’s view of rights and justice is based on his view of the human being as 
a communal being/03 An individual can only have rights when regarded as a 
social individual. The highest expression of this is in the production process 
where man/woman realises his/her human nature by producing for the needs 
of all.
When communist artisans associate with one another, 
theory, propaganda, etc. is their first end. But at the same 
time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new 
need - the need for society - and what appears as a means 
becomes an end. In this practical process the most 
splendid results are observed... Such things as smoking, 
drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or 
means that bring them together. Association, society and 
conversation, which again has association as its end, are 
enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere 
phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of 
man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies [my 
emphasis].306
This quotation, with its contrast of enslavement and nobility, like his speech
to the People’s Paper, illustrates Marx’s crucial ontological theme of
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alienation (commodification, fetishism) and its overcoming in the positive 
freedom of authentic communal human existence.
Chapter 5. The Particular and the Universal: Relativism and 
Rationality in Existentialism and Contemporary Philosophy.
5.1 Existentialism.
Value relativism in the form of a rejection of the universality of judgments 
of the valuable, the good, the ideal etc. and an assertion of the relativity of 
values to the particular valuer has survived Marx's criticism, partly because 
Marx's thought has been corrupted by mechanism and its attendant 
relativism. Existentialism, which was so popular during most of the 20th 
century, is an obvious form of such relativism. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
were ancestors of twentieth century existentialism, and Nietzsche in 
particular is also an ancestor of post-modernism. They are both opponents of 
a universalising rationality. Nietzsche opposed as universalism not only 
science and even logic, but democracy and socialism, all as restrictions on 
the freedom of the aesthetic human spirit. His right-wing anarchism echoes 
the sentiments of Plato's Callicles. Kierkegaard also opposed democracy 
and socialism, and sought refuge in an individualistic and frankly irrational 
approach to religion. However his rejection of bourgeois "Christendom"
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allowed him to pay attention to the ontological dimension of human 
existence.
Kierkegaard exaggerates and even reifies the limits of the ability to argue 
rationally with others that they should be moral or spiritual. He turns these 
into three possible stages (levels, spheres, dimensions) of life. These form 
a hierarchy in which the higher is better or more spiritual than the lower. He 
starts off with what he calls the aesthetic stage. Here Don Juan, the hedonist, 
is the typical example. This also ties in with the hedonism of Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, the greatest happiness (measurable pleasure) of the greatest 
number. The time element of this stage is the moment; living for the moment 
is the keynote of this way of life. Pleasure is the master and is equated with 
happiness. This could in principle be measured (for instance by machines 
like the lie detector or the dolorimeter) in terms of electrical impulses in 
nervous tissue causing sensations. The category of this stage is the 
particular.
The second stage which Kierkegaard believes we can rise to is the moral or 
ethical stage. Here as in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, the model person 
is the citizen who obeys the laws of the state. This stage is caught up in 
statism and legalism. The ideal is the judge who interprets and follows the 
law, seen as a legacy from the past to be passed on improved to the future; 
past, present and future are the time element of this stage. This also includes 
the Kantian universality of ‘doing your duty for duty’s sake’ which however 
Kant, unlike Kierkegaard, sees as the content of religion. The category of 
this stage is the universal.
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The third stage which Kierkegaard analyses is the religious stage (in a more 
secular mode it might be seen as the ontological or spiritual stage). He 
believes that it is only in this stage that we can become what he calls ‘a self. 
The judge and Don Juan are incapable of achieving this. The self is 
authenticity; the self is responsible for becoming an individual self, which is 
a synthesising of the finite and infinite in one’s being. This stage of life does 
not confine itself to the moment, or to past, present and future time, as do the 
particular and the universal stages; it opens one’s self to the eternal. It is only 
in this religious (or, I would say, ontological) stage that I enter into a true 
relationship to God and attain the category of this stage, which is 
individuality.
The importance of these three stages to the issue of rationality and relativism 
is that for Kierkegaard one cannot rationally explain or prove to someone 
who abides by the ‘values’ of the lower stages that they should rise up to the 
higher. Kierkegaard insists that reason cannot get you there, rather it requires 
a leap of faith. Don Juan will not accept your reasons for living morally— 
you are talking a different language from him. So in this schema it is only 
the higher which can understand the lower: the lower simply cannot 
comprehend the higher; unless it is lucky enough to experience something in 
life which forces a change of direction (conversion), or unless the person 
makes the leap of faith.
The essence of this position poses difficulties for those who would argue for 
a model of rational human life as opposed to a relativist one. One who 
believes that the ontological stage is the best and most rational life can only 
explain it rationally to another if that person breaks through to this way of
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living. But if the other breaks through, one will not need to give reasons. 
However if the other cannot break through then one cannot give what the 
other would term satisfactory reasons. Rather the other will charge that this 
form of life is simply what one believes, motivated by a will to believe (and 
indeed to control), and as such is relative to me (that is relative to my will or 
pleasure). Nevertheless one must continue to appeal to the other’s reason 
with reason, even if only by saying with Jaspers that we must have ‘faith in 
reason’, but in a higher and wider reason than, say, the rationality of 
‘economic man’ or the Enlightenment progressivist positivist.
Kierkegaard’s hierarchical schema of spheres of existence and his insistence 
on a ‘leap of faith’, is important, and can be used as a counter attack not only 
against empiricist relativism’s crude levelling and reductive stance, but 
against Kant’s reduction of the religious dimension to the moral, and Hegel’s 
reduction of the religious to the secular; against them Kierkegaard needed to 
posit an autonomous religious sphere. However it can be said he did so at the 
expense of rationality, and by restricting universality to an alleged separate 
sphere of morality, without an ontological dimension. It continues German 
Idealism’s theme of the divorce of nature (both the stage of hedonism and 
that of morality) and spirit (the religious stage). It can thus also be said to be 
at the expense of the traditional and adequate concept of nature.
As I have already said, Nietzsche's irrationalism is akin to that of Callicles in 
the Gorgias. Postmodernists who expand his term "genealogy" to include 
any source or origin are misrepresenting and Bowdlerising him. His 
meaning is specific: values are generated by one of only two kinds, masters
T AO t
or slaves. Masters evaluate people in terms of the good and the no-good
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or bad. In a chiasm of this evaluation the no-good slaves evaluate 
themselves as the good, and their masters as the evil ones. Nietzsche adopts 
the ontology of Callicles: natural justice is the rule of the stronger. In fact, 
his is a morality without justice, and he is "suspicious" of justice as an 
attempt to clip his wings. It is not surprising that his right-wing anarchism 
should have an appeal in a particularly right-wing phase of the bourgeois era, 
and it certainly should have no part to play in a reconstruction of Marx's 
thought.
5 .2 Sartre: From Relativism to Rationality?
The complexities and difficulties involved in the contemporary debate 
between proponents of a universal rationality and proponents of relativism is 
evident in the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, from his early existentialism to 
his later attempt to fuse that with Marxism. The later Sartre believes he can 
combine his early thought, which admittedly is in the dialectical tradition 
and not the empiricist one, with Marxism to provide an existential 
philosophy which opens onto a dialectical understanding.
One could describe the early Sartre as advocating a radically relativist 
epistemology based on his radical ontology. Sartre sees human beings as 
necessarily totally responsible for creating themselves. For him the self is 
detachable from its social and historical roles and status to such a degree that 
the self can have no history, just a future in which it is forced to make itself. 
Sartre, like Pico della Mirandola in the ‘Oration on the dignity of man’ 
affirms an exceptional position for human beings in the universe. They are
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free in that they are not, as other things are, tied to a determinate nature, but 
rather have the power to assume any nature. Pico makes a decisive break 
with the older Platonic order and prepares the way for a stage where the ends 
of human life will no longer be defined in relation to a cosmic order at all, 
but must be invented or chosen. Pico, however, still retains a hierarchical 
order in which man in choosing to assume a nature, either debases or exalts 
himself.
For the early Sartre the world is a meaningless positivity. It is the en-soi, a 
plenum. Man wants to impose meaning on the world absolutely: man 
necessarily wants to be God but “God” (the 'pour-soi en-soi’) is impossible; 
“man is a futile passion”.309 All humans want to be the unique consciousness 
for whom all others are objects. In principle he asserts that we all would like 
to be (like God) the source of ourselves {causa sui) and of everything, but 
we know we are not, we know we are contingent and finite. Nevertheless, in 
a finite way we are Gods, in that we create all values for ourselves. So values 
are not out there in the universe or in God. For Sartre all values come from 
the subjective consciousness just as for Hume all values are “in the breast”. 
Also like Camus, Sartre believes that the individual subject’s consciousness 
gives all meaning and value and that these have no relevance to anybody 
else’s. The individual’s consciousness, he says, makes a hole in being like a 
worm eating through an apple.
Although Sartre’s theory of consciousness derives from the dialectical 
tradition through Hegel it shares with Hobbes a theory of a ‘war to the death’ 
of all individuals, but as consciousnesses; for Sartre love is impossible, and 
‘Hell is other people’. Kojeve’s interpretation of the master-slave dialectic of
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Hegel (Hegel’s version of Hobbesianism) greatly influenced Sartre. For 
Sartre to love another is to want to make that consciousness a slave, and to 
want to be loved by a slave is self-defeating — a slave’s love is worthless. In 
fact Sartre is closer to the Nietzschean account of slaves and masters than to 
Hegel’s reconciliationist account.
The early Sartre is like the empiricists in seeing consciousness as infinitely 
malleable, but in his case existentially (subjectively) and by itself, not 
causally (objectively) by the environment. There is no rationality in which 
humanity participates or shares. Unlike Aquinas he sees no link between 
God and Man through a participation in Reason (Mind, intellect or Nous). If, 
for instance, I say that ‘killing the innocent is wrong’ I would merely be 
giving this statement my subjective force: it is not a universal law which all 
rational people should agree on and observe. Killing the innocent has only 
the disvalue that I give it. One could say in Protagoras’s words, what is true 
for me is true for me, and what is true for you is true for you. Other than this 
there is no truth per se. Sartre says we are condemned to create values 
without foundation; ‘we are condemned to be free’.
Of course Sartre recognises that our freedom is situated. He writes
...man is defined first of all as a being in a situation. That 
means that he forms a synthetic whole with his biological, 
economic, political, cultural, etc. situation... it is he who 
gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by 
it. To be in a situation... is to choose oneself in a situation, 
and men differ from one another in their situations and
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also in the choices they themselves make of 
themselves.310
As proof that reason cannot ground choices, he tells the story of a student 
who needs advice. The student is undecided as to whether he should join the 
resistance or look after his sick mother. Now for Sartre there is no right 
choice to make. He presupposes that morality must be able to prescribe one 
right, or just course of action in any circumstances. In this case it 
transparently cannot. The student must simply make a choice. Sartre draws 
from this particular hard case a universal conclusion:
we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that 
he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself.3"
Sartre misunderstands morality on this point. For a morality in the 
Platonic/Aristotelian/Stoic/Thomist tradition of rationality, the student must 
simply do something good or at least not bad. Either choice in Sartre’s 
example would be good. There is therefore no moral problem with either 
particular choice, as long as the student understands the consequences and 
undertakes the potentially tragic responsibilities of his choice. In addition, 
the situation contains other possible choices, such as collaborating with the 
Nazis, which morality can easily rule out. So in fact a universal rational 
morality can deal with what Sartre thinks of as an insoluble dilemma for any 
morality. This disproves his argument for the falsity of all claims to 
rationality for morality.
For Sartre, to believe in human nature at all is to believe that there is
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something outside Man that establishes for Man a ‘nature’. For him this 
something must be God. Since there can be no God it follows that there is no 
human nature. There are therefore no given meanings or values for humans. 
But Sartre himself posits as a given that humans have no essence. He also 
seems to posit another given or universal, that all humans are essentially 
free. Reliance on universalism is thus shown to be inescapable even for 
Sartre’s statement of relativism.
Sartre’s early philosophy echoes the individualist relativism and antagonism 
of Hobbes. But in Existentialism is a Humanism (1946) he changed his 
position from one of total arbitrariness of radical choice for the self, to one 
of the necessity of a universal choice for all humanity. The choice for oneself 
of a communist trade union is for him a choice of revolution as the essence 
of humanity, whereas the choice of a Catholic trade union is a statement that 
resignation and patience are the proper human values. This essay is the hinge 
between the early and late Sartre. His turn to Marxism involved seeking a 
rapprochement with essentialism or universalism. But this is a contradiction
312that Sartre himself cannot escape. Until the Critique of Dialectical Reason 
Sartre believed that we were governed neither by mechanical necessity nor 
by binding rational norms; rather there is just choice or freedom. But his 
later philosophy aspires to a kind of rationality and universal values; the 
radical choice you make should be guided by the idea of choosing for 
humanity. What he insists we must choose for humanity is freedom. 
However, since Sartre insists that the slave is as free as the master, his claim 
in the essay that willing freedom requires willing the freedom of others is an 
idle one, since everyone, slave and master, is already free in Sartre’s sense.
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5.3 Rawls: Freedom and Justice the Same Thing i.e. the Market.
Like Hobbes, John Rawls claims that rationality involves the absence of an 
interest in one another’s interests.313 To a great extent he accepts 
utilitarianism’s theory of morality as social engineering—a means to 
survival in order to gain pleasure. Justice is seen only as a limit to the 
calculation of utility such as would be accepted by any totally self-interested 
person.
Rawls seems to think it is sufficient to differ from utilitarianism to call his 
own philosophy a natural law theory.314 But it is not sufficient, on my 
understanding of natural law. For Rawls has a view of human nature which 
necessitates a social contract and his political ontology is very similar to the 
views of both the ancient sophists as portrayed by Glaucon in the Republic31^ 
and modernists like Hobbes and Locke, as well as of Robert Nozick , 
with whose basic human ontology he agrees.
Rawls, like Bentham, believes that each individual is determined by nature 
to seek his/her own interests, and is rationally justified in doing so . Also 
even though he claims to supersede the utilitarian view of the nature of 
justice he does not disagree with them on much else. Rawls points out that 
for the utilitarians morality is subordinate to political economy - but his own 
theory has a similar tendency. His contractualist natural law theory of the 
‘right’ accepts the ‘good’ of the capitalist market - utilitarianism, the 
maximisation of pleasure . His theory of justice is non-moral; morality is 
only to be decided after the rational agent enters the contract. This I believe
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stems from his divorce of the right and the good and his bourgeois definition 
of (what is really ‘economic’) rationality as ‘having no interest in one 
another’s interests’. Rawls’s model of man is homo economicus, economic 
man; the market model of mankind prevails here. His explicit assumption is 
that institutional inequalities which affect our whole ‘life prospects’ are 
inevitable in any society. His theory of ‘justice’ is explicitly anti­
perfectionist and is in principle based on what he was the first to call a ‘thin’ 
theory of the good which shares the same motivation (scepticism about the 
rational defensibility of values) as political neutrality and the reduction of 
justice to proceduralism i.e. rights. He believes in the supremacy of ‘the 
right’ over ‘the good’ which indicates a bias towards the Cartesian 
dichotomy which divorces the good as utilitarian from the right as Kantian. 
Unlike Raz and others like John Finnis, Rawls does not cater for ‘thick’ (or 
rich) goods like knowledge, truth or beauty.
Rawls’s reductive account of justice is merely procedural (he likens it to 
dividing up a cake ‘fairly’, as one would if one were sure to receive the last 
piece); and it favours the right over the good. Principles of procedural justice 
like Rawls’s underpin class division and do not go very deep in order to 
discover the nature of injustice. For in Rawls’s society he recognises there 
will still have to be inequality, not only between individual incomes but 
between the life prospects of the different classes. It is this assumption of 
class division which makes Rawls’s theory a narrow, thin conception of 
justice based on formal competitive rights and ‘fairness’.
Rawls’s theory assumes a priori a social setting in which each individual is 
seen as determined by nature to seek his/her own interests, and is rationally
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justified in doing so. He argues that the principles of justice are those which 
would be chosen by a rational agent, for whom rationality implies self-
"^90interestedness, ‘having no interest in one another’s interests’.
The idea at the heart of John Rawls’s theory of justice in A Theory of Justice 
is that of the ‘original position’ of an agent situated behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’. This would mean that the agent does not know what place in 
society s/he will occupy. Nor will agents know what class they will have, or 
what talents or ability they will possess. Furthermore they can have no 
conception of what their idea of the good, or their aim(s) in life will be, what 
temperament they will have, or what kind of economic, political, cultural or 
social order they will inhabit. According to Rawls, from behind this ‘veil of 
ignorance’ the proposed agents would, if they were rational, define a just 
distribution of goods in terms of two principles, and of a rule for allocating 
priorities when the two principles conflict. These would be, as Rawls puts it,
[1] Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all. [2] Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the joint savings principle, and (b) 
attached to offices and parties open to all under
• • *321conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
For Rawls the first principle has priority over the second. The general rule 
for allocating priorities would be:
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All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to 
be distributed equally unless an equal distribution of any 
or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
322favoured.
These two principles of justice are said by Rawls not to be the only criteria 
by which a society should be judged but nonetheless they are to be an 
important part of it: “Justice is not to be confused with an all-inclusive vision 
of good society; it is only part of such a conception”.323 Rawls makes it a 
presupposition of his view that human beings must expect to disagree with 
each other about what the good life is. The rational agent, when deciding 
how goods of society are to be distributed, must consider only those goods in 
which everyone takes an interest, irrespective of their view of the good life. 
So in Rawls’s theory of justice the good and the right are wholly separate.324 
The good is substantive and the right is procedural.
From the two principles and the general rule, the rational agent would be 
able to judge the basic structure of any society: the political constitution and 
economic and social institutions. Rawls believes that together these define a 
person’s liberties and rights, life chances, what s/he may expect to be, and 
how well they may expect to fare. A model of a just society which would 
satisfy his two principles of justice is a constitutional democracy, in which
the government regulates a free economy in a certain 
way. More fully, if law and government act effectively to
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keep markets competitive, resources fully employed, 
property and wealth widely distributed over time, and if 
they maintain the appropriate social minimum welfare, 
and if there is equality of opportunity underwritten by 
education for all, the resulting distribution will be just.
Rawls’s is a ‘contractarian’ concept of justice, which he refers to as a natural 
law concept as opposed to the utilitarian one. Rawls claims to supersede the 
utilitarian view of justice, but he does not disagree with them on much else. 
He points out that for the utilitarians morality is subordinate to political 
economy -- the substantive good has nothing to do with procedural justice. 
His contractualist natural law theory agrees in fact with the ‘morality’ of the 
capitalist market - which is in essence utilitarianism, the maximisation of 
pleasure. His theory of justice is non-moral; the question of morality is 
only to be decided after the rational agent enters the contract. This I believe 
stems from his divorce of the right and the good and his bourgeois definition 
of rationality as ‘having no interest in one another’s interests’.
For Rawls, it is irrelevant how those who are now in grave need came to be 
in grave need; justice is a matter of present patterns of distribution to which 
the past is irrelevant. It is not surprising then that Rawls includes social 
classes and economic incentives as part of the a priori principles of justice. 
As C. B. MacPherson in Democratic Theory comments:
[Rawls] assumes that inequality of income will always be 
necessary in such a society as an incentive to efficient 
production and that, therefore, welfare-state transfer
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payments must be limited to an amount which will still 
leave one class better off than another.329
His explicit assumption is that institutional inequalities which affect our 
whole life prospects are inevitable in any society. It is this assumption of 
class division which makes Rawls’s theory a narrow, thin, conception of 
justice based on rights and ‘fairness’. Principles of justice like Rawls’s 
underpin class-division and do not go very deep in order to discover the 
nature of injustice. For in this society there will still be inequality, not only 
between individual incomes but between the life prospects of the different 
classes. He does not see that the class inequality in the market system is 
bound to be an inequality of power as well as income, that it allows one class 
to dominate another. Rawls’s theory shows the close ideological connection 
between bourgeois ‘freedom’ — the social contract — and utility, between the 
procedural justice of the market and the utility confined to economic growth. 
Rawls’s idea of freedom is the negative one — the virtual absence of 
restrictions on the satisfaction of whatever desires an individual may have 
and, of course, the absence of restrictions on private property and 
accumulation of wealth.
Rawls’s model of man is economic man, homo economicus. The market 
model of mankind prevails. The motivation for the social democratic safety 
net approach, as opposed to Nozick’s liberal democratic approach, is not pity 
or love, only cautious self-interest. The person in the original position is 
hedging bets as to whether s/he will be a capitalist or a worker. Rawls’s 
theory is not at all about general justice in the traditional sense which 
requires philia or friendship. Rawls justifies the market; and he does not
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consider the Marxist critique which shows that the capitalist market is a 
system of domination, exploitation and slavery, and that political liberalism 
is its ideology. As Macpherson remarks, Rawls’s theory of justice:
does not recognise that in a competitive market system 
where capital and labour are in separate hands, all capital, 
whatever its degree of concentration, is power which 
controls and impedes the lives of others. Capital in that 
society is extractive power, and the extractive power of 
the owners of capital diminishes the developmental 
powers of the non-owners.330
5.4 Raz’s ‘Personal Autonomy’ as an Answer to the Question of 
Perfectionism versus Anti-perfectionism.
Most contemporary liberalism rejects the perfectionism of the earlier liberal 
tradition’s aspiration (e.g. J.S. Mill’s) to ‘make men moral’ on the ground 
that perfectionism violates fundamental principles of ‘justice’ and ‘human 
rights’.331 They maintain that even if moral perfection is desirable, this is not 
a good enough reason for any particular version of it to be enacted in 
legislation. Hence as a matter of moral principle they rule out so called “ 
‘morals’ laws”, in favour of anti-perfectionist theories of ‘justice’ and 
‘political morality’.
There are however contemporary liberal perfectionists such as Joseph Raz 
who join perfectionist critics such as Aristotle in arguing that anti­
perfectionism’s ideal of government neutrality about the human good is
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illusory. Both traditional perfectionists and liberal perfectionists agree that 
governments must inevitably act on the basis of some conception of the 
human good. The dispute then is about which conception of the ‘human 
good’ they advocate and not, as anti-perfectionist mainstream contemporary 
liberalism believes, about a neutral view of the human good.
The political morality advanced by Raz in his book The Morality of 
Freedom is one that maintains the value of “personal autonomy”. This he 
believes is an intrinsic human good for human beings (although not the only 
one), and is realised in choosing among or between morally good options. 
Raz’s point is that if the autonomous person pursues certain ends which are 
evil or empty, then they are bereft of any value, so a government must not 
protect or be neutral about such pursuits. However he insists that the 
government must limit its use of legislation when pursuing a perfectionist 
concern for autonomy due to the ‘harm principle’ that excludes the 
criminalisation of what Raz calls ‘harmless’ or ‘victimless’ immoralities. 
Against the anti-perfectionist John Rawls, Raz argues that Rawls’s own 
procedures for arriving at principles of justice (e.g. the original position, the 
veil of ignorance) do not exclude perfectionist conclusions.
As he says
An agreement on a method of choosing between 
perfectionist principles cannot be ruled out on the grounds 
that the methods of evaluating different ideals are 
themselves subject to evaluative controversy. They are
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not more evaluative than some of the psychological facts 
available to the parties...and the considerations 
concerning self-respect on which the priority of liberty is 
based.332
Raz’s criticism of Rawls is that the people in the original position are not 
neutral about values they choose; rather they are choosing between values. 
He writes
An agreement on a method of choosing between 
perfectionist principles cannot be ruled out on the grounds 
that the methods of evaluating different ideals are 
themselves subject to evaluative controversy. They are 
not more evaluative than some of the psychological facts 
available to the parties...and the considerations 
concerning self-respect on which the priority of liberty is 
based.333
Raz maintains that the autonomy of the person in the original position, who 
is concerned for the dignity and integrity of individuals, does not require 
moral neutrality (being ‘disinterested’, as Rawls unfortunately calls it, in 
each other’s interests); rather it requires moral pluralism in which 
individuals are free to choose. He is against the idea of autonomy without 
constraint; in fact he argues that autonomy is possible only within a 
framework of constraints.
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For Raz then, there is no completely autonomous person. The idea of the 
existentialist with no biological or social nature, whose mind is a tabula rasa 
for his/her will, is absurd. Raz then like Socrates believes autonomy only has 
value when in pursuit of the good. They both are against the anti­
perfectionism and moral relativism which says ‘do what you like’-- any 
immoral action which is alleged to be autonomous is, for both Raz and 
Socrates, as it is for Kant, devoid of moral value. Raz summarises his 
position as follows
Since autonomy is valuable only if it is directed at the 
good it supplies no reason to provide, nor any reason to 
protect, worthless let alone bad options. To be sure 
autonomy itself is blind to the quality of options chosen.
A person is autonomous even if he chooses the bad...[but] 
autonomously choosing the bad makes one’s life worse 
than a comparable non-autonomous life is. Since our 
concern for autonomy is a concern to enable people to 
have a good life it furnishes us with reason to secure that 
autonomy which could be valuable. Providing, preserving 
or protecting bad options does not enable one to enjoy 
valuable autonomy.334
For Raz autonomy is itself an intrinsic good, and someone is still 
autonomous even if they choose the bad; but the value of personal 
autonomy, Raz argues, is conditional upon whether or not one uses one’s 
autonomy for good or ill. However Robert George, a modern Thomist, 
challenges Raz. He believes that the significance of autonomy lies not in
183
providing a reason for action, but, rather, in supplying a condition for the 
possibility of action -- the choice as to whether one deliberates well and 
chooses uprightly or not. George concludes that it is a mistake to conceive of 
autonomy as itself an intrinsic good. Rather one would use one’s autonomy 
for the sake of, and realising the good of, practical reasonableness’s choice 
among or between other goods.
Raz’s perception that morally upright (i.e. practically 
reasonable) choices are intrinsically perfective of human 
beings, while immoral (i.e. practically unreasonable) 
choices realise no value in respect of the autonomy 
exercised in making them, is entirely sound. The intrinsic 
perfection is located in the exercise of reason that 
autonomy makes possible, however; it is not located in 
autonomy itself.
George aims to overcome a difficulty in Raz’s theory of autonomy 
highlighted by Donald Regan336. Regan believes there is an inconsistency in 
holding that autonomous actions can still be termed autonomous even when 
they are evil or wicked. Regan believes that Raz should deny this and 
instead use the term autonomy only to describe morally upright actions, as 
the only other alternative would be to deny autonomy any value at all. 
George believes that Regan is right in pointing out this inconsistency but he 
disagrees with the advice he gives in solving it.
George states that autonomy appears to be intrinsically valuable because 
there is something more perfect about the realisation of goods when they are
184
the result of one’s own deliberation and choice. However for George that 
additional perfection is not provided by autonomy but by the exercise of 
reason in self-determination (practical reason). Practical reasonableness 
(Aristotle’s virtue of phronesis), like other basic goods, is intrinsically 
valuable because it is capable of providing an ultimate reason for action. The 
same cannot be said for Raz’s “personal autonomy” as this may be grounded 
in some non-rational factor; autonomy can lead to bad or wicked behaviour. 
So for George we must use our autonomy to choose what is practically 
reasonable between certain possibilities — we do not choose certain 
possibilities because they are autonomous. Raz believes that while autonomy 
is intrinsically a good (i.e. better to have it than not to have it even if it 
results in bad action), the value of personal autonomy lies in its use for the 
good. George however believes that Regan is right in pointing out the 
inconsistency here; but rather than say, like Regan, that only good acts are 
truly autonomous, George believes that the real value does not lie in 
autonomy, it lies in practical reason’s use of autonomy for the good.
Raz’s concept of a liberal perfectionism aims at overcoming the relativism 
of the moral neutrality of Rawls’s anti-perfectionism. He quite rightly points 
out that such moral neutrality is in fact illusory. However, his theory is itself 
open to criticism for failing to understand the cognitive nature of moral 
reasoning. George takes on board Regan’s criticism and develops it towards 
an Aristotelian view of phronetic reasoning’s use of the autonomous will 
and as such gives a fuller account than Raz. Raz, while providing a 
corrective to Rawls, does not seem to recognise that a model of rationality 
like, for instance that of Aquinas is required to instruct the autonomous will, 
so that ends and means of the human act can be reasoned about. Aquinas
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details the complex cognitive processes involved in the voluntary human act 
and stresses the development and use of practical reasoning’s judgement in 
line with virtue, in order to become an authentic human being. Etienne 
Gilson lays out Aquinas’s position here,
The intellectual virtue of prudence together with the three 
moral virtues of justice, temperance and courage are 
known as the principal or cardinal virtues. They imply 
both the faculty to act right and the actual accomplishing 
of the good act: to know what to do and how to do it.
Virtuous living guided by practical reason becomes the 
internal principle which regulates our autonomous moral 
activity.337
Raz’s concept of autonomy like Taylor’s concept of ‘strong evaluation’ is 
un-anchored and inadequate in comparison to the Thomistic model of 
rationality. Without such a rational framework to guide the autonomous 
will’s judgement of what value is, then it seems to me relativism about such 
matters is inevitable.
However some modern Thomists, Germain Grisez and followers such as 
John Finnis lack the Aristotelian dimension of Aquinas. Finnis for instance 
accepts that there are objective goods, yet like Hume and Kant he argues that 
these are not ‘natural’, rather they are a result of practical reasoning. He 
would contend for instance, that knowledge is objectively good, but this is 
something different from saying that it is the object of a natural inclination 
in the Thomistic sense. He accepts the positivist ‘is/ought’ dichotomy and
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rules out the possibility of arguing from the natural to the good. For Finnis 
you cannot get from the facts of nature, which for him is Newtonian, not 
Aristotelian, to a normative claim about what ought to be. To say that dogs 
have four legs, for instance, does not license one to say that they ought to 
have four legs. Theoretical reasoning (science) tells us what is (understands 
nature) but it does not tell us what we should do. For Finnis this is the 
domain of practical reason, which intuits values; practical reasonableness 
judges the appropriate values in given circumstances.
Finnis does not follow Aristotle or Aquinas closely. For them nature is not a 
mechanism. Rather human nature is that of a developing organism with 
rational needs. Finnis does not seem to be able to account for the Thomistic 
statement already quoted that it is naturally knowable that the human 
intellect needs truth and the human will goodness. Finnis’s theory is thus, 
like Rawls’s, based on ‘rational’ rights set against nature rather than a 
natural law which aims at fulfilling our nature.
5.5 Charles Taylor and Authenticity.
Like Raz, Charles Taylor argues against John Rawls’s neutrality regarding 
the good. He argues that many people, Muslims for example, would not be 
able to make any sense of the idea of the neutrality of a person in the 
‘original position’, or of a corresponding ‘procedural justice’; Rawls’s sketch 
of ‘justice’ is designed for western ‘enlightened’ individuals. Rawls 
universalises a particular mode of being and denies the intrinsic validity or
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worth of all other ways of being. In effect, he denies the value of difference 
by imposing an illusory value-free model on mankind. Rawls insists that if 
one chooses to be a Muslim one would only do so secondarily, after one has 
entered the social contract. There is surely no justice in Rawls’s theory for 
Muslims or any body else who is different from the economic model of the 
human being that he postulates.
Taylor’s philosophical psychology solves the problem of free will and 
determinism with a model of rationality based on ‘strong evaluations’. He 
also attempts to use the rational capacity of humans to answer political and 
ethical problems about enlightenment universalism as one criterion of 
rationality, and recognition of difference, ethnicity, culture etc. as a counter 
criterion. The question is whether morality (and by extension politics) 
requires only recognising our common equality as rational beings; or 
whether it requires, for instance, positive discrimination in favour of groups 
or individuals who are not of the mainstream culture.
Taylor believes that in the political realm we have to recognise difference. 
This means for him recognising the equal value of different ways of being. 
But what grounds the equality of value? Mere difference itself, he says, 
cannot be the ground of equal value. A recognition of difference — that is, of 
the equal value of different identities — is not enough; we also need some 
standards of value by which the expression of the identities concerned can be 
judged. There must be some substantive agreement on value or else the 
formal principle of equality will be empty and a sham. For Taylor the 
substantive agreement comes from ‘strong evaluations’. He writes
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strong evaluations involve discriminations of right and 
wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not 
rendered valid by our own desires inclinations and 
choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer 
standards by which they can be judged. These standards 
constitute goods which the self requires to guide him/her 
to authentic living.338
For Taylor the concept of ‘strong evaluation’ is the answer to the problem of 
recognition of difference in the political realm. But he says it is not as 
adequate there as it is in philosophical psychology, where it is employed in 
order to argue for our free will. Strong evaluation is seen as a capacity to 
judge given desires, and to correct whims that might cloud our judgements. 
The aspiration to fullness or authenticity can be met by building something 
into one’s life, some pattern of higher action which connects one’s life with a 
greater reality.
For example Taylor says that when the young St. Francis left his friends and 
family he must have felt the insubstantiality of his previous life due to an 
aspiration to reach a higher being; he must have been looking for something 
fuller, more whole, so that he could give himself more to God, without stint. 
Similarly Taylor sees the revolutionary who sees him or herself as part of a 
social revolution which will emancipate and redeem the human race as 
giving meaning or fuller being to his/her life by practically applying every 
fibre of his/her being to achieving this task. But Taylor does not provide a 
unifying theory of the rational good; for instance, one based on human 
nature, as Aquinas (following Plato and Aristotle in the dialectical tradition)
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does. Rather he seems content with such illustrative examples.
These two examples of “strong evaluation” favour a desire for authenticity, 
to fill a deep sense of loss or emptiness found within a current form of life. 
But Taylor does not seem to register that such evaluations can themselves be 
evaluated by a yet higher-order evaluation. One would need to judge the 
validity of for example Heidegger’s call to the authenticity of being a true 
German and serving the Fuhrer. At what stage do we reach finality in a 
regression to higher orders? And more significantly perhaps, what are the 
criteria for any of these evaluations?
Taylor does not answer this problem. Which ideal/value contents are higher 
and therefore more fully human? What is truly good and just? What makes 
us truly free? ‘ Taylor insists that the householder (family wo/man) who 
becomes neither a saint nor a revolutionary also ‘evaluates strongly’. S/he 
may not fully rise to the joys of higher being, because s/he cannot give 
him/herself to these concerns unstintingly. However his/her ultimate 
allegiance would be to higher being, and against those who would say that 
s/he chose a pusillanimous second best s/he could say that s/he intended 
giving his/her life meaning through the rich joys of family love, through the 
concerns of providing and caring for spouse and children and by building up 
a web of relationships which gives fullness and joy to human life. This 
person like the previous two has set a direction for his/her life and as such 
has already enriched his/her life by building something into it.
Taylor leaves the problem there. This is a superficial interpretation of the 
problem and does not pay attention to actual choices which must be involved
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in living such a life if one is truly aiming at the good (just) life with which 
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas are concerned. For instance is it rational for the 
family person, who pickets at Harryville Catholic church in Ballymena, or 
“protests” with pipe bombs against four year old girls’ going to Holy Cross 
school in Ardoyne, or wears the uniform of an oppressive regime or the sash 
of a sectarian supremacist ‘religious order’, to claim to be authentic or to be 
in touch with a higher and more meaningful form of life? Or indeed can a 
family person who idly stands by (in thought and deed) in obviously 
discriminatory or unjust circumstances or societies, or economic geo­
political systems claim to be authentic because s/he can find sufficient 
meaning in family and friends, or in religious traditions? After all s/he could 
at least have done something about the injustice, local or global. Could it be 
the case that s/he would in fact be even more religious, rational and authentic 
by confronting the truth of the situation and putting this theory into practice?
These questions show that far more is needed to answer the problem of 
relativism than Taylor’s unanchored concept of ‘strong evaluation’. Rather 
human beings need some basis for systematic guidance. For instance in the 
dialectical tradition of philosophy, the above situation poses the question of 
what I should do when I encounter unjust societies (laws etc.) and wish still 
to be a good person. As we have seen, for Aquinas the natural rational moral 
law prescribes that an unjust law is not a law at all, it is rather an act of 
violence, and as such need not be obeyed. So within this framework the 
family person who, for any other reason than out of the virtue of prudence, 
acquiesces in an unjust society, transgresses the first precept of the natural 
law ‘good is to be done and bad avoided’. Such a person has breached the 
principles of moral reasoning.
191
Also Taylor’s notion of strong evaluations (i.e. second order evaluations) 
does not seem to indicate where this process stops. Can we not have strong 
evaluations about our strong evaluations? What further model of rationality, 
morality or justice allows us to make such a judgement? Taylor does not 
give us grounds for strong evaluations; in other words there is no objectivity. 
He therefore remains a relativist, under the spell of the modernist 
enlightenment to which he is inordinately sympathetic.
It seems to me that something like Aquinas’s objective concept of human 
good, which is at the basis of his natural law position, is less problematic 
than Taylor’s theory of strong evaluation. Aquinas offers us guidance to the 
full complexity of human existence. For instance for Aquinas I would simply 
be wrong if I strongly evaluate that my Aryan ideal requires that six million 
Jews should be killed. Also for Aquinas I would be wrong if I strongly 
evaluate that the Catholic religion is a barrier to human ‘freedom’ and 
‘progress’ and is mere superstition and should be oppressed in the most 
savage way. This is the ‘strong evaluation’ made by the Orange Order in 
Ireland.
As indicated earlier, Taylor believes that ‘strong evaluation’ is necessary and 
helpful to judge the recognition of difference. This is similarly problematic. 
Taylor suggests that we should respond to the question whether to subsidise 
a black lesbian company putting on a theatrical tour, by saying that we 
should do so only if we strongly evaluate that it is ‘good’ theatre. But he 
does not give an account of ‘the good’; it seems therefore to remain 
subjective and relative. A homophobic racist will not admit that his/her
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strong evaluation is a “whim” that clouds his/her judgement. Strong 
evaluation is employed here oppressively as a device to discriminate.
But what is it that makes something worthy of respect? In the dialectical 
tradition what is good must be at the same time just and right and open to the 
continual scrutiny of reason, including scrutiny of the nature of reason itself. 
The point (and it is one which Taylor does not deal with) is that some 
‘cultures’ such as the Ku Klux Klan’s (or its British version - the Orange 
Order) do not deserve recognition or respect, since they are irrational and 
unjust.
5.6 Bhaskar: Realism Includes Acknowledging Relativity
Roy Bhaskar’s realist theory of science offers a criticism and an alternative 
to the relativism implicit in scientism. At the beginning of Reclaiming 
Reality Bhaskar quotes Kant’s Sapere aude (dare to be wise). This motto of 
the eighteenth-century bourgeois enlightenment can, Bhaskar argues, 
become the dawning of a new socialist enlightenment which will stand to 
some future order of things as “the bourgeois enlightenment stood to the 
American declaration of independence and the French revolution”.340
Bhaskar aims to convince socialist intellectuals of the crucial significance of 
philosophy as the discipline that has traditionally underwritten both what 
constitutes science or knowledge proved by reason, and legitimate political, 
moral and economic practices. For in a capitalist economy and bourgeois 
society socialism will never be simple sense. For Bhaskar then the task or 
project socialist intellectuals should set themselves is to win the intellectual
193
high ground for socialism. This, he argues, can only be achieved if we take 
philosophy seriously. He defines his use of philosophy thus:
philosophy is conceived in Lockean fashion, as an 
underlabourer for science and projects of human 
emancipation and, in Leibnizian mode, as an analyst and 
potential critic of conceptual systems and forms of social 
life in which they are embedded/41
There are a whole host of other philosophies which Bhaskar employs in the 
course of his underlabouring in philosophy, but he stays silent about them in 
this very basic definition of philosophy including the thought of Plato and 
Aristotle (which was continued and perfected by Aquinas), and the thought 
of Marx, who himself drank deep at the well of Greek philosophy and with 
the help of Schelling and Feuerbach among others had already claimed the 
intellectual high ground for socialists from the bourgeois apologists Kant and 
Hegel.
Bhaskar affirms that all philosophies presuppose a realism, that is they 
presuppose an ontology or general account of the world. This being so, the 
crucial question is, what kind of realism gives us the critical tools to 
apprehend reality? Is it, following the Cartesian dichotomy, an empirical 
and pragmatic, or an idealist realism on the one hand? Or a scientific, 
transcendental and critical realism on the other? Bhaskar is opposed to the 
former and affirms the latter. These distinctions help us to understand “New 
realism” as actually a realism of the most superficial sort; it is empirical (or 
empiricist) realism. It fails to recognise what Aristotle and Marx called the
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essences or structures (what Bhaskar calls generative mechanisms — which 
seem to correspond to Aristotelian and Thomistic essences) underlying and 
producing observable phenomena and events; whereas critical realism
is not, nor does it license, either a set of substantive 
analyses or a set of practical policies. Rather it provides a 
set of perspectives on society (and nature) and on how to 
understand them. It is not a substitute for, but rather helps 
to guide, empirically controlled investigations into the 
structures generating social phenomena.342
Bhaskar continues
And from this critical realist perspective we can see the 
swingometer of intellectual fashion as having lurched 
from the hyper-structuralist view of people as the mere 
effects or dupes of structures over which they have 
neither knowledge nor control to the ‘new realist’ view 
which effectively empties the social world of any 
enduring structural dimension.343
Against the poles of atomistic, voluntaristic individualistic liberalism (both 
utilitarian and Weberian) and the undifferentiated collectivism of 
Durkheimism and reification of labourism (Stalinism), critical realism seeks 
an understanding of the relationship between social structures and human 
agency that is based on a transformational conception of social activity 
which avoids voluntarism and reification. The social (structures) essentially
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consist in or depend on relations (reproduced or changed by human agency). 
Bhaskar explains that
Far from it being the case that, in Mrs Thatcher’s dictum, 
society doesn’t exist, the existence of society is a 
transcendentally necessary condition for any intentional 
act at all. It is the unmotivated condition for all our 
motivated productions. We don’t create society - the error 
of voluntarism. But these structures which pre-exist us are 
only reproduced or transformed in our everyday activities; 
thus society does not exist independently of human 
agency - the error of reification. The social world is 
reproduced or transformed in daily life.344
He points out that social relations are themselves structures which pre-exist 
the individuals who enter into them. All social structures (e.g. the economy, 
the state, the family etc.) presuppose social relations; for instance the 
capitalist system presupposes the relations between capital and labour. For 
Bhaskar then, the focus of critical realism is to provide an explanatory key to 
the understanding of structures of social relations aimed at the self­
emancipation of the exploited and oppressed. Critical realism asserts that the 
social world, being itself a social product, is seen as essentially subject to the 
possibility of change or transformation. Bhaskar (echoing Marx) illustrates 
this approach.
Society then is the ensemble of positioned practices and 
networked interrelationships which individuals never
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create but in their practical activity always presuppose, 
and in so doing everywhere reproduce or transform.345
In order to transform society towards socialism we must know the 
underlying structures of the present society. The world cannot be rationally 
changed unless it is adequately interpreted. But Bhaskar cautions us on two 
points. Firstly we should use critical realism in an explanatory role and not a 
predictive one, because social systems are intrinsically open (incomplete), 
and this makes scientific predictions impossible. However, powerful 
explanatory theories like Marx’s may make conditional predictions about 
tendencies in the future, but the failure of such predictions would not falsify 
the explanatory theory.
Secondly, we are reminded that social theory and social reality are 
interdependent. The social theory is practically conditioned by, and 
potentially has practical consequences in, society. However critical realism 
is opposed to the view that the social theorist ‘constructs’ reality (the 
epistemic fallacy - the reduction of being to knowing). Critical realism also 
opposes the view that social theory is value free or neutral or passive. Social 
theories consist in a practical intervention in social life which entails values 
and actions. Therefore if we accept Marx’s critique of political economy, we 
must then pass immediately to a negative evaluation of those structures and 
also to a positive evaluation of action rationally directed to changing them. 
This critical realist method generates an understanding of is and 
demonstrates the falsity of the standard fact/value and theory/practice 
dichotomies.
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The critical realist perspective is one of socialist emancipation based on the 
transformation of structures. It is opposed to the tradition in social 
democracy which merely aims at ameliorating the current state of affairs. For 
Bhaskar critical realism seeks to transform unneeded, unwanted and 
oppressive structures to needed, wanted and empowering ones. Echoing 
Marx again Bhaskar tells us, we must change society from a mere 
reproductive one to a transformative one i.e. we need to revolutionise both 
humans and society. Thus the relationship between social knowledge or 
theory and social practice takes the form of a dialectical emancipatory spiral 
(very similar to the dialectic of justice in Plato) in which better theories may 
make possible new forms of practice which in turn can lead to better theories 
and so on.
Bhaskar, repeating Marx, opposes the Cartesian dichotomy between mind 
and body, nature and society. Socialists must transform the relationship 
between nature and society from a Promethean expansion based on the 
notion of a dilution of infinite resources, to a social form oriented to human 
well-being which is environmentally sustainable. The other crude dichotomy 
between mind and body, or between basic, bodily or physical needs and 
higher, psychological, mental or spiritual needs is objected to because he 
believes the latter needs are not the object of a different or separate set of 
practices, but are intrinsic to the way basic needs are met. So the so-called 
basic need of housing can be met in either an inhuman or a human way. This 
need should be provided for in a human way which could generate respect, 
dignity and allow for self-development - thus unifying in the person bodily 
and spiritual needs.346 The basic elements of Roy Bhaskar’s transcendental 
dialectical critical realism are thus perhaps the best attempt to date to take up
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the inheritance of the dialectical realist tradition from Plato and Aristotle 
through Thomas to Marx.
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